By Lee Byong-chul

North Korea is, without question, a failed state. By ancient Korea's political and social mores, its feckless leaders ― Kim Il-sung who died in 1994 and his son, Kim Jong-il ― should have been killed because of their incompetence to govern the country.

In ancient times, it was a common thing that nature-caused tragedies such as drought demanded the lives of kings and political leaders.

Absurd though it may sound from the scientific perspective of today, it was none other than a strong warning from the people that a leader with absolute power should rule the country with an equal sense of responsibility over that power.

Still, Kim and his troops who have practically led the communist regime to an incomprehensible level of disaster in barely two generations, in economic and political terms, are luckily exempt from such brutality, even though most North Koreans are inexpressibly angered by Kim's bizarre leadership.

How did the Kim family succeed in turning themselves into kings in North Korea? The Kim family's modus operandi can be a good study in dictatorship or tyranny.

First, the Juche (self-reliance) idea still functions as a backbone of spreading the groundless rumor that capitalism is a silly and insulting term from American imperialism and is nothing more than a code for surrendering moral values and firm principles.

In particular, the Kim regime's ideology was certainly sharpened by the collapse of both the Soviet Union and some former communist states in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. It was the Soviet Union that installed Kim Il-sung in power over the northern half of the Korean Peninsula as soon as Japan was defeated in World War II in August 1945.

While these countries were experiencing a taste of capitalism in the wake of reform and openness, North Korea focused on indoctrinating the people into an ideological rearmament based on Juche idea.

Many of the people on the street believe that the ideology is better at solving the problem of poverty than openness through reform because Kim and his clans have tried to change people's hearts.

Second, the military first politics plays an effectively leading role in dwarfing any other element of sustaining the fragile regime. No wonder that Kim is always accompanied by a troupe of military commanders during his on-the-spot ``guidance.'' That said, the military is Kim Jong-il's consigliere.

The influence of the military on Kim seems to have something to do with a state of mind. He always sees the world in militarily confrontational terms, and the military acts like an inexhaustible supply that breeds a tough-minded ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, the very opposite of U.S. President Barack Obama's world without nuclear weapons.

Despite people suffering from poverty and hunger, Kim and his troops firmly believe that nuclear weapons can save the country, instead of transforming it into a trustworthy nation in the international community.

Third, North Korea represents the confluence of the Korean Workers' Party and kleptocracy. Tamed by gun-wielding cowboys, North Korea is thoroughly marinated in the corrupt inner circle culture. Key posts are filled with Kim's hand-picked cronies and relatives.

They are the clubbiest in the communist country, mainly working behind the scenes to conjure up all kinds of state affairs, while singing praises for ``Our style socialism.''

The country's economy and political elite are hopelessly intertwined but form the strongest force to create an unprecedented power succession for Kim Jong-un, the third son of Kim Jong-il's.

Kim Jong-il would likely put on a debutant ball for his son in 2012, the designated year for achieving a ``strong and prosperous state.'' In North Korea, the communist party and the military exist in a mutually beneficial symbiosis. They are far keener on the permanent existence of the regime rather than nuclear weapons.

It is thus no wonder that the North desires to deal with the U.S. directly to secure its political and national security affairs, while limiting the role of South Korea to mere economic assistance.

In truth, however, the conservative President Lee Myung-bak and his aides clearly oppose feeding the poverty-stricken North Korea, unless Pyongyang abandons its nuclear weapons. Seoul also resents being the fall guy, sacrificing itself in return for the North's nuclear weapons.

North Korea needs to know the fact that Lee is the first president with experience as a CEO ― from Hyundai. He has a gut belief in business. For him, the inter-Korean relationship should be developed on a give-and-take basis rather than the one-way mode in the past.

Pandering to China is hardly new in North Korea, but anyone who is familiar with the Lee government's North Korea policy knows how much concerned Seoul is about the growing influence of the Chinese businessmen into the North.

In fact, South Korea and the U.S. initially misdiagnosed the fate of the Kim regime as an extremely imminent reality that could not be remedied with short-term, stop-gap measures. Yet, their wishful thinking-based predictions made light of China's role in the North.

While wielding significant influence in North Korea, China no longer hides the secret agreement with North Korea regarding the lease of a port on its northeastern coast for at least 10 years.

Beijing is likely to have its best chance of becoming a huge winner in the course of resolving Korean affairs, such as the denuclearization of North Korea and the establishment of a peaceful regime on the peninsula.

There's no way of knowing what will happen in North Korea after its leader Kim dies. Inclusion of the regime change scenario in the classified North Korea contingency plan is, though, sure to rankle cronies on the flank of Kim's political and military base, let alone the ill-faced Kim himself.

Assuming their aim is not to create a North(ern) dependency, Seoul and Washington need to find a balanced solution of engagement based on a diplomacy-is-better-than-sanctions strategy to enable Pyongyang to recognize the nuclear myth. North Korea is not a candidate for regime change.

Lee Byong-chul is senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Cooperation, a non-partisan policy body in Seoul. He can be reached at bcleebc@gmail.com. The views expressed in the above article are the author's own and do not reflect the editorial policy of The Korea Times.