By Kim Yun-sik

In Washington, D.C., Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were appalled by General Douglas MacArthur's actions when they learned of his order to bomb the Yalu bridges to prevent Chinese troops from cross the border into North Korea.

Three hours prior to the scheduled departure of the bombers, the JCS cabled MacArthur with orders postponing all bombing of targets within five miles of the Manchurian border.

The JCS cable stressed that MacArthur's order to bomb the Yalu bridges was a clear violation of Washington's directive and also jeopardized the process of a major political maneuver within the U.N.

The cancellation of the air strike against the bridges at that period of the conflict signified Washington would assume a more direct role in controlling operations. This was the first time in U.S. military history a field commander was denied the use of organic military power to safeguard the lives of soldiers.

Later, during the beginning of a new phase of tactical operations, President Harry Truman permitted MacArthur to bomb the Yalu bridges. The difference this time was Washington drafted the policy in response to the rapidly changing situation in Korea instead of a field commander making the decision.

The public anxiety over the Korean War intensified when, during a press conference, President Truman stated the possibility of using nuclear weapons to end the war since ``we will take whatever steps necessary to meet military situation just as we always have.''

In response, then-British Prime Minister Clement Atlee immediately paid a visit to Washington, D.C. During their talks on Dec. 8, 1950, Atlee dissuaded Truman from using atomic bombs in Korea without first obtaining a formal U.S.-U.K. agreement.

President Truman agreed, and promised the U.S. would not take any measures or actions to expand the war beyond Korea. But, he also stressed the U.S. would not accept the U.N. granting Beijing a seat, or the withdrawal of the U.S. from Formosa or Indochina.

As a result of the Truman-Atlee talks, Gen. MacArthur boasted he would receive reinforcements and be permitted to bomb and blockade Communist China if the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) attack below the 38th Parallel; since, this would allow the U.N. to hold both a strong position on the Korean Peninsula and allow the Chinese Nationalist Forces of Chiang Kai-shek to head a second-front against the CCF from southern China.

During the war, most South Korean soldiers, including me, believed Gen. MacArthur might use the crisis to advance his cause for expanding the war with Communist China.

Washington considered, with few objections, the possibility of authorizing MacArthur to bomb CCF airfields in Manchuria to prevent the use of Soviet-supplied aircraft by China in the conflict. But approval of the plan would have violated the pledge Washington had made to London not to take any action toward China without prior consultations.

In early December, the CCF intensified the offensive by introducing additional forces into North Korea. It was clear to MacArthur that the X Corps and 8th Army would be unable to hold a defensive position across the Korean Peninsula (the Munsan-Hwacheon-Yangyang line).

On Dec. 9, under instruction from the JCS, Gen. MacArthur officially ordered the X Corps to rapidly withdraw to Hamhung; and the 8th Army, once unable to hold Pyongyang, to withdraw to the Seoul area. Officials in Washington had full comprehension of the situational change and realized the nature of the conflict was about to completely change.

In early 1951, the feud between President Truman and Gen. MacArthur reached boiling point as MacArthur publically attacked Truman's policy toward Korea, criticized the U.S. for losing China, and called for the use of Chang Kai-shek's troops in Korea.

Truman viewed MacArthur's statement as a direct and public challenge to his presidential authority. In March, a U.N. counter-offensive began. Seoul was recaptured and the battle line returned to the 38th Parallel.

On April 11, 1951 Truman relieved General Macarthur of command, and Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgeway was appointed commander of the Far East Command. At this point, Truman abandoned all hopes of unifying Korea by force.

In June 1951, the Soviet representative to the U.N. proposed ceasefire talks on the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese and North Koreans agreed to the proposed plan. On July 10, the U.S. entered into ceasefire negotiations with China and North Korea at Kaesong.

In early June 1953, an armistice agreement was almost reached, but was stopped by South Korean President Syngman Rhee who was determined to sabotage the negotiations and stated, ``South Korea must be permitted to fight alone.''

South Korea proclaimed a state of emergency and President Rhee ordered the return of all South Korean officers attending training in the U.S. On June 18, Rhee ordered South Korean guards to permit the mass escape of approximately 27,000 anti-communist prisoners from a POW camp.

President Dwight Eisenhower, shocked by the news, sent his personal representative, Walter Robertson, to Seoul. President Eisenhower and his advisors continued attempts to finalize an armistice agreement by every means conceivable.

The U.S., as a means to gain President Rhee's support for an armistice agreement, promised and delivered a mutual defense treaty, $1 billion in economic aid over three years, and equipment to support an army consisting of 20 divisions.

The Armistice Agreement was finally signed on July 27, 1953, at 10 p.m. Each of us came out of our trenches; verified the battlefield had fallen silent in the valley of central Korea, took off our helmets, and proceeded homeward. A terrible long war was finally over.

The writer is a professor at the Asian Division, the University of Maryland, Yongsan, Seoul. He can be reached at rokmankim@hotmail.com.