Capture of Taliban Leaders Sign of Progress

By Arthur I. Cyr

Scripps Howard News Service

News of arrests of the Taliban's Afghanistan provincial leaders Mullah Abdul Salam of Kunduz and Mullah Mir Mohammed of Baghlan, along with the capture of top Taliban military commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, are dramatic successes. All three men were taken in Pakistan, an especially important but vexing partner for Washington.

These events indicate very extensive Taliban dependence on sanctuaries in Pakistan, despite the upsurge in the guerrilla activity in Afghanistan. The arrests also argue strongly that there has been an about-face within the Pakistan government regarding working to destroy the Taliban. Implicitly, this good news is also powerful evidence for much closer, more positive cooperation between Pakistan and United States intelligence and military services.

Pakistan has been a problem for Washington policymakers since the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Very deeply rooted traditional corruption has plagued the nation's political system, including the intelligence profession. There have been reports of some government people, including members of ISI ― the Inter-Services Intelligence agency ― supporting Islamic radicalism.

Washington has been blunt in sustained criticism of past Pakistani denial of a Taliban threat. Current developments, however, provide persuasive evidence of realism and effectiveness in recognizing and combating this very serious challenge.

The wider context involving U.S. policies and leadership has also become more promising. Last month, NATO Afghanistan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal endorsed a power-sharing arrangement between the Taliban and the national government of Pres. Hamid Karzai, directly echoing similar statements by Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

Earlier, while President Obama was engaged in his lengthy review of Afghanistan policy, McChrystal appeared to upstage his commander-in-chief by giving a detailed public speech on the subject at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Clear current Gates-McChrystal collaboration should put such understandable worries to rest.

Defense Secretary Gates and Gen. McChrystal both bring considerable strengths to the modern special operations arena. The former spent his entire career in the CIA, and was in fact the first such professional to emerge at the top of the agency. He achieved and occupied high office under Republicans, including notably his mentor George H.W. Bush, thus providing some implicit bipartisanship in fiercely divided Washington.

The latter has spent his Army career in special operations, a distinctive branch that until recent years was not a road to senior command, but the reverse. Unconventional warriors were generally viewed as too independent and unpredictable by ``straight leg" generals, with justification.

Special Forces doctrine traditionally emphasizes combating insurgents in part by winning over the wider population. This was a conscious response to Mao Zedong's famous dictum that Communist revolutionaries were fish swimming in a sea of civilians. In short, McChrystal's background and expertise may suit him ideally to a comprehensive political settlement in Afghanistan, designed to recognize but absorb the Taliban, which remains extremely unpopular.

Pakistan historically has been a solid U.S. ally. The British-trained military is very capable. During the Cold War, Pakistan was a conservative counter-weight to neutralist India and Communist China.

In the 1950s, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles ensured that this important ally joined both the Central and Southeast Asia Treaty Organizations. Both of these regional alliances are long dead, but the strategic importance of Pakistan continues.

If Pakistan is indeed now committed firmly to the Allied effort in Afghanistan, that would be very congruent with practices and outlooks predating the current struggle with the Taliban.

Arthur I. Cyr is Clausen Distinguished Professor at Carthage College and author of ``After the Cold War" (NYU Press and Macmillan/Palgrave). E-mail him at acyr@carthage.edu.