By Tong Kim
Despite positive official characterizations of U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth's talks with the North Koreans on December 8 to 10 ― as ``a candid and business like" exchange of views that was ``very useful" (Bosworth), ``quite positive" for a preliminary meting (Secretary Clinton), ``a serious and frank discussion" (the DPRK's foreign ministry spokesman) and ``a good start" (the Chosun Shinbo) ― there is no assurance and it is rather unlikely that they will return to the six-party talks, as Bosworth hopes, just based on what they heard on their exploratory talks.
``Candid" or ``frank" usually means disagreement in diplomatic language. Bosworth admitted in Seoul that the North did not commit to ``when and how the DPRK will return to the six-party talks." The Chosun Shinbo, Pyongyang's mouthpiece in Tokyo, made it clear on Dec. 11 that the DPRK would not participate in any multilateral talks, ``without confidence that the hostile relations between the United States and North Korea would be transformed into peaceful relations."
On a positive note, both Bosworth and the DPRK spokesman issued similarly forward-looking statements that Washington and Pyongyang ``identified some common understandings and the need for" the six-party talks (Bosworth), and the talks ``deepened mutual understandings, narrowing the differences and finding common grounds, recognizing the need for the resumption of the six-party talks" (Pyongyang's foreign ministry). The North also said that both sides ``agreed to continue to cooperate to narrow the remaining differences."
The differences between the two protagonists are tactical in the sense that both accept the need for denuclearization. The key element of the U.S.'s position is to resume the six-party process, within which it insists that the DPRK's wish list ― including a peace treaty, normalization and economic aid ― would be addressed in compliance with the 2005 six-party joint statement, by which Pyongyang committed to denuclearization. Bosworth said his discussions in Pyongyang were held ``within the framework of the six-party talks" and were focused on denuclearization and ``implementation of other elements" of the joint statement.
``Other elements" of course include preconditions that the North hopes to pull off from bilateral negotiations with Washington before returning to the Beijing talks. The DPRK has not accepted that the Pyongyang talks were held within the context of the six-party talks, which it abandoned last April and to which it has yet to find a political justification to return. Pyongyang's priority is placed on bilateral talks to deal with the ``other elements." The North lists the issues for negotiation in the order of a peace treaty and removal of other obstacles before returning to the multilateral talks. As a minimum, Pyongyang requires a comfort level of trust and confidence in the promise of the Obama administration for the security and survival of its regime in return for giving up nuclear weapons.
An emerging consensus among analysts holds that it would probably take one or two more bilateral meetings ― not just to explore each other's views but to actually negotiate a way to meet Pyongyang's minimum condition ― a guarantee of undertaking and concluding the discussion of a peace agreement and normalization of relations as a political symbol of terminating ``U.S. hostility" toward North Korea.
The next step is not when the North will return to the multilateral talks but when and how it will propose an additional bilateral discussion. This could happen as early as next January, if Pyongyang were to seek urgent economic aid from the international community to alleviate the political and social difficulties from its economic troubles, which are getting more complicated following recent currency reform.
The result of the first U.S.-DPRK bilateral meeting may be accepted as a win-win situation for both sides. Washington has made a strong case to Pyongyang for an early resumption of the multilateral denuclearization talks, after it had successfully mustered support from other participants in the denuclearization process behind its calculated approach to Pyongyang. This had helped silence criticisms against the bilateral talks. Perhaps, Washington's biggest gain is having temporarily put to sleep the most serious concerns that North Korea's nuclear weapons or fissile materials might fall into the hands of terrorists.
The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has successfully bought time to further contemplate on his next move, weighing advantages and disadvantages in the nuclear game. He has succeeded in directly conveying to Washington his intent to resolve the nuclear issues through dialogue, without making any sort of commitment. By holding the bilateral talks in Pyongyang, he has boosted his political prestige at home. He has saved face, an important requirement for returning to the multilateral talks.
In view of Pyongyang's consistent objective of engaging the United States bilaterally ― especially since Bill Clinton's August visit to the North, which obviously was a turning point in mutual perceptions, North Korea will insist on the importance of direct negotiations with the United States, even after the resumption of the six-party process. It is true that little progress was ever made without U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks in the multilateral talks, and Pyongyang points out no progress was made towards a peace treaty or normalization through the multilateral process.
In this context, Washington's challenge would be to convince the North that the original spirit of the six-party talks' joint statement would be restored to move toward a negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue, while addressing Pyongyang's security concerns and respecting the DPRK's sovereign rights in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
North Korea knows that its wellbeing will not improve without the economic assistance of the international community, which will not be forthcoming without progress in denuclearization. The United States knows that it cannot succeed in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime to pursue the Obama administration's goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, without resolving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Pyongyang must have learned that one year of no dialogue with the international community regarding its nuclear programs, in which it pursued a provocative development of nuclear weapons and missiles, did not help improve its security or its economy. Pyongyang is getting increasingly concerned about the growing power of the South. If convinced that it can trust Washington, Seoul and others in the multilateral talks, it would make sense that it resumes nuclear negotiations.
Two important international nuclear conferences are scheduled to take place in Washington in 2010: a Global Nuclear Security Summit in April and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May. Neither conference will succeed without addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. Washington will have to push the denuclearization effort on North Korea.
Year 2010 seems to bode well for making progress in denuclearizing North Korea, and the six-party process is likely to resume in the early spring of next year. Washington should refrain from gratuitous rhetoric and Pyongyang from renewed provocation to keep the new window of opportunity open in the meantime. What's your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com
![[INTERVIEW] 'Money Heist: Korea' writer feels satisfied to expand series' franchise](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/e264f8d5589442489d72f9494ca3f1c7.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
