By Andy Jackson

Seoul and Washington have often been out of step over the past decade over how to deal with North Korea. Lee Myung-bak's summit meeting with Barack Obama scheduled for Tuesday is an opportunity to get the allies in sync.

Kim Dae-jung's ``Sunshine Policy,'' and its more generous variant under Roh Moo-hyun, often clashed with the more hard-line stance of the Bush administration during the latter's first term.

When Lee took charge last year, there was every reason to believe that Seoul and Washington would better be able to align their policies, especially since he and Bush appeared to share broad policy goals.

However, Seoul zigged toward a harder line just as Washington zagged with conciliatory gestures. Lee demanded reciprocity from Pyongyang in exchange for aid last year while the Bush administration continued its second-term lurch towards bilateral engagement toward Pyongyang, bypassing its allies and the six party talks in the process.

That engagement cumulated in Washington with the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism despite the latter's continued harboring of Japanese Red Army terrorists and holding of Japanese and South Korean abductees.

(Those maneuvers were reminiscent of how the Clinton administration had dealt with Pyongyang in the early 1990s. Then-President Kim Young-sam was surprised to find that Seoul was expected to help pay for concessions to North Korea agreed to in bilateral discussions between Washington and Pyongyang.)

With the election of Barack Obama, it appeared that Korean and American policies would go even further out of sync as Obama had stressed his desire to reach out to American's opponents around the world. Lee's critics said that Seoul would find itself the odd man out as Washington and Pyongyang forged new ties.

Fortunately for Seoul, the reality of Obama has so far proven to be far less conciliatory toward North Korea than his campaign rhetoric had indicated he would be, if for no other reason than the fact that Pyongyang's provocations have left him with little choice but to respond strongly.

In that regard, Pyongyang's actions of late have been the gift that keeps on giving. The missile test, the nuclear test and the shriller than usual pronouncements from state media (who would have thought that possible?) have cast North Korea as a government that cannot and has no desire to be bargained with.

All of that has been capped by Pyongyang's admission of a uranium enrichment program, something it had refused to admit to in the past and the existence of which was a principal cause of the breakdown of the Agreed Framework in 2002. After years of denials and coyness about uranium enrichment, the admission in a government statement was blunt: ``Enough success has been made in developing uranium enrichment technology to provide nuclear fuel to allow the experimental procedure. The process of uranium enrichment will be commenced.''

While the technical achievement of the uranium enrichment may be bluster, the admission of its existence, which began with technology Pyongyang acquired while the Agreed Framework was in effect, undercuts the argument that there was ever a time when North Korea acted in good faith to end its nuclear weapons programs.

America's domestic politics may also push a stronger American stance toward Pyongyang. North Korea is outside the Obama team's main foreign policy focus in the Middle East and South Asia. As such, it allows the administration to cover its political flank against charges of being soft on America's enemies by playing against type in its dealings with Pyongyang.

North Korea's bellicosity also gives President Obama a chance to practice his tough talk. On June 6, he said, ``We are not intending to continue a policy of rewarding provocation.''

There is an emerging consensus in Washington that North Korea is not developing nuclear weapons as a negotiating tactic in its dealings with the United States but because they actually would like to have nuclear weapons.

If that view takes hold in Washington, the Obama administration will see little advantage in continuing to seek nuclear disarmament talks with Pyongyang and will instead concentrate on containing North Korea's ability to expand and export its weapons. That would put the Lee administration in the unexpected position of being more ``pro-engagement'' than Washington, even if only slightly more so.

In any case, Lee has an opportunity to help mold a still largely amorphous Obama policy toward Pyongyang.

If nothing else, what Lee must emphasize is that Washington's policy toward Pyongyang must be conducted in close coordination with Seoul and Tokyo. There should not be a repeat of diplomatic end runs seen during the Clinton and Bush administrations that left Seoul standing on the sideline.

If Lee and Obama can succeed in truly harmonizing their policies toward North Korea, it will decrease the chances of Pyongyang miscalculating the intentions of Seoul and Washington and enhance security on the Korean peninsula.

Andy Jackson has taught courses on American government and has been writing on Korean politics and other issues for four years. He is the chairman of Republicans Abroad-Korea. He can be reached at andyinrok@lycos.com.