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North Korean Colonel Chang Chun-san, left, and U.S. Colonel James Murray, Jr. initial maps showing North and South Korean boundaries zone during the ceasefire talks on Oct. 11, 1951. / Korea Times File |
 By Kim Yun-sik
Toward what would be the end of the Korean War, the U.S. State Department authorized George Kennon, a former member of its policy planning staff, to informally approach Jacob Malik, the deputy foreign minister of the U.S.S.R. about peace talks.
Malik said privately that the Soviet Union wanted peace in Korea and recommended that the United States begin talks with North Korea and China.
On June 30, 1951, U.N. Commanding General Matthew Bunker Ridgeway responded to Malik and formally proposed to the communist side that the armistice talks be held aboard the Jutliandia, a Danish hospital ship, berthed in the North Korean port of Wonsan.
However, both sides agreed to hold the first round of talks at Gaeseong on July 10, 1951. Gaeseong at that time was just north of the frontline above Munsan, northwest of Seoul.
The U.N. team was led by Turner Joy, Rear Admiral Arley Burker, Eighth Army deputy chief of staff Maj. Gen. Hank Hodge, Far East Air Force (FEAF) vice commander Maj. Gen. Laurence Craigie, and ROK 1st Corps commander Maj. Gen. Paik Sun-yup.
The communist team consisted of two Chinese generals ― Hsieh Fong and Teng Hua ― and North Korean army generals Nam Il, Lee Sang-cho and Chang Pyong-sang.
The U.N. members immediately realized it had made a mistake meeting behind enemy lines at Gaeseong, which was teeming with both communist Chinese and North Korean soldiers.
The U.N. members, traveling by road through communist lines, had to fly white flags and go through Chinese checkpoints. Those arriving by helicopter were escorted by armed North Korea soldiers.
The Western press was barred from the talk sites in Gaeseong. The communist press had free access and its propaganda was clearly intended to create the impression that the United Nations had come cap-in-hand to surrender or pursue peace.
The U.N. delegation came prepared to discuss three cardinal points: a truce line, the exchange of POWs and to guarantee enforcement of the armistice.
The communists wanted to discuss those three plus one other: the ``withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea.'' Joy vigorously opposed that inclusion, fearing that the withdrawal of U.S. troops would invite new aggression on the South.
The delegation met daily at the Naebongjang mansion in Gaeseong. On July 25, an agreement was finally reached on an agenda. The items to be discussed were the drawing of a military demarcation line and the disposition of prisoners of war.
From Aug. 10 to 22 the issue of the demarcation line remained the primary topic on the table with neither side budging.
Demarcation Line
The communist delegation insisted stubbornly that the line be redrawn at the 38th parallel, whereas the U.N. delegates pushed for the line to be drawn substantially above the 38th parallel. Admiral Joy was adamant that the line reflect the current military situation at the time a ceasefire was to be signed.
He also believed that the U.N. forces had absolute superiority in both the air and sea. The U.N. delegations were most certainly not to agree to return to the 38th parallel because of the military reality of the situation.
The communists reacted to Joy's bland proposal with outrage. There was no progress for several days. On Aug. 23 the communist side charged that U.N. planes had bombed the site of the talks, and then broke off negotiations.
Joy explained and apologized for the planes that had mistakenly strafed the area. The talks resumed in October, and on Oct. 25 both sides agreed to move the location of the talks from Gaeseong to Panmunjeom.
Ridgeway wanted Gaeseong back under the control of U.N. forces, which had previously held it before the negotiations began, but had withdrawn in a gesture of good faith to provide a neutral zone for the talks.
Now he wanted it back due to Gaeseong's strategic importance, as located slightly below the 38th parallel it could serve as an invasion gateway to Seoul, thus the United Nations should control it militarily.
The communists rejected Ridgeway's demands, particularly the yielding of Gaeseong back to U.N. control. In return, they proposed their own truce line.
Their proposal yielded some indefensible terrain under communist control on the Ongjin and Yonan peninsulas, but retained Gaeseong and required the United Nations to give up Heartbreak Ridge, the Punchbowl and the Iron Triangle at Gumhwa and Cheorwon.
Hodge rejected the communist proposal. From then on, the communists made no further mention of the 38th parallel. However, holding Gaeseong had become the crux of their position.
The United Nations had a basic principle that the demarcation line should be generally along the battle line, a principle that the communists finally came to accept. Then and there, they accepted the line of battle at the time when the armistice was signed.
However, the United Nations regarded Gaeseong as North Korean territory under such circumstances. By May 1952, after five months of quarreling over the agenda and violations of neutrality, a disagreement over the location of the armistice line persisted.
Most of the issues were settled, including troop replacement and membership of the International Supervision Commission. The final issue that remained was the prisoners of war, but talks were frozen over it.
The writer is a professor in the Asian division of the University of Maryland in Yongsan, Seoul. He can be reached at rokmankim@hotmail.com.
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