Future of Japan-US Alliance (1)

The headlines associated with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates' recent visit to Japan notwithstanding, relations between Washington and Tokyo are not as strained as they may appear … at least not yet.

By Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman

The headlines associated with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates' recent visit to Japan notwithstanding, relations between Washington and Tokyo are not as strained as they may appear … at least not yet.

But there is no question that improper handling of a number of sensitive issues before, or worse yet during President Barack Obama's scheduled visit to Tokyo thist week could help weaken an alliance that the two sides have spent almost 50 years building.

The Okinawa base issue has grabbed the lion's share of the headlines over what has been portrayed as an ``ultimatum" from Gates that ``it is time to move on," combined with his warning that pulling apart the current (previously agreed upon) plan would be ``immensely complicated and counterproductive."

But Gates also pointed out that ``we are very sympathetic to the desire of the new government in Japan to review the realignment roadmap," further noting that ``we have not talked in terms of a time limit, but rather the need to progress as quickly as possible."

He further noted that ``modest change" on the Futenma Airbase relocation issue was a matter between Tokyo and the Okinawan government and people (who have thrice signaled acceptance of the plan).

Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama clearly does not want to be rushed on this issue; efforts to publicly push him are likely to be counterproductive. But he has also pledged to take local opinions into account and to make a final decision once his administration's review process is over.

In discussing the issue, the prime minister also noted that ``there are still numerous causes for concern in the Asia-Pacific region. The deterrence capability of U.S. forces in Okinawa is also necessary for the security of our country."

With a bit of patience, there could yet be a happy ending. The key for both sides is not to make this an issue of contention during President Obama's visit.
This bit of cautious optimism aside, there are a number of other sensitive issues that could just as easily put new strains on the alliance if not properly handled.

One centers around Prime Minister Hatoyama's apparent determination to unveil details of an alleged ``secret pact" between Japan and the United States ― one that is said to allow U.S. vessels and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons to stop in Japan.

This investigation threatens a collision between Tokyo's three non-nuclear principles and the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship that serves as the cornerstone of the U.S. commitment to Japan's defense.

While we applaud transparency, the government of the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) needs to be fully aware of the potential consequences of this investigation if followed through to its logical conclusion.

In December 1967, then Prime Minister Sato Eisaku introduced the ``three non-nuclear principles," which pledged that Japan would not possess, manufacture, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

That policy ― it was passed as a parliamentary resolution in 1971 and is not a law ― reflected Japan's deep-rooted aversion to nuclear weapons and helped Sato win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974.

It has been a pillar of Japanese diplomacy and foreign policy ever since ― Hatoyama renewed Japan's ``firm commitment" to these principles in a speech to the United Nations Security Council just last month.

That pledge notwithstanding, for decades there have been rumors of a secret ``don't ask, don't tell" arrangement between Japan and the U.S. that allowed the U.S. to keep nuclear weapons on ships and aircraft that stopped in Japan or transited its waters.

Previous Japanese governments denied this deal existed, and it became moot in 1991 when then-President George H.W. Bush ordered the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from deployed U.S. ships and aircraft.

Nonetheless ― and here's the rub ― the U.S. still follows a strict ``neither confirm nor deny" policy in discussing the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons anywhere to avoid precedents that could limit its flexibility or threaten operational security during periods of crisis or conflict or compromise nuclear storage facilities on U.S. territory.

As part of its ``transparent government campaign," the DPJ pledged that it would uncover the truth behind the allegations if it won the August parliamentary elections.

After taking office, Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya said his office would launch an inquiry and ``We will reveal everything we find." Fine; then what? Let's say that the Hatoyama government comes up with ``proof" that such a deal existed. What happens next?

Is the Hatoyama government then prepared to announce ``case closed" and move on or will it feel compelled to take measures to ensure that this could never happen again ― a move that would force Washington to choose between maintaining its ``neither confirm nor deny" policy or maintaining the alliance?

That might seem like a simple choice to the Japanese but it is not so easy for Washington, which has to always keep one eye on precedents and how this would affect operations and alliances elsewhere.

Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS (pacforum@hawaii.rr.com), a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Brad Glosserman is executive director of the forum.