Time to Discern Merits and Faults of Ex-President

Few Korean leaders have received more contrasting evaluations than former President Park Chung-hee, who died 30 years ago Monday.

With the passage of a generation since his grim end, the time has long past for Korean society to put Park's 18-year-long rule in order by carefully dividing what he did well from what he did wrong, rather than making a simple, dichotomous categorization of successful industrialization and failed democratization.

Opinions are still divided over the justification of the military coup d'etat led by Park in 1961 and the subsequent state-led economic development, or ``developmental dictatorship,'' as his critics put it.

Park's admirers say that free democracy was premature due to Korea's political immaturity at the time, citing the loose, disorderly social atmosphere and incompetent government. His opponents counter that this is simply an excuse for the takeover by politicized military officers.

Likewise, the former group argue that unlike some European countries, economic growth and democratic development couldn't go together in Korea, which had little foundation and experience with capitalism. The latter group contends the ``Miracle of the Han River'' might have been possible under the civilian government, as the Third Republic's five-year development plans were actually exact copies of those of the ousted Democratic Party government.

Needless to say, history does not allow allegations in a subjunctive mood. Few can deny that Korea is one of the most successful cases of capitalistic conversion among peripheral economies, thanks in part to Park's strenuous push to make a ``rich and strong country,'' which exquisitely combined with the Korean people's eagerness to get out of centuries-old poverty, both as individuals and as a nation.

But that's a growth strategy of a generation ago, which has long outlived its efficacy; North Korea's slogan is still a ``strong and great country.'' As long as Korea remains nostalgic about the Park-era development pattern, it cannot meet the new challenges calling for new paradigms, such as more equitable prosperity for various groups of people ― men and women, rich and poor, racial majority and minority ― as well as a more harmonious growth between humans and the surrounding environment.

The experiment of the past decade by relatively liberal parties, however, ended in half-success ― or half-failure at best ― in part because they had to start with the unprecedented financial meltdown, which itself was the result of the accumulated problems during the state-led development, including the chaebol-oriented industrial structure. And the liberal governments' consequent limitation in resorting to neo-liberalistic policies to get out the currency crisis, certainly didn't help, either.

In a nutshell, Korean politics has turned into an arena between the two groups: The governing conservative camp which still believes the old method of state-led development and the neo-conservative market force will solve everything, and the opposition liberal parties which know the past strategy does not work but have yet to present a new one appealing enough to voters.

Park Chung-hee's tragic death has mythicized his controversial but somehow effective reign, making more than a few Koreans miss the ``dark but growing era'' whenever the economy heads south, and extending its long shadow even to his daughter, an influential politician who has been regarded as the most likely candidate for the presidency in most surveys for years.

Nothing is more dangerous than the memory of past success. And this is why the nation has to get over the legacy of Park by finding his correct place in history as soon as possible. The best place to start is to launch an objective study of his tenure in a joint effort by his supporters and opponents.