By Arthur I. Cyr
Scripps Howard News Service

October is the scary month, and not just because of Halloween. During this month in 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis crowded out most other news as Washington and Moscow sparred on the very edge of nuclear war.

Despite the passage of time, this particularly terrifying crisis contains extremely important lessons for current foreign policy. They include the exceptional difficulty of securing accurate intelligence, the uncertainty of events in a crisis, and the vital importance of prudence at the top.

Intense debate over wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, plus the struggle against al-Qaida, makes these insights urgent as well as important.

After U.S. reconnaissance photos revealed the Soviet Union was placing offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, despite contrary assurances, President John F. Kennedy and his advisers spent a week debating options, which included an immediate military attack to destroy the missiles.

On Oct. 22, 1962, Kennedy addressed the nation, and in effect the world as well, declaring unequivocally that the United States would not permit such missiles in Cuba. Until Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev acceded to this demand on Oct. 28, nuclear Armageddon was only a misstep away.

Kennedy administration officials, with the exception of Republican CIA director John McCone, had assumed Moscow would never put long-range missiles into Cuba. They erroneously thought Khrushchev and associates agreed the move would be just too risky.

Earlier, reconnaissance flights over Cuba had been severely curtailed to avoid antagonizing Moscow, and were resumed out only because McCone aggressively, adamantly pressed the matter.

This was very fortunate; hard photographic evidence of the Soviet deception was received just before the missiles were to be activated.

However, there was already substantial circumstantial evidence, including reports from reliable agents in Cuba, that something of this nature was underway. As with the Bush White House regarding Iraq, senior decision-makers chose the evidence they preferred to believe.

In recent years, meetings between surviving officials from both sides in the crisis confirmed Soviet generals in Cuba in 1962 possessed fully operational short-range nuclear weapons, and at least for a time had independent authority from Moscow to use them if faced with an American invasion.

At the start of the crisis, there was strong sentiment among Kennedy advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for military destruction of the strategic missiles and launchers.

Evidence is now persuasive that such a move would have quickly escalated to nuclear war. Very fortunately, JFK decided instead on a naval blockade as the U.S. first step in response to the Soviet move.

Even short of the ultimate horror of nuclear war, the actual crisis involved reckless efforts by U.S. Navy vessels to harass as well as track Soviet submarines, including trying to force them to surface.

Some Soviet submarines were armed with nuclear torpedoes. These actions took place beyond White House efforts to manage as well as monitor developments on the naval blockade line. After the crisis, a misleading image was promoted of effective control from the top.

Throughout the crisis, the president demonstrated impressive open-mindedness. He immediately assembled an ad hoc group, dubbed the Executive Committee, or ExComm, which freely debate a wide range of options. In this atmosphere, the initial strong support for a military strike faded.

The previous year, a very inexperienced JFK had too casually signed off on a Cuba invasion plan strongly endorsed by the CIA and military ― the experts. The result was disaster at the Bay of Pigs.

Arthur I. Cyr is Clausen distinguished professor at Carthage College in Kenosha, Wis. He can be reached at acyr(at)carthage.edu.