By Tong Kim

While North Korea continues its ``charm offensive," Washington has repeated for a month now that it is ready to talk directly to Pyongyang. The direct talks are likely to be preceded by an announcement only a day or week before they commence.

Through direct talks, Washington hopes to bring the North Koreans back to the six-party talks. A bigger question that is haunting policy makers in Washington and Seoul is: Will North Korea really eliminate its nuclear weapons at the end of negotiations?

It is clear by now that North Korea has shifted its security policy to reliance on nuclear weapons from security assurances through improved relations with the United States. Is there still a chance to reverse Pyongyang's path to a better future?

The North has been using the tactic of obscuring its true intentions. On several occasions, Pyongyang has reaffirmed its pledge for denuclearization, but on other occasions, it has conveyed its defiant determination to keep its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang has been sending conflicting messages of denuclearization and nuclear armament.

Most recently on Oct. 5, Chairman Kim Jong-il repeated his father's ``behest" for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula to Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, adding that Pyongyang's ``efforts to attain the goal of denuclearization remain unchanged."

On the other hand, Pyongyang's dependence on its ``nuclear deterrent" has been emphasized in the strongest terms especially since January 2009, when it started demanding U.S. acceptance of a nuclear North Korea. On Oct. 14, Pyongyang's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) claimed that denuclearization would require ``a comprehensive and total elimination of all the nuclear weapons on earth, to say nothing of those in and around South Korea."

The North Koreans have all along applied a dual approach to the United States, insisting that it is ``ready for dialogue" and at the same time ``it is ready for confrontation," whichever the United States chooses.

The bottom line is that the North Koreans are ready to continue living in isolation and economic hardship in order to protect their system. In the absence of confidence in the pronounced U.S. intent, survival by means of nuclear weapons is more reliable than waiting for security assurance and economic benefits that may be obtained through improved relations with the United States.

Bilateral negotiation is essential to any progress in denuclearization as part of a multilateral process, and there are bilateral issues to address independent of or in conjunction with multilateral talks. The Obama administration is prudently sticking to the six-party process with the support of the four other parities ― China, South Korea, Japan and Russia.

There is a consensus in the international community that the six-party forum is still the best venue to seek a resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue. Kim Jong-il also told Wen Jiabao that the North would ``return to multilateral talks, including the six-party talks, depending upon the outcome of U.S.-DPRK talks."

Pyongyang maintains its nuclear program is a byproduct of ``U.S. hostile policy" and the nuclear threat of the United States. While the alleged ground for Pyongyang's accusation of Washington's hostile policy is broad and ambiguous, the U.N. sanctions currently in place are a ready source of Pyongyang's complaints.

North Korea says the withdrawal of ``U.S. hostile policy" is the prime condition for North Korea's denuclearization. In theory, this is a more fundamental condition than other incentives ― including normalization of relations, a peace treaty and an economic aid package.

The past efforts of Washington to persuade the North Koreans that it harbors no hostile intent or policies toward Pyongyang did not succeed. The U.S.-DPRK joint communiqu? of September 2000, followed by Albright's visit to Pyongyang, was a good starting point but its positive impact was too short-lived to erase the history of long hostile relations between the two countries.

Several calculated U.S. measures ― including the negative security assurance in the September 19 Joint Statement, stipulating that the United States has ``no intention to attack or invade the DPRK;" and the U.S. delisting of the DPRK as a terrorism sponsor state in 2008 ― did not end Pyongyang's accusation of Washington's hostile policy.

In a way, what is or what is not hostile is in the eye of the beholder. It is a matter of North Korean perception of U.S. policy, which can only improve as their trust builds in the United States. The North Korean leader was quoted this week as saying, ``The hostile relations between the DPRK and the United States should be converted into peaceful ties through the bilateral talks" (KCNA Oct. 5). Bilateral talks are important to building confidence.

Many specialists have voiced the view that the United States should negotiate with Kim while he is in control of Pyongyang's decision making. Former President Bill Clinton's report on the North Korean leader's health must have had a big impact on Washington's outlook of the North Korean situation and its consequent approach to denuclearization.

Obviously, there now appears to be no succession crisis in Pyongyang. Pyongyang is not on the verge of collapse. On the contrary, Chinese Premier Wen's promise of political and economic support for Pyongyang creates concerns that Kim Jong-il might be less interested in denuclearization, convinced he can survive U.N. sanctions.

In bilateral talks, it will be important to ask Pyongyang what exactly would serve as a proof of non-hostile policy. One would think the prior six-party agreements, if reinstated, should be sufficient to meet the needs of all parties, including Pyongyang, although many of the agreements are yet to be implemented.

We should explore what other actions or requirements would put the North Koreans back on track toward the completion of denuclearization. An exchange of the laundry lists of complaints and demands from both sides ― North Korea and the United States backed by its allies and partners ― would help identify the differences to address in order to move forward toward denuclearization.

For the multilateral talks, a starting point will be requiring Pyongyang to file a new, updated declaration of its nuclear programs to reflect all the changes, including a uranium enrichment program that the North has recently acknowledged.

If the North is assured of survival and a better life without nuclear weapons, denuclearization is still possible. Otherwise, there is no need to negotiate with the North.

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.