Multipolarity and Korean Crisis

By Igor Khripunov

The venerable Russian city of Yekaterinburg ― situated on the dividing line between Europe and Asia and the site of the barbarous Bolshevik murder of the Czar Nicholas II and his family ― has made headlines recently.

Russian president Dmitri Medvedev proudly hosted two back-to-back summits in the city in mid-June. One of these was the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.

The SCO is made up of emerging world powers united by their opposition to ``U.S. hegemony" and their desire to promote a ``multipolar" world of roughly equal great powers. The body's membership includes Russia, China and six Central Asian states. India, Iran, Pakistan and a few others took part in the proceedings as observers.

The SCO members issued a summit declaration reaffirming their primary goal of nurturing multipolarity and preserving stability across Eurasia.

Published on June 16, the Yekaterinburg Declaration emphasized such vital elements of the SCO mission as improving joint research into effective solutions to global and regional problems, drawing on the organization's growing potential and international prestige.

The current flare-up of tensions following North Korea's second nuclear test on May 25 was among the top agenda items debated by the participants, some of whom recommended the resumption of the six-party talks.

The problem is that Pyongyang's bellicose rhetoric and finger-pointing have been so extreme this time as to rule out an early resumption of negotiations under the six-party format.

In the meantime, a new forum must be found to constructively engage North Korea and lay the groundwork for the six-party talks to resume in a less volatile atmosphere.

Why not the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? Russia and China are the major drivers of this organization and are the closest to Pyongyang, not only geographically but also ideologically, economically and spiritually.

They both grasp the new, serious risks to themselves posed by the geopolitical realignment brought on by the North's recent nuclear and missile tests.

Japan continues to build up its military power, including a state-of-the-art ballistic-missile defense system, South Korea is rapidly modernizing and expanding its own armed forces, and the United States is reinforcing its military presence in the region and having second thoughts about cutbacks to its own missile defenses.

To restore some balance, Russia and China must approach the crisis on the Korean Peninsula with new urgency, innovative diplomacy and persistence. If they take a wait-and-and-see attitude, they will soon face radically different, stark realities likely to work against their vital geopolitical interests.

For example, the economic implications are critical. Russia is opening up its energy resources to the East, China is asserting itself as the dominant power in the region and both Moscow and Beijing are struggling with the fallout from the global financial and economic crisis.

For Russia, in particular, persistent instability on the peninsula has kept wary countries from joining Far Eastern regional infrastructure projects championed by Moscow. The Medvedev administration has a real and growing stake in settling matters.

It is difficult to foresee what form the mechanism for such engagement would take, or the likely outcome of an SCO-North Korean parley. But as the current SCO chair, Russia can put the SCO option to the test.

For a young organization, the SCO has compiled an impressive record of orchestrating large-scale programs to combat terrorism and drug trafficking.

Its agenda has far-reaching educational, cultural and other dimensions. Possible advantages from new multilateral diplomacy would include more transparency and predictability, greater participation in joint regional projects, and dialogue among new partners.

Originally established to pursue multipolarity, the SCO must now fulfill its great and as-yet untapped potential. The time has come for bold action rather than walking the thin line between coercion and inducements to get North Korea involved in negotiations.

The vicious circle, in which tough punitive measures only prod the embattled communist regime into further escalation, can be broken. By spearheading such an initiative, the SCO can show that broad-based cooperation, mutual accommodation and commitment to nonproliferation works where antiquated zero-sum games and rivalries failed.

The forthcoming U.S.-Russia summit in July is an appropriate forum for President Medvedev to start discussing this option with President Obama, thus opening up a new page in the arduous search for solutions to the Korean crisis.

Dr. Igor Khripunov is associate director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia and adjunct professor of the School of Public and International Affairs at the same university. He can be reached at i.khripunov@cits.uga.edu.