Cycle of North Korean Crisis

By Tong Kim

In this column, I have been writing for three and a half years mostly about the security issues involving North Korea's nuclear weapons programs ― with disappointment at times and optimism at others.

Before I started writing here, I had eyewitnessed what was transpiring at almost all bilateral and multilateral meetings to which the United States and North Korea were parties. In the past 15 years since 1994, there has been a vicious cycle of confrontation and negotiation between the two protagonists of the nuclear game.

Inasmuch as the fundamental nature of the game remains unchanged with no fixed rules in place, it is hard to avoid repeating myself when writing about the subject. I always wanted to make sure where we were at the time of writing, struggling to suggest some positive way forward. I will do it again this week ― in view of the strongest condemnation and the toughest sanctions the U.N. Security Council has just imposed on the North and the hardened stance the United States, South Korea and Japan have forged against the defiant leadership of North Korea.

There should be no surprise if the North would defy the new UNSC resolution 1874 and strike back with a third nuclear test and more missile firings, as it said it would. The North is reportedly preparing for the launch of an ICBM and a third nuclear test. Although it would be unlikely that the North would provoke a suicidal all-out war at this point, it may be tempted to launch limited skirmishes either on the West Sea or along the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula. Recognized or not, North Korea is already a nuclear weapons state. The North said it would use its nuclear weapons in defense. There is no assurance against its possible transfer of nuclear weapons or fissile material to a third party.

The updated position of the Obama administration ― as articulated by U.S. special representative for North Korea Stephen Bosworth at the Senate hearing on June 11 ― is to apply a strategy of coercion through regional cooperation and U.N. and U.S. sanctions, strengthening deterrence, and ``diplomatic engagement, if North Korea shows serious willingness." And the policy goal remains the same: The United States will not accept a nuclear North Korea and it prefers diplomacy to remove threats from North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. The United States does not ``threaten to change the North Korean regime through force," and it has ``no hostile intent toward the people of North Korea" as differentiated from the regime.

The administration's new strategy contains elements of pressure and engagement, but it understandably seems now to be tilted toward pressure with sanctions and deterrence. Administration officials reiterate that the United States would be ready to engage the North Koreans in dialogue if, and only if, they show an interest in carrying out their commitment to denuclearization. Presumably, this strategy is anchored in the belief or the hope that sanctions and increased international pressure, coupled with reinforced defensive measures, will eventually force North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs.

What lacks in the mixed strategy is a confidence that the policy goal will be achieved. The strategy seems to reflect a reactive measure that may help slow down the further development of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles. The strategy does not set forth a road map toward the final resolution of the problem. If North Korea does not change its path, and if pressure does not work ― and it is likely that the North won't change its path and that pressure won't work ― the U.S. strategy does not have a fall back position other than further isolating the North and containing deadly North Korean weapons from further proliferation by way of stiffer measures, including a complete blockade.

History has proven that U.N. sanctions were not effective on North Korea without an active participation by China, an ally and the largest trading partner of North Korea. China wants neither a nuclear North Korea nor the collapse of the North. China's investment and trade with the North have sharply increased in recent years. Even if the North is completely cut off from arms trade and denied access to the international financial system, it will be left with enough revenue to sustain itself.

If we believe, as many skeptics do, that North Korea would never give up its nuclear weapons, there would be no reason to engage the North in dialogue. Despite all its threatening rhetoric, North Korea's true intent is still unknowable until probed by serious engagement. The North Koreans seemed to have been vacillating between abandoning and keeping their nuclear programs. Now the question is how we are going to bring the North Koreans back to the table.

The new sanctions can make it more difficult for them to sell arms and to continue to develop nuclear and missile programs. But the sanctions alone would not end such programs or bring the North to dialogue. If the United States and its allies still want to peacefully achieve denuclearization, they must take the initiative to revive the denuclearization talks and to find a way to deal with missile threats, probably as a separate issue.

Some conservatives favor a policy of stronger coercion to punish the North's bad behavior and to stifle the North Korean regime that Americans disapprove. Some are urging the administration to re-list North Korea as a sponsor of terrorism, to take additional U.S. sanction measures similar to those imposed on the BDA, and even to start leaflet operations into the North to undermine the stability of Kim Jong-il's regime. The theory of an imminent collapse of North Korea still remains as a theory.

Many North Korea watchers attempted to explain the recent provocations in the context of Pyongyang's domestic politics ― involving Kim Jong-il's health and a succession process. Trying to understand the North Korean mind is like a blind man touching an elephant. But if we think of our actions and inactions on North Korea, and if we carefully read their statements and actions, it is not impossible to figure out why they have been behaving the way they have. They have been reacting to our actions as we have been to theirs.

One senior administration official said North Korea would return to talks after the succession issue is put under control. The administration seems to believe that North Korea will come forward to negotiations because it will have no other choice. I doubt but hope this would be the case. What's your take?

Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.