|
In this file photo taken March 9, South Korean protesters with portraits of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, right, and his alleged third son Kim Jong-un, shout a slogan during a rally in Seoul against the North’s recent military policy. North Korea told its diplomatic missions that Kim Jong-il’s youngest son ― who reportedly enjoys skiing and studied English, German and French at a Swiss school ― will be the nation’s next leader, media reports said Tuesday. / AP-Yonhap |
By Bennett Ramberg
``North Korea has nuclear weapons, which is a matter of fact. I don't like to accept any country as a nuclear weapons state … We have to face reality," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Mohamed ElBaradei said in a statement during a nuclear energy conference in Beijing, April 20.
North Korea's nuclear test marks yet another demonstration of Washington's failed policy to prevent Kim Jong-il from keeping and modernizing his nuclear arsenal.
It came at a time when Washington and its allies were already on edge due to Pyongyang's earlier long-range ballistic missile test, the expulsion of IAEA monitors from its nuclear facility, the resumption of nuclear reprocessing coupled with plans to resume reactor operations, and its boycott of six-party talks.
Given the isolation of the Stalinist state, all this may matter little but for two concerns: Pyongyang could export nuclear weapons or material as it exported nuclear technology, or, in a act of paranoia, failure of command and control or intelligence, it could launch the arsenal.
Unfortunately, efforts to stem the North's nuclear ambitions have reached a dead end. Consider the positive measures the international community attempted: It coaxed Pyongyang into the nonproliferation treaty.
The IAEA applied safeguards to prevent cheating. South Korea pursued a political and economic Sunshine Policy. The Clinton administration promoted diplomatic engagement, which President Bush returned to in the six-party talks and bilateral meetings, while taking the North off the state sponsor of terrorism list.
Washington and others provided food assistance and heavy oil for the North's power plants. Sticks then followed after the North's repeated nonproliferation backsliding: security Council economic and military trade sanctions, freezing Pyongyang's international bank accounts, diplomatic and economic isolation and threats of military force.
Ultimately, neither sticks nor carrots worked. Today, North Korea is a nuclear-armed state.
In April, ElBaradei reluctantly acknowledged the ``reality" but failed to provide a new course of action to deal with it and neither has President Obama.
Rather, Washington and its allies remain wedded to failed sanctions and the hollow hope that resumption of nonproliferation diplomacy can bring Pyongyang to heel.
The time has come for a new course, based on the recognition that nuclear nonproliferation is not an end in itself. Rather, it is only one means to prevent the use of the bomb, the ultimate objective.
Since we cannot disarm the North, we must seek other methods to assure that Pyongyang never launches or sells the arsenal. A refocus on an old tact ― applying confidence-building measures to reduce fear, tension and hostility on the Korean Peninsula ― provides a practical option.
To have even a hope of success, confidence building must have a new footing. Washington's unconditional recognition of the Stalinist regime provides the answer. Long sought by Pyongyang, the U.S. de-linking of recognition from nuclear disarmament provides an untried foundation to reduce nuclear risks.
Past confidence building provides a prologue. For years, Washington and Seoul regularly pre-announced military maneuvers away from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and in an east-west direction to reassure Pyongyang.
North-South military negotiations established a communication link, including common radio frequencies, to prevent naval clashes in the West Sea. The six-party talks marked a confidence building effort.
At times these and other measures contributed to the relaxation of tensions. But durability did not survive the intractable nuclear issue. Accepting the new ``reality," diplomatic and nuclear recognition remain a strategy that could provide Pyongyang with dual security blankets upon which confidence building can advance.
The new agenda could include a variety of approaches: implementation of a long-sought crisis hotline between Pyongyang and Seoul also linking Washington; limits on armament and armed forces near the North-South border; reciprocal visits to monitor military exercises; geographic confinement of exercises.
Bringing Pyongyang out of the dark about the threat environment would help. Open skies ― North and South Korean aircraft fitted with a suite of intelligence sensors flying over the borderlands ― offers one option.
On the aid and trade front, South Korea and others could renew economic engagement to expose North Korea's population to the possibilities of prosperity and lay the foundation for eventual economic and political reform. In the near term, greater prosperity would reduce the regime's incentive to sell nuclear contraband.
Given Pyongyang's erratic behavior and penchant to remain a hermit state, the proposed path offers a new direction but not one that assures relaxed tensions. No doubt Kim will resist too much cooperation with the U.S. and others, fearing that it will undermine the regime.
However, by allowing the North to keep its nuclear security blanket and legitimating the regime through the exchange of ambassadors, the proposal allows the international community the path to address stark facts: North Korea is just beginning its learning curve as a nuclear armed state.
Confidence building provides the means to insure that Pyongyang's insecurities do not become our problem.
Certainly the alternative is far less attractive: a Stalinist regime further isolated, increasingly paranoid, with poor intelligence, placing its nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert, while attempting to generate hard currency by selling nuclear weapons to terrorists. This is a path we cannot permit.
Bennett Ramberg served in the bureau of politico-military affairs in the Department of State in the George H.W. Bush administration. The author of three books and editor of three others on international politics, he is best known for his classic treatment of the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to military attacks. His books include ``Nuclear Power Plans as Weapons for the Enemy" (University of California Press). He obtained a Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins University. He can be contacted at bennettramberg@aol.com
|
