By Tong Kim
North Korea is often blamed for bluffing, blackmailing, or brinkmanship. But last week the DPRK followed through with the earlier warning of a foreign ministry spokesman (March 24) that it would boycott the six-party talks. Will the North also follow through on its threats of restarting nuclear weapons production?
The U.N. Security Council adopted a statement on April 13 condemning North Korea's April 5 rocket launch and urging it to return to the six-party talks. In an angry reaction, the DPRK declared, ``The need for the six- party talks has come to an end," and ``we will never again attend the talks that have turned into a platform for infringing upon our sovereignty and aiming at our disarmament and the subversion of our system. Nor will we be bound by any agreement of the six-party talks."
This new threat was made in the DPRK's foreign ministry statement (April 14) ― which is a higher level of official statement than a ministry spokesman's and therefore carries more weight. The statement also said it will restore the disabled nuclear facilities for normal operation to reprocess the spent fuel rods unloaded before last year's disablement.
The Security Council's statement ― which basically reaffirmed its 2006 resolution 1718 instead of adding new sanctions ― did not call Pyongyang's launch a missile launch. It simply condemned ``the April 5 2009 launch" to be in ``contravention" of the old resolution that had not been fully enforced. Now it calls for stricter enforcement of the sanctions already built in item 8 of resolution 1718.
The DPRK has a mixed record of living up to its pledges. However, it normally finds a rationale or pretext for not keeping its commitment or walking away from them. And to be fair to the North Koreans, sometimes they make good arguments to justify their controversial decisions. In their view, the international system is largely led by the United States and other powerful nations, which Pyongyang views to be ``hostile" to it.
In compliance with international practices and unlike in 1998, the DPRK did notify the international organizations of its impending test-launch of a ``communications satellite," branded as a missile test by the United States and its allies, because (1) a rocket launch could be either for a missile or a satellite, and (2) North Korea has a history of exporting missiles and missile technology and it therefore is a prime suspect of future sales. .
Pyongyang complained it's not what is launched but who launches it that matters to the big powers. The North argued it was singled out for condemnation because it does not support U.S. policy. The real problem is that the DPRK has a notorious record of proliferating dangerous missiles in a volatile region of the world. In this context, it's true that who launches a rocket matters. South Korea is expected to launch a satellite in July and nobody's raising issue with it.
There is one missing piece in the analysis of Pyongyang's multiple purpose of the rocket test ― beyond the elements of domestic consumption for solidarity and stability, grabbing Washington's attention, inducing the United States to bilateral negotiation, enhancing negotiating leverage or increasing missile marketability. It's North Korea's security interest in developing a nuclear delivery system as part of the ultimate shield for survival.
The DPRK, as it has recently reiterated (Jan 17), may not have developed nuclear weapons for the purpose of normalizing relations with the United States or securing economic aid from the international community. Instead, to prepare for the worse case scenario, it may indeed have developed weapons as a deterrent to perceived threats from the United States.
The DPRK keeps saying that it abides by its principle of ``good for good" and ``evil for evil"; ``dialogue for dialogue" and ``pressure for pressure." If diplomacy fails, the DPRK may take its intractable path of independence and isolation. Pyongyang has said, ``Leave us alone. We have lived without normalized relations with the U.S. for decades."
There is no guarantee that a tougher enforcement of U.N. sanctions against an expanded list of DPRK entities suspected or proven to be involved in nuclear weapons or missile-related activities would stop the further development of the North's nuclear weapons program and its delivery system.
Even before the international community reacted to the rocket launch, Pyongyang had noticed a number of red flags against an early move toward engaging the Obama administration. Other than a shift in process from primary reliance on the six party talks to a parallel practice of direct diplomacy, Pyongyang had yet to see significant change in substance from the Bush administration. Washington's rhetoric seemed to be more measured but no fundamental change was detected in logic and language. Pyongyang was waiting to see how different the new administration was really going to be.
While President Obama showed personal interest in easing up relations with Iran and Cuba, North Korea did not get comparable presidential attention. Instead, the North got Obama's stern warning against the rocket launch.
Revived emphasis on trilateral coordination among Washington, Tokyo and Seoul was unwelcome news to Pyongyang, whose relations with the two American allies are at their lowest point. It reminded Pyongyang of Bush's approach of one voice among the five participants against the North in the six party talks, another form of pressure that did not work.
I argue against the conventional wisdom for the imperative of trilateral cooperation when it comes to the process of denuclearization. The United States should of course cooperate with both of its allies. But it can do so bilaterally instead of trilaterally.
The trilateral approach in the six-party talks tended to create a divide along the lines of the Cold War era ― China, Russia and North Korea on the one side and U.S., South Korea and Japan on the other. Moreover, the North is adamantly opposing the continued participation of Japan, which has refused to share the cost of compensation from a multilateral agreement, pending the resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees in the North.
Open discussions of a sudden change and a succession crisis in the North, as well as Seoul's decision to fully participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), yet to be institutionalized, are more red flags for Pyongyang. The DPRK wants to ascertain the real intent of the United States and its allies. Washington is still in the process of formulating its North Korea policy and Pyongyang is still waiting for the outcome of it.
Despite its announcement to quit the six-party talks, Pyongyang keeps a window of dialogue open to Washington. It did not say it would not talk to Washington. Interestingly enough, when the North Korean People's Army (KPA) warned that it would ``deal deadly blows at the Japanese intercepting means and other major targets" if Japan would intercept the DPRK rocket, it urged the United States to stay out of the area to avoid ``hurt" from a KPA strike.
Incidentally, Seoul's decision to participate in the PSI came at a bad time in terms of inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang has always believed that the real target of the Bush initiated PSI is North Korea. PSI's objective regarding the DPRK could be accomplished through the enforcement of U.N. resolution 1718 and other relevant laws and agreements already on hand. Pyongyang has warned Seoul's full participation would be regarded as ``a declaration of war against the North to which we would immediately apply resolute counter measures."
It's time that all the parties calm down to search the best way forward to resolve the North Korean issue. It will take a cooling-off period before we see the next move. For the lack of a better option, negotiation is still the best hope. We'll see. What's your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.