By Joseph Hong
A recent consensus has formed around the collapse of the latest round of denuclearization talks for North Korea: that the U.S. State Department's North Korea policy, formulated by Christopher R. Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, had a disturbing lack of concern for human rights and had been largely ineffective in obtaining any substantial security concessions from the North Korean regime.
The Kim Jong-il-run enclave saw right through the past months of talks as a final push by the George W. Bush administration to enhance its foreign policy legacy. In fact, policy in the past few years has been marked by a lack of understanding of the nature of the totalitarian regime.
Human rights advocates have recognized that discussion on North Korea's human rights abuses probably did not belong within the framework of the six-party talks, or at least not until the process of normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations was under way.
However, as President-elect Barack Obama prepares to take office, a special consideration for future North Korea policy must be made: the 200,000 concentration camp prisoners cannot wait for the normalization of relations.
One way the Obama administration can do this is to consider a Helsinki Final Act-type disarmament deal for North Korea to include human rights in the dialogue. Helsinki has taught the West that there can be progress on both security and human rights concerns, when the two are linked.
While it is uncertain whether an application of Helsinki is entirely appropriate for North Korea (the implication of Helsinki for communist regimes is regime collapse and any sort of disarmament deal seemingly implies collapse in the North Korean regime's perspective) ― with strong assurances that the regime would remain intact ― incorporating elements may be worth a try.
Obama and Secretary of State-designate Hilary Rodham Clinton can also reverse an underlying problem that is endemic in the State Department ― the gross abuse and neglect of the institutionalization of human rights.
The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 has never been fully implemented. Rhetoric and assurances veiled a lack of political will to protect refugees, particularly the thousands of female refugees forced into the Chinese sex trade. The creation of a Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea in 2004 only allowed Assistant Secretary of State Hill to sideline human rights concerns, because the position was so easy to marginalize.
And though the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008 made the Special Envoy on North Korean human rights issues (renamed) an ambassadorial position, there was no language specifying that the position could not be double-capped by a person holding office in the executive branch.
In other words, an Assistant Secretary of State can also be the new Special Envoy (if and when the appointment is ever filled).
Lastly, the Obama administration can empower a generation of dissidents through information dissemination in North Korea, a country that consistently ranks at the bottom of the Reporters Without Borders annual press freedom index.
Defectors, Russians and North Koreans, have stated that radio broadcasts enabled them to dream of better lives. While the Broadcasting Board of Governors has done a stellar job and has received a substantial increase in funding, a vast information vacuum still exists.
Escapees of this brutally efficient regime should not be alone in launching balloons carrying leaflets, especially with balloons that are only capable of reaching regions along the border between the two Koreas.
Imagine millions of leaflets covering the country, bringing hope and new ideas to North Koreans, from political penal labor camp prisoners to top military brass. In the coming months, nine million North Koreans will be at risk of malnutrition.
No one has to tell them about the illegitimacy of a regime that does not ensure the food security of its own people.
But this project should not be misinterpreted as some ideological ploy. The world should welcome and encourage the possibility of a new generation of the elite that will actually start to respect and protect the rights of its citizens.
However dismal the prospect of a dissident movement may be, it is still worth a try. We owe North Koreans that much. Of course, all this depends on how much substantive priority Obama will place on human rights in North Korea.
One can only hope for a policy that will be effective on both security and human rights concerns. One can only hope for a strong and independent Special Envoy. Maybe then, one can begin to have hope for North Korea.
Joseph Hong is the research and policy officer of Liberty in North Korea (LiNK), an international NGO devoted to human rights in North Korea, and the protection of North Korean refugees worldwide. He can be reached at joseph@linkglobal.org