By Elijah N. Munyi
The months of March and April mark painful spots in the historical timelines of South Korean-Vietnamese relations. In March 1966 the Korean and U.S governments signed the ``Brown Memorandum" that ushered the combative entry of South Korean troops to fight alongside the United States in Vietnam.
Nine years later, on April 29, 1975, Saigon (South Vietnam's capital) fell to the communist Northern Army and the war was lost. April 1975 marked the beginning of a long remorseful period for Korea. Memories of the Vietnam War still prick South Korea.
Yet in revisiting South Korean-Vietnamese relations, it's not my intention to evoke these sour memories.
My intention is to reflect on the significance of the triangular bilateral relations (U.S.-Korea) and (Korea-Vietnam) at that time and how they have evolved beyond Cold War rivalries. What lessons in economic history can development cooperation today draw from these relations and their evolvement?
First and foremost, Korean diplomacy with Vietnam is a lesson in pragmatism. The crafty charm of Korea's diplomacy is laudable and so is Vietnamese pragmatism in moving beyond history.
Korean diplomacy has framed relations with Vietnam in a manner that has been constructive economically, and redemptive politically. As with the 1965 normalization of relations with Japan, the Korean government has pursued policy that pacifies historical conflicts while advancing economic ties.
In dealing with Vietnam, Korea oozes humility and likes to evoke Vietnamese pride in their triumph over the United States and its allies even though Korea was one of those allies.
The 1965 normalization of relations with Japan brought into Korea a whooping $500 million in loans and grants. The fray into Vietnam added in another $150 million from the U.S. government.
This development financing, representing a sizeable 12 percent of all official development assistance (ODA) into Korea between 1961 and 1975, went into constructing the foundation of Korea's magnificent transport infrastructure.
In addition, Vietnam provided a much-sought opportunity for labor exports in the 1960s. More than 10,000 Koreans worked in Vietnam during the war thus providing a massive boost to Korea's foreign exchange with their remittances.
Consequent to the ``Brown memorandum," remittances as a percentage of external trade revenues rose sharply from 23 percent to 36 percent in 1967.
Korea's participation in Vietnam also had the effect of exposing Koreans to foreign markets and triggering an entrepreneurial spirit in overseas business activities which was to come in handy during the 1970s oil boom in the Middle East.
Looking at the complex evolvement of Korea-U.S. and Korea-Vietnam diplomacy, some two significant lessons for development cooperation, today emerge.
One, ODA should enhance state capacities in implementing tough, unpopular economic policies rather than undermining government strength.
By being avidly supportive of then-President Park Chung-hee, the United States enabled him to push through legislation, which may have been democratically unpopular at the time but was beneficial in the long run.
The operational strategy for this is to fund government programs rather than NGO-led projects. An awareness of this factor is the single most important success of Chinese diplomacy in Africa and Korea may borrow some insights.
Secondly, developing countries need to develop transformative attitudes that embrace utilitarian partnerships rather than lingering in post-colonial grandstanding mentalities and egoism. To this day, European (chiefly British and French) relations with their colonies, particularly in Africa, remain mistrustful.
On the other hand, as is happening in Zimbabwe, African nations often like posturing to Europe of their putative independence from Europe often to their own disadvantage. While Europe needs to learn humility, Africa needs to learn a utilitarian use of diplomacy.
In addition, developing countries as well as developed countries should explore the possibilities of formal, organized manpower exports as well formal methods of channeling remittances as Korea did with labor exports to West Germany and Vietnam in the 1960s.
In an interesting twist to this tapestry of economic diplomacy Vietnam has now become the second overall biggest beneficiary of Korean ODA after Iraq.
Speculations may be tossed around regarding the motivations for Korea's generosity. The bottom line is that Korea-Vietnamese relations provide a pragmatic lesson in transformative attitudes in diplomacy and give testimony to potentials for moving beyond history in economic partnerships. I wish Africa could borrow a page.
Elijah N. Munyi is an associate researcher for African economies at the Korea Institute for Development Strategy. He is a graduate of Yonsei University's Graduate School for International Studies. He can be reached at: munyi@kds.re.kr.