Lee’s North Korea Policy (2)

President Lee Myung-bak's complaints that South Korea-U.S. ties had been neglected for the sake of inter-Korean relations have a certain legitimacy.

By Leonid Petrov

President Lee Myung-bak's complaints that South Korea-U.S. ties had been neglected for the sake of inter-Korean relations have a certain legitimacy.

However, his assumptions that strengthening ties between South Korea and the U.S. would help make South-North relations better and that if ROK-U.S. relations improved then DPRK-U.S. relations would also get better cannot but raise doubts. (The DPRK, North Korea's official name, stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.)

Experts in Korea and overseas see the main weakness of Lee's North Korea policy in that he does not specify South Korea's role in the denuclearization process other than strengthening its cooperation with the United States.

The new South Korean President plans to make human rights a top priority in the government's policy on North Korea. The DPRK is customarily criticized for serious violations of human rights and its refusal to cooperate with the U.N. Human Rights Commissioner or special investigators.

Lee has promised that he would not shy away from telling North Korean leaders the truth about their society's ``shortcomings'' and emphasized that ``constructive criticism, if pointed out with affection, would go a long way toward improving North Korean society.''

Certainly, this decision is morally right and honorable, but its effectiveness is highly dubious given the longstanding record of the DPRK being immune to international criticism.

Based on the above, the revamped Unification Ministry under President Lee is likely to play a new role, at odds with its purpose as formulated by the previous two governments ― ``to promote co-prosperity and peaceful coexistence through the expansion of reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea.''

On the contrary, by pursuing the denuclearization and democratization of North Korea, Seoul will risk further alienating the North and, by so doing, will risk making its economic recovery and political opening even more problematic.

Sadly, in the case of a ``hard landing'' (i.e. North Korea's regime collapse and ensuing domestic conflict and chaos) South Korea will suffer more than any other neighbor.

It is a mistake to believe that the DPRK can be persuaded to denuclearize and disarm by a mere promise of economic assistance afterwards. For North Korea the existing nuclear program is not only the means for military deterrence (the bomb) but also a way of economic survival (cheap energy, smaller army and less conventional weapons).

Also, South Korean ``conditional economic aid'' can be easily replaced by unconditional economic aid from China or Russia with, probably, better chances of face-saving for Pyongyang.

It is pointless to criticize the North for domestic inadequacies and human rights abrogation unless that country is given a proper security assurance by the U.S., its main and long-time adversary.

Until then the DPRK leadership will continue to feel insecure and maintain the wartime-like regime inside the country where popular mobilization against ``state enemies'' is the order of the day.

Any strengthening of the ROK-U.S. security relations (such as the present joint military drill) will be interpreted by Pyongyang as preparations for an invasion.

What the North Korean leadership wants least is foreign intervention into its domestic affairs, specifically in the areas of ideology and human rights. It is equally futile to demand from North Koreans any degree of ``openness'' or to offer them ``full-fledged economic exchanges.''

The DPRK economy is a centrally planned one (not transitional), with only some of its segments being regulated by the market. Quick depressurization of the old-fashioned economic and political system will lead to a terrific shock with consequences catastrophic for the people and the leadership.

Kim Jong-il and his close advisors are well aware of the Russian and Romanian experiences, and abstain from experimentation with reforms.

If something is a valid incentive to North Korea for good behavior that might lead to a solution of the nuclear issue, it is a complete, verifiable and irreversible security assurance given to Pyongyang by the U.S. against any military action.

Broader diplomatic recognition and the rapid removal of the DPRK from the list of terrorism-supporting states are also urgent.

Enhanced cooperation between North Korea and its closest neighbors (South Korea, China and Russia) in the production and distribution of energy, the coordinated development and usage of transport networks, and the joint exploration of natural resources would be desirable too.

Without comprehensive engagement and cooperation, Seoul has little or no leverage on the North. That makes any incentives or penalties meaningless.

Right now, while agonizing over the appointment of a new unification minister, President Lee and his associates should resolutely decide upon what they want to achieve in the future ― short- and long-term.

Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are vitally important for peace and security. Nevertheless, excessive emphasis on denuclearization in the context of inter-Korean dialogue may well lead to disengagement and resumed confrontation.

Working toward a nuclear-free regime on the Korean Peninsula, the new government in Seoul should not discard the decade of engagement efforts.

It is also expected that the ``pragmatism'' of the new administration in Seoul will not be limited to simply copying the well-known neo-conservative model, where the search for weapons of mass destruction routinely prevails over common sense.

Crusades to protect democratic values from the ``dark forces of evil'' often bring about new hostility and an escalation of tension.

During the last decade, the dynamics of inter-Korean cooperation have made unprecedented progress. It would be unforgivable to slow down this process only because someone may find a peaceful compromise excessively expensive.

Let us not forget that this matter is about the future of the Korean people, and attempts to economize on the future of the people sooner or later leads to political bankruptcy.

Leonid Petrov is a research associate at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University in Canberra. He can be reached at leonid.petrov@anu.edu.au.