By Tong Kim With the inauguration of the new government, former President Roh Moo-hyun has returned to a private citizen. It may be premature to assess the legacy of his presidency from a historical perspective. Yet there are some valuable lessons for the incoming administration to learn from the past five years of democratic experiment in Korea. Five years ago the reformist Roh government started with the thematic self-characterization of ``participatory government," in which the people would be encouraged to participate in the decision making process for national affairs. The Roh government began with the support of a 90 percent approval, which quickly came down to 40 percent in six months, then to its lowest of 18 percent ― after North Korea's nuclear test, and it ended with 31 percent at its departure. Throughout the period of his rule, Roh isolated himself from the people by surrounding himself largely with ``code sharers" who held the same views as his, often rejecting to consider challenging views. His government was not a participatory government that it intended to be. It did not try to build a political or public consensus on the key issues of vital interest to the nation ― on the issues that are vital to "national security, economic well-being and domestic tranquility." Instead of focusing on the issue of bread and butter for the people, it used up much of its time and energy debating and passing the four politically-motivated bills by the National Assembly for repeal of the National Security Law, revision of the Private School Law, enactment of a new newspaper law and an inquiry of historical incidents involving collaborators with Japanese colonial rule. Relocating the capital was Roh's campaign pledge that became one of the top priority projects for his government - like the inland cannel project is to the Lee Myung-bak government. But it only stirred up strong resistance from the opposition parties and the mayor of Seoul. Later Roh conceded to a partial relocation of the capital, which was not carried out. Preoccupied with their radical reform agenda President Roh seemed committed to a fair redistribution of wealth and to replacement of the elite system of South Korea that had long been in place. Obviously he was convinced that he was doing the right things for the country. The Roh government pursued a neoliberal economic path that resulted in creating an economic divide with a widening gap between the rich and the poor. It turned the people away from its ``reform" policies that were not helpful to their practical well-being. The issues of North Korea and the U.S.-Korea alliance were also subject to fundamental reevaluation for the Roh government at its beginning. As the birth of the Roh government owed to the voters' anti-American sentiments at the time, and as Roh was perceived as harboring a negative attitude toward the United States, his administration was seen as anti-American and pro-North Korean. (Anti-American sentiments rise and fall in Korea according to the policy of the United States. There is a proclivity for people to disapprove their government relations with the United States for better or worse, as the ideological pendulum swings back and forth over time between the left and the right.) President Roh's foreign policy team was divided, as was the Bush administration, at the outset of its policy formulation over the North Korean issue between the nationalist or independence group and the pro-alliance or the pro-American group. The former group was named ``Talibans at the Blue House" by the alliance group at the foreign ministry. The Taliban group insisted upon seeking a proactive role for South Korea to engage the North toward resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue from an inter-Korean perspective instead of unquestionably supporting U.S. policy that may not best serve South Korea's interest. Roh and his advisers from both groups all shared the serious concerns that the United States might start a war to eliminate North Korea's nuclear programs at the expense of South Korea. Even after President Bush said he would not ``invade" North Korea, President Roh had never got over his concerns of ``military action" by the United States that Bush repeatedly said was included in ``all options on the table." Roh's alliance group argued that South Korea must strengthen the alliance with the United States to influence U.S. policy to peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiation. Absent no viable alternative, the alliance group, many of whose members were U.S. educated, saw this was the only path for their government to pursue. True that Roh made several indiscrete statements that were disturbing to the Americans even while serving as president. Some of his statements may have been intended for his domestic constituents, but they were not helpful to the alliance. At home he became notorious for harming presidential dignity by using frank but inappropriate words. This is something his successor also should watch against. It is an irony that President Roh, initially skeptical of the raison d'etre for the alliance ended his presidency after rendering a great contribution to the strengthening of the alliance. He accommodated difficult demands from the United States _ such as troop reduction, redeployment and the concept of strategic flexibility for U.S. forces in Korea, dispatch of Korean troops to Iraq. He also initiated the arrangement for the transfer of the wartime operational control, a welcome development for the United States. Roh also successfully concluded an FTA pact with the United States despite domestic opposition. It is a dual irony that the leftist president became fully immersed in neo-liberalism and that the prospects of ratification is brighter in Seoul than in Washington. Last week a former White House official hailed President Roh as having contributed more to the alliance than pro-American former president Chun Doo-hwan or Roh Tae-woo. It is also an irony that the Bush administration, so opposed to engaging North Korea for six years, is now so interested in settling the nuclear issue through negotiation during the remainder of its term if possible. What's interesting is whereas most notable neocon hard liners left the government in Washington, most anti-American ``Talibans" in the Roh government cooperated with the Americans on a range of complex issues from alliance to denuclearization. True Washington did not like Roh's approach to the North, but there is no evidence that more progress would have made otherwise. Roh also made conflicting statements on the North, some of which were unpleasant to the North Koreans. Yet at the end, he had a rather successful summit with the North Korean leader, without affecting the election of President Lee contrary to the conventional wisdom. Roh said he is interested in commenting on the subjects of government and politics as a free citizen. I bet his comments will be interesting as he is a logical thinker with a good debater. I once thought he would be more successful as a political talk show host than he was as a president. What's your take? Tong Kim is former senior interpreter at the U.S. State Department and now a research professor with Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University SAIS. He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com