How Long Will US Occupy Iraq?

By Doug Bandow

How long will the American occupation of Iraq last? Friendly nations which expect it to pass with the Bush administration are in for a rude surprise.

Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton figures at least through her first term, if she is elected. President George W. Bush says a decade or more.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates endorsed a ``long and enduring presence,'' pointing to Japan and South Korea, which have hosted U.S. troops for more than 60 years, as models.

Presumptive Republican presidential nominee John McCain says U.S. forces could stay for a century. Indeed, the Bush administration is currently negotiating with Baghdad to maintain American forces in the country.

``The pact will cover the tasks of U.S. troops in Iraq and their mission in the next phase,'' said Hoshiyar Zebari, Iraq's foreign minister. He insisted that a permanent occupation was a ``red line'' that would not be crossed.

Really? The U.S. retains substantial clout in Baghdad, since American rather than Iraqi security forces ensure the Maliki regime's survival. And President Bush evidently initiated the war expecting to establish permanent bases in Iraq.

Sen. McCain clearly desires a perpetual occupation. Sen. Clinton voted to authorize the war and her husband's promised one-year military deployment to Bosnia, begun in 1995, ran nearly a decade.

At least Sen. Obama opposed President Bush's misguided policy from the start, but he would come under enormous pressure to be ``reasonable'' and avoid a ``precipitous'' troop drawdown.

The Bush administration appears to be working to ensure that the U.S. never leaves Iraq. For instance, Washington is constructing a mammoth new embassy, costing almost $600 million. This is not the sort of facility that a retiring power would maintain.

Moreover, the Bush administration is pushing to include in its Iraq agreement the right to undertake combat operations while exempting U.S. personnel, including civilian contractors, from Iraqi law.

But occupation proponents have promised that Iraq will turn into a bucolic land filled with friendly people showering their occupiers with love.

Indeed, those most interested in controlling Iraq from Washington expect to forge an Iraqi role likely to be very unpopular among Iraqis ― and thus enforceable only if the U.S. maintains substantial coercive power, that is, combat troops, in Iraq.

For instance, Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute argues that the negotiations are normalizing ``relations between allies in a common fight against al-Qaida and against Iranian efforts to dominate the Middle East."

At this stage, few Iraqis support al-Qaida ― in Iraq. But even fewer Iraqis, particularly Sunnis, who only recently turned against the Sunni-based terrorist group, would join Washington in a crusade against al-Qaida outside of Iraq.

Equally unlikely is an alliance against Iran. Iraqis aren't likely to threaten Tehran with military action, even (or especially) alongside the U.S. Iraqi government spokesman Ali Dabbagh insisted that ``Iraq will not be used as a passage to attack any of the neighbors."

Casting further suspicion on its behavior is the Bush administration's attempt to cut Congress out of the process. Gen. Lute explained that the discussions were not expected to ``lead to the status of a formal treaty which would then bring us to formal negotiations or formal inputs from the Congress."

The general added that the November U.S.-Iraqi accord does not ``rise to that level of negotiated document,'' for which the Iraqi constitution requires legislative authorization.

Yet the ultimate agreement will have far more than typical diplomatic boilerplate, incorporating the promise of U.S. military aid against internal and external foes. Congressional assent has always been required for such commitments.

Fearing the obvious, last year Congress barred use of funds to construct permanent bases. But the administration then debated using the terms ``continuing'' or ``enduring'' instead of ``permanent'' to circumvent the congressional restriction.

President Bush eventually issued one of his infamous ``signing statements,'' indicating that he would ignore Congress. Although he claims to have no interest in establishing permanent bases, the president asserted the unilateral right to disregard the legislative prohibition.

To avoid an eternal American military presence in Mesopotamia, the American people must vote their opposition to the war in November. Moreover, Congress must fight to carry out its constitutional responsibilities.

If the president, ignores congressional restrictions on war appropriations, then Congress must challenge him in the courts of law and public opinion, as well as retaliate politically, by defunding administration offices and personnel.

Unfortunately, neither event is certain. The decision to invade Iraq was a tragic mistake which cannot be redeemed by a lengthy occupation and permanent bases.

But future American policymakers seem ready to compound the Bush administration's past mistakes. America's friends cannot rest easy until the American debate today turns to how quickly America should withdraw from how long its military forces should remain.

Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of ``Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire" (Xulon).