By Doug Bandow

For years the U.S. has attempted to mold Pakistan. The result is not pretty: an unstable, undemocratic state which possesses nuclear weapons, border provinces which offer safe haven to Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, and a people which loath the American government. The murder of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto is merely the latest blow to Washington's plans.

Pakistan was born in violence as part of Britain's partition of its Indian colony on the way to independence. Since 2001 Pakistan has been a front-line state in allied efforts to eradicate al-Qaida and suppress the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Yet despite receiving more than $10 billion from the U.S. since 9/11, Islamabad has been but an indifferent ally in the war on terror. Even Musharraf's limited cooperation angered the Pakistani people, almost half of whom said in a recent CNN poll that they approved of bin Laden.

Pakistan also embodies the problem of nuclear proliferation, having built an "Islamic bomb" despite Washington's opposition. Even worse, Pakistan sent planeloads of nuclear materials around the world.

Finally, Musharraf, who seized power from an elected government in a coup, paid only the barest pretense to democratic forms. Not that Pakistani democracy, which tended to alternate irregularly with military rule, met America's standards.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Muhammad Nawaz Sharif developed nuclear weapons, allied with the Taliban, supported Middle Eastern militants, and tolerated religious persecution at home. Both were thought to be profoundly corrupt.

For decades the U.S. provided aid, sold weapons, and offered diplomatic support to whatever regime happened to be in power in Islamabad. Yet America had minimal success in promoting domestic reform.

The country remains desperately poor. Moreover, Pakistan lacks the tolerant public ethos and private mediating institutions that are so important in creating stable democratic systems.

Only by threatening to bomb did the Bush administration get Islamabad's attention after September 11. Thus was Pakistan forced to drop Afghanistan's Taliban regime as a client and formally enlist in the coalition against al-Qaida. But Pakistan still resisted full cooperation with the U.S.

Musharraf's growing isolation led the Bush administration to push even harder on the democratic front. Yet, as noted earlier, Bhutto's record didn't inspire confidence.

Moreover, she, no less than Sharif, represented a family and tribal politics common to South Asia. Her party was more a tool of personal ambition than political philosophy or moral principle.

Despite this record, Bhutto had several advantages over Sharif was willing to tell Westerners what they wanted to hear. As a result, she was lavished with encomiums by Washington elites.

Thus, the Bush administration applied strong pressure on Musharraf to allow Bhutto back into the country. Washington sold this as a grand step forward on the return to democracy, but Musharraf saw the political advantages of winning parliamentary legitimacy for his continued rule. Their dealings looked more like two oligarchs dividing the political spoils than opening up the political system.

Then came the assassination. The administration's plan is in ruins.

But the usual suspects still shout advice from the sidelines and concoct grand new initiatives involving Musharraf stepping down, new aid programs, and enhanced military intervention.

Such ideas sound wonderful in theory. But the Pakistanis don't much care what the U.S. wants.

Indeed, there's no reason to believe that any civilianPakistani government would be notably more competent, less corrupt, and more willing to combat Islamic extremism than past civilian regimes, let alone more likely to survive.

Under such circumstances the best strategy for the U.S. government would be to put distance between itself and the authorities in Islamabad. Cooperation would still be necessary to deal with the Taliban and al-Qaida.

A continuing dialogue over the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons would remain worthwhile. And America's bully pulpit should be used to affirm the responsibility of governments everywhere to respect the lives and dignity of their peoples, and to be accountable to them.

But no more attempting to micromanage Pakistani political affairs. No more trying to dictate political actors and outcomes. No more taking sides among contending parties.

Attempting to reorder the globe is a fantasy. Decades of plans and programs designed to remake Pakistan have come to naught.

The failure of Washington's latest strategy, based on the return of Benazir Bhutto, was not surprising, just more disastrous than usual. U.S. policymakers should learn a lesson from their manifold mistakes and say no more.

Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon Press).