By Elijah N. Munyi
Due to election skirmishes in Kenya, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has now classified Kenya as a ``dangerous-to-travel-to-country'' and advised against non-essential travel to Kenya.
It is an unfortunate development. Although the two countries are very different economically, Korea's experience with democratic consolidation is only a few years removed from Kenya's.
Kenya has been a rising African star in its assiduous economic and democratic efforts in the last five years. Its labors are now threatened. In the past few days, questions have been posed to me of what drives the deplorable rampage and carnage that is rocking Kenya?
It is a good question because the underlying political discontentment in Kenya today maybe very similar to South Korea's own challenges only a few years back. These challenges include perceptions of cronyism in government, regionalism and loose political parties, which mill around powerful individuals.
As such Korea's democratic consolidation holds crucial lessons for fledgling democracies such as Kenya's. For Koreans, understanding the portentous nature and cause of Kenya's political upheavals could guide a more informed involvement in African democratic evolvement.
Kenya and Korea share several political parallels, some quite obnoxious. One, in both countries major political parties have a penchant for frequent metamorphosis. These parties are fluid in associations and policy. In Western Europe or the U.S. political parties are principally collective definitive ``standpoints'' on moral and economic issues.
In Korea and more pronouncedly in Kenya, parties tend to be understood principally as vessels to gaining political power. In Korea for instance, the creation of the United New Democratic Party (UNDP) seemed like an expedient metamorphosis by the Uri Party to bolster its presidential bid.
Frequent changes in parties' structures, names and constitutions may signal a lack of commitment to any core principles. This is certainly a problem in Kenyan political parties. Both parties on which the current president and the opposition leader run in the just concluded Kenyan election were less than a year old ― convenient contraptions designed purely for the electoral process.
Secondly, just as in Korea a few years ago, Kenyans suffer from irrational regional devotion to certain political leaders based on homogenous kinships rather than policy preferences. In Korea, the Grand National Party (GNP) has had popularity in the Gyeongsang provinces while Uri and the UNDP have had greater popularity in the Jeolla provinces.
Such regional strongholds correspond to the place of origin of the parties' leaders or contenders. Support for a certain presidential candidate in Africa is often based on nothing else but a shared sense of kinship. Such expedient kinship cronyism and passionate loyalty to certain political figures is the fuel of the violence rocking Kenya now.
The real reason for violence in Kenya is not a disputed presidential vote. The disputed poll only offered an excuse for the brazen venting of ethnic tension caused by fledgling national identities. Nascent African democracies face the challenge of incomplete identity transformations in the form of ethnocentricism.
Just as nationalism maybe an impediment to international agreements, so too is any sense of ethnic superiority in nation building. The civil reconciliation of national and ethnic sentiments within individuals has not occurred fully in African countries. It's a process that requires time, exposure and economic advancement.
In Korea, less than a decade ago, accusations of negative discrimination were leveled against then president Kim Dae-jung for having a disproportionate number of senior government officials from his Jeolla provinces in his administration. Similar accusations of cronyism continue to dog many African governments such as Kenya's.
The Kenyan government has suffered credibility gaps domestically due to suspicions that people belonging to the president's ethnic group had been given most of the top jobs in governments.
This is something that African legislators may have to deal with by formalizing and incorporating ethnic considerations in the civil service employment. Regional hubris should be countered by institutionalizing a system of ethnic balance in government employment.
Korea has largely overcome its disposition to cronyism and regionalism. It is now Africa's onus to observe how this has been achieved. The most important lesson from Korea for African political development today, I think, is the focus on economic policy and development as the centerpiece of political activity ― be it by political parties or individuals.
While Kenya is still in the grip of political tensions, it is interesting to note that unlike Western nations, none of the Asian giants (Japan, China, India or Korea) has issued any statement regarding the credibility of the presidential elections nor any overt suggestion of meddling in the ongoing political negotiations for a settlement. This is typical Asian nonchalant diplomacy at play.
Elijah N. Munyi is a research associate at the Korea Institute for Development Strategy. He is a Kenyan citizen and a graduate of Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies. He can be reached at munyi@kds.re.kr.