 Volunteers join in the cleanup of Mallipo Beach in Taean, South Chungcheong Province, Dec. 12, five days after the country’s worst oil spill occurred. / Korea Times |
By Ben HancockOn March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez supertanker struck a reef in Alaska's Prince William Sound, gashing its hull and sending more than 41,000 kiloliters of oil rushing into the ocean.
At its peak, the slick spread almost 5,000 square kilometers and cast a black, oily pall over vast stretches of once-pristine coastline. It was an environmental disaster of monumental proportions.
In the following months, the United States scrambled to clean up the Alaskan coast while penning a comprehensive policy that would address oil spill prevention and proper procedure in future catastrophes.
The result was the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The OPA not only expanded the federal government's ability to provide necessary resources and funding to deal with spills ― up to one billion dollars per incident ― it also established the owner of the vessel from which the oil is discharged as the responsible party.
Now, as Korea attempts to clean up the shores of Taean after the worst oil spill in its history, its citizens are asking: What will the central government do to prevent this from happening again? Who will be held accountable for the hundreds, if not thousands, of people who face a loss of their livelihood?
Following the 1995 Sea Prince spill off the country's southwestern coast, the Korean government faced the same questions ― it has had ample time to prepare its answers, to draft its own version of the OPA. The response to the current disaster has revealed a serious lack of initiative.
Though there was much talk in the government about the need to clamp down on single-hulled vessels after 1995, action was sluggish, and no legislation materialized (the use of single-hulled tankers will be banned worldwide after 2010, under an international maritime treaty).
Despite spending nearly 20 billion won on four large oil spill cleanup vessels several years ago, other essential aspects of cleanup ― such as the purchase and supply of proper equipment for people dealing with toxic substances ― appear to have gone overlooked.
Allocation of funding has also been slipshod; several days after the Taean spill, area fishermen boycotted the cleanup effort because they weren't receiving compensation for fuel.
While the administration's declaration of the affected region as a ``special disaster area'' gave the local government the ability to pay for cleanup costs, medical aid and tax cuts for impacted citizens, it is doubtful that these measures will provide adequate relief.
Last Monday, The Korea Times reported that nearly 450 oyster and abalone farms had been contaminated, ruining their stock. The cleanup effort alone will take months, but even afterward the effects of contamination will linger; the market price of non-contaminated seafood from the region has already plummeted.
Though it is tempting to hold the Hebei Ocean Shipping Company responsible for this disaster (the company operates at least six single-hulled very large crude carriers similar to the Hebei Spirit, according to a recent Bloomberg article), the accountability in this scenario rests squarely upon the central government for failing year after year to develop a policy that would bar such vessels from Korean waters.
Instead of scuffling in the National Assembly, Korea's legislators should be addressing how they intend to help the people of Taean recoup their losses.
Perhaps most importantly, Korea must walk away from this incident prepared for the event of a similar spill. The administration should take a page from the OPA by developing a national contingency plan that establishes a chain of command in the event of a spill and also requires separate, area-specific contingency plans.
A national trust fund should be developed to provide monetary resources for cleanup and relief efforts.
The unfortunate truth is that as long as the global economy runs on oil, nations around the world will continue to incur tragedies of this sort.
No matter how many hulls oil tankers are equipped with, there is no failsafe; but what can be controlled is the response. If Korea is interested in preserving its scenic coasts and the livelihoods of its people, then it must act quickly, and not wait another 12 years for a catastrophic reminder.
Ben Hancock recently graduated from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and is currently working as a freelance journalist. He lived in Seoul during 2004-2005, and has studied Korean language and culture for more than five years. He can be reached at bghancock@gmail.com.
