By Oh Young-jin
If exaggeration and wishful thinking are broadly categorized as lies, then South Korea is telling three lies regarding North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship.
The three are: 1) arming itself with nuclear capabilities 2) having the United States reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons 3) preparing a preemptive strike.
All three remain on the margins of public opinion.
Still, some influential politicians are pushing for them and it can be seen that, depending on how the situation is with the North, they can gain more traction. The North is seen as getting closer to making deliverable nuclear weapons after five underground tests and numerous ballistic missile launches.
Despite this growing threat from the Kim Jong-un regime, however, there is little chance of any of the three becoming a reality.
The effort to go nuclear is pushed by a group of ruling Saenuri Party lawmakers, together with Chung Mong-joon, a billionaire and former lawmaker. They argue that the South needs nuclear weapons to defend itself against the North's asymmetric threat.
Few dispute that it will mean Seoul terminating its alliance with the United States and getting isolated from the world system as we know it.
The U.S. has two pillars in its foreign policy ― nonproliferation and human rights.
If Seoul chooses an independent nuclear path, the U.S. would treat it as if it were another North Korea. As an open society integrated into the global system, the South wouldn't have either the will or capability to withstand the sanctions that have been imposed on the North, a hermit kingdom that only needs China to sustain its existence.
How seriously the U.S. guards its proliferation policy over its ally, South Korea, is well captured by two cases.
Korea successfully developed its own ballistic missile with a range of 180km on the basis of U.S Nike-Hercules ground to air missile in 1979. Then, the U.S. forced Korea to sign a promise not to develop missiles of ranges over 180km. It took 22 years for the U.S. to allow Korea to join the Missile Technology Control Regime and raise the range up to 300km.
Only in 2012, did the U.S. grant Seoul the right to develop missiles with ranges over the previous limit of 300km. The new upper limit is set at 800km, covering most of North Korea.
In 2004, Korea was also almost taken to the U.N. Security Council for experimenting with a small amount of nuclear material. John Burton, U.S. President George W. Bush's U.N. ambassador, pushed for sanctions on Seoul. For the U.S., the alliance is conditioned on the other's compliance with nonproliferation.
The reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons onto the peninsula is being pushed as an alternative to independent development.
The U.S. deployed tactical nuclear weapons here in the 1950s after the end of the Korean War.
That was aimed at countering the Soviet Union, the patron of the North, as its military expansion was cresting toward the peak of Cold War rivalry. But they were withdrawn as part of the U.S. strategic restructuring through the 1980s. Still, the U.S. used the policy of "neither confirming nor denying" the existence of a nuclear arsenal in the South or the possession of it onboard warships involved in port calls or in joint drills.
Now, Sung Kim, a Korean-born U.S. ambassador-designate for the Philippines, recently put his foot down in the capacity of North Korea policy coordinator, telling his Korean counterpart in public that Seoul doesn't need any such weapons.
Obviously, the U.S. thinks that it is not necessary and whatever needs it has can be met through its bases in Japan and Guam or other strategic assets such as nuclear submarines or trans-continental bombers.
The Clinton administration considered a preemptive strike against the North before it clinched the 1994 Agreed Framework in which the allies agreed to provide the North with light-water reactors in return for the freezing of its nuclear activities. That plan was killed because it was concluded that any such attempt would trigger an all-out war that would entail casualties to the tune of millions. Now, a war against the nuclear-armed North could entail a World War III Armageddon.
What really makes these scenarios impossible is public opinion. For the deployment of the U.S. missile interceptor, terminal high-altitude area defense (THAAD), residents of the site originally designated as the host, resisted it so vehemently that it was bounced to another site, where residents are also up in arms. It's not hard to imagine how much stronger public opposition would be against tactical nukes, for instance. There would be no place to deploy them, for sure.
Then, why are these "fanciful" ideas capturing part of the public narrative?
It's about pride. When the South was about to get rid of the constant bogyman ― the North, the impoverished nation has come up with a nuclear ticket. The South now is in a state of denial and takes a liking to these ideas as a psychological buffer. Just think how Koreans can remain sane after decades of living next door to the madcap nation whose main purpose of existence is to invade and conquer the South.
Of course, there is more to it than that ― strategic considerations that were not necessarily started as such. It's about applying pressure on the U.S. to prove and renew its commitment to defend Seoul. The South is having more doubts about its ally as the North's nuclear brinkmanship is turning their existing security equation upside down.
The U.S. has long promised a nuclear umbrella for the South but it is fast becoming "theoretically" obsolete as its main target ― the Soviet Union ― no longer exists and China is short of becoming its replacement as a military threat.
The North is too small to become the Soviets or the Chinese.
The South's reasoning goes: Would the U.S. be willing to use nuclear weapons against the North, if it uses one against the South without killing U.S. soldiers stationed here or hurling one against its mainland? Adding to the mix is the U.S. adoption of "extended deterrence" in lieu of the nuclear umbrella, the concept that is still nebulous at best.
All told, the South has a strong extenuating case for telling these lies.
Oh Young-jin is The Korea Times' chief editorial writer. Contact him at foolsdie5@ktimes.com foolsdie@gmail.com.
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The three are: 1) arming itself with nuclear capabilities 2) having the United States reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons 3) preparing a preemptive strike.
All three remain on the margins of public opinion.
Still, some influential politicians are pushing for them and it can be seen that, depending on how the situation is with the North, they can gain more traction. The North is seen as getting closer to making deliverable nuclear weapons after five underground tests and numerous ballistic missile launches.
Despite this growing threat from the Kim Jong-un regime, however, there is little chance of any of the three becoming a reality.
The effort to go nuclear is pushed by a group of ruling Saenuri Party lawmakers, together with Chung Mong-joon, a billionaire and former lawmaker. They argue that the South needs nuclear weapons to defend itself against the North's asymmetric threat.
Few dispute that it will mean Seoul terminating its alliance with the United States and getting isolated from the world system as we know it.
The U.S. has two pillars in its foreign policy ― nonproliferation and human rights.
If Seoul chooses an independent nuclear path, the U.S. would treat it as if it were another North Korea. As an open society integrated into the global system, the South wouldn't have either the will or capability to withstand the sanctions that have been imposed on the North, a hermit kingdom that only needs China to sustain its existence.
How seriously the U.S. guards its proliferation policy over its ally, South Korea, is well captured by two cases.
Korea successfully developed its own ballistic missile with a range of 180km on the basis of U.S Nike-Hercules ground to air missile in 1979. Then, the U.S. forced Korea to sign a promise not to develop missiles of ranges over 180km. It took 22 years for the U.S. to allow Korea to join the Missile Technology Control Regime and raise the range up to 300km.
Only in 2012, did the U.S. grant Seoul the right to develop missiles with ranges over the previous limit of 300km. The new upper limit is set at 800km, covering most of North Korea.
In 2004, Korea was also almost taken to the U.N. Security Council for experimenting with a small amount of nuclear material. John Burton, U.S. President George W. Bush's U.N. ambassador, pushed for sanctions on Seoul. For the U.S., the alliance is conditioned on the other's compliance with nonproliferation.
The reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons onto the peninsula is being pushed as an alternative to independent development.
The U.S. deployed tactical nuclear weapons here in the 1950s after the end of the Korean War.
That was aimed at countering the Soviet Union, the patron of the North, as its military expansion was cresting toward the peak of Cold War rivalry. But they were withdrawn as part of the U.S. strategic restructuring through the 1980s. Still, the U.S. used the policy of "neither confirming nor denying" the existence of a nuclear arsenal in the South or the possession of it onboard warships involved in port calls or in joint drills.
Now, Sung Kim, a Korean-born U.S. ambassador-designate for the Philippines, recently put his foot down in the capacity of North Korea policy coordinator, telling his Korean counterpart in public that Seoul doesn't need any such weapons.
Obviously, the U.S. thinks that it is not necessary and whatever needs it has can be met through its bases in Japan and Guam or other strategic assets such as nuclear submarines or trans-continental bombers.
The Clinton administration considered a preemptive strike against the North before it clinched the 1994 Agreed Framework in which the allies agreed to provide the North with light-water reactors in return for the freezing of its nuclear activities. That plan was killed because it was concluded that any such attempt would trigger an all-out war that would entail casualties to the tune of millions. Now, a war against the nuclear-armed North could entail a World War III Armageddon.
What really makes these scenarios impossible is public opinion. For the deployment of the U.S. missile interceptor, terminal high-altitude area defense (THAAD), residents of the site originally designated as the host, resisted it so vehemently that it was bounced to another site, where residents are also up in arms. It's not hard to imagine how much stronger public opposition would be against tactical nukes, for instance. There would be no place to deploy them, for sure.
Then, why are these "fanciful" ideas capturing part of the public narrative?
It's about pride. When the South was about to get rid of the constant bogyman ― the North, the impoverished nation has come up with a nuclear ticket. The South now is in a state of denial and takes a liking to these ideas as a psychological buffer. Just think how Koreans can remain sane after decades of living next door to the madcap nation whose main purpose of existence is to invade and conquer the South.
Of course, there is more to it than that ― strategic considerations that were not necessarily started as such. It's about applying pressure on the U.S. to prove and renew its commitment to defend Seoul. The South is having more doubts about its ally as the North's nuclear brinkmanship is turning their existing security equation upside down.
The U.S. has long promised a nuclear umbrella for the South but it is fast becoming "theoretically" obsolete as its main target ― the Soviet Union ― no longer exists and China is short of becoming its replacement as a military threat.
The North is too small to become the Soviets or the Chinese.
The South's reasoning goes: Would the U.S. be willing to use nuclear weapons against the North, if it uses one against the South without killing U.S. soldiers stationed here or hurling one against its mainland? Adding to the mix is the U.S. adoption of "extended deterrence" in lieu of the nuclear umbrella, the concept that is still nebulous at best.
All told, the South has a strong extenuating case for telling these lies.
Oh Young-jin is The Korea Times' chief editorial writer. Contact him at foolsdie5@ktimes.com foolsdie@gmail.com.
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