By Kim Bo-eun
South Korea's spy agency reportedly arranged the defection of 13 North Korean restaurant workers in China to the South in April.
Citing an "unidentified source familiar with the matter," the Hankyoreh local daily reported "A National Intelligence Service (NIS) employee provided 60,000 yuan (10 million won) for the workers' defection."
The defectors bought flight tickets to Malaysia with the money, because the NIS official advised them to enter South Korea "via a third country," the report said.
The defectors became familiar with the NIS employee through a Chinese Korean based there, who they became acquainted with while they were working for another restaurant.
The Ministry of Unification did not confirm the report, while the NIS was not available for comment.
"This will need to be confirmed by the NIS," Unification Ministry spokesman Jeong Joon-hee said Sunday.
According to the report, the defectors' process of entering and leaving Malaysia was swift ― after landing at the airport there, they went to the South Korean Embassy and left for the airport the same day, guarded by a special police team.
They had Korean passports and boarded a plane to South Korea without an inspection by immigration.
The defection process of the 13 North Korean restaurant workers was exceptionally swift, as most defectors spend at least two to three months in a third country before they make their way to the South.
In an exception, the Korean government also disclosed the defection of the 13 workers just a day after they arrived in the South.
The workers had not anticipated they would get exposed to the media openly.
"I did not know that the government would publicize our defection," the restaurant manager was quoted as saying by the Hankyoreh.
The defectors were placed in a protection center within the NIS instead of the state-run settlement agency Hanawon, where defectors are usually sent to.
The NIS cited that this was because it was "a high-profile case." The defectors left the center in small groups from Aug. 8 to 11.
A progressive lawyers' group Lawyers for a Democratic Society, had attempted to interview the defectors while they were at the center, in order to check whether they had experienced any human rights violations, but was denied its request.
The progressive vernacular reported the intelligence agency told the defectors that the lawyers group members were "pro-North Korean" and "bad people."
"I thought the lawyers group was pro-North and bad. If we met with its members, we thought our parents in the North would be killed," the restaurant manager told the newspaper.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights officials had a brief meeting with the defectors on Aug. 18.
The defectors were presumed to have left the Pyongyang-run restaurant in China's eastern city of Ningbo, due to sales pressure from the North amid sanctions placed on the isolated regime in March following earlier military provocations. The sanctions were aimed at cutting off sources of hard currency to prevent financing of nuclear and missile development.
South Korea's spy agency reportedly arranged the defection of 13 North Korean restaurant workers in China to the South in April.
Citing an "unidentified source familiar with the matter," the Hankyoreh local daily reported "A National Intelligence Service (NIS) employee provided 60,000 yuan (10 million won) for the workers' defection."
The defectors bought flight tickets to Malaysia with the money, because the NIS official advised them to enter South Korea "via a third country," the report said.
The defectors became familiar with the NIS employee through a Chinese Korean based there, who they became acquainted with while they were working for another restaurant.
The Ministry of Unification did not confirm the report, while the NIS was not available for comment.
"This will need to be confirmed by the NIS," Unification Ministry spokesman Jeong Joon-hee said Sunday.
According to the report, the defectors' process of entering and leaving Malaysia was swift ― after landing at the airport there, they went to the South Korean Embassy and left for the airport the same day, guarded by a special police team.
They had Korean passports and boarded a plane to South Korea without an inspection by immigration.
The defection process of the 13 North Korean restaurant workers was exceptionally swift, as most defectors spend at least two to three months in a third country before they make their way to the South.
In an exception, the Korean government also disclosed the defection of the 13 workers just a day after they arrived in the South.
The workers had not anticipated they would get exposed to the media openly.
"I did not know that the government would publicize our defection," the restaurant manager was quoted as saying by the Hankyoreh.
The defectors were placed in a protection center within the NIS instead of the state-run settlement agency Hanawon, where defectors are usually sent to.
The NIS cited that this was because it was "a high-profile case." The defectors left the center in small groups from Aug. 8 to 11.
A progressive lawyers' group Lawyers for a Democratic Society, had attempted to interview the defectors while they were at the center, in order to check whether they had experienced any human rights violations, but was denied its request.
The progressive vernacular reported the intelligence agency told the defectors that the lawyers group members were "pro-North Korean" and "bad people."
"I thought the lawyers group was pro-North and bad. If we met with its members, we thought our parents in the North would be killed," the restaurant manager told the newspaper.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights officials had a brief meeting with the defectors on Aug. 18.
The defectors were presumed to have left the Pyongyang-run restaurant in China's eastern city of Ningbo, due to sales pressure from the North amid sanctions placed on the isolated regime in March following earlier military provocations. The sanctions were aimed at cutting off sources of hard currency to prevent financing of nuclear and missile development.