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My answer is yes. I will explain why, what happens then, and what South Korea should do now.
A July 9, 2015 article by Chris Pleasance, published in DailyMail.com of United Kingdom, states that Kim Jong-un had ordered the executions of 70 officials since taking power in 2011. There is no doubt that the number is higher by now.
Some of high profile executions include Jang Song-thaek who was once the second most powerful man in North Korea and was married to Kim's sister, and Army chief Ri Yong-Ho who was executed in 2012, but not before a firefight with North Korean soldiers dozens of whom were killed.
In July 2015, Ma Won-chun, the designer behind North Korea's new airport terminal in Pyongyang, was reported to have been brutally executed, allegedly because Kim was not pleased with the design for the new building,
U Dong-chuk who was first deputy director of the State Security Department, Kim Yong-chun who was first deputy defense minister, and Armed Forces Minister Kim Jong-gak reportedly are all missing or banished.
Among the most brutal execution was that of Hyon Yong-chol, former Military Minister, who was shot to death using an anti-aircraft gun allegedly after falling asleep during a meeting. Stories on high profile executions keep surfacing with no end in sight.
Why is Kim killing so many high level associates? I think the real reason is that Kim suffers a paranoid disorder. This psychological sickness usually begins in early adulthood as Kim. Classic symptoms of a person with paranoid disorder include: (a) suspicion, without sufficient basis, that others are exploiting, harming, or deceiving him or her; (b) preoccupation with unfounded doubts about the loyalty or trustworthiness of associates; and (c) feeling threats from benign remarks or events. Kim most likely suffers also from schizophrenia by not being able to assess the reality as is.
The problem with Kim being paranoid and schizophrenic is that no one can tell him that he is sick. In addition, his close associates are likely to become his victims, because his constant contact with them will provide ample opportunities for him to be suspicious of them even if they are completely loyal to him.
Will Kim Jong-un be assassinated?
Assume that I am one of high profile officials in North Korea. Assume that I know some of my high profile colleagues, who are executed or banished for no particular reason. Assume that like others close to Kim, I realize that the only reason Kim is killing his associates is his unfounded suspicion or paranoid disorder. Under these assumptions, I feel danger that I may be the next. If I know I will be executed, I will do anything I can to stay alive or to sacrifice myself to save other innocent associates. I think assassination will occur, although I cannot predict when.
How should the policy makers of South Korea prepare for the possible assassination of Kim Jong-un?
I do not know the answer, but Sungmin Cho provides one in his article titled "Anticipating and Preparing for the Potential Assassination of Kim Jong-un," published in the Spring/Summer 2015 issue of the International Journal of Korean Studies. Cho received his bachelor's degree from Korea University, master's degree from Peking University, and was working on his doctoral degree at Georgetown University at the time of his writing.
According to Cho, "the assassination of Kim Jong-un is more likely to be carried out by a lone assassin than a group of plottersowing to the Kim family regime's coup-proof measures." Further, the lone assassin is most likely to be of the regime's top officials and "the assassination is most likely to occur in a non-public situation like a banquet or secret meeting."
Cho makes three policy recommendations to prepare for the likely event. First of all, Seoul policy makers need to "pay special attention to the rivalries among the powerful figures in Pyongyang." This is because "a potential assassin in Pyongyang would be motivated to remove his rival in a power struggle at first and extend the thought to remove Kim Jong-un altogether." Secondly, Washington and Seoul should consider a bold intervention because the assassination could prompt a civil war in North Korea with the possibility of North Korean WMDs falling into the wrong hands. Finally, "Washington and Seoul need to talk with Beijing secretly to avoid miscalculation with each other," and "to influence the domestic politics of North Korea" after the assassination.
My personal recommendation is that South Korea needs to develop measures based on the assumption that the assassination will occur, not may occur. Measures may include passage of a law through the Korean Assembly that will guarantee a safe haven with employment in South Korea for families of anyone fighting against Kim's brutal dictatorship, and assurance from China that it would stay out of complications that may arise in the Korean peninsula following the assassination.
Chang Se-moon is the director of the Gulf Coast Center for Impact Studies. Write to her at: changsemoon@yahoo.com.
