This is the third in a series of contributing columns by experts and our staff on priority issues for the Park Geun-hye government. — ED.
By Dr. Alexandre Mansourov
The Ice Age in North Korea is coming to an end. Although the pace of change is glacial, its direction is unmistakable: political ice is melting, social mores are relaxing, the economic engine is warming up, and the country is beginning to open up.
Although the new regime in Pyongyang is still based on the North Korean Workers' Party monopoly on power, tight repressive controls over the society, and authoritarian political culture, it is led by the young, charismatic, Swiss-educated leader, who has already demonstrated pragmatism in his policy approaches, considerable concern for the people's well-being, and interest in developing the knowledge-based economy and improving the country's relations with its friends and enemies alike.
●Some people are quick to assert Kim Jong-un is not a reformer. I disagree. Kim Jong-un is a Renaissance man by North Korean traditional standards. He evidently means well, and he is on the record saying he wants his people to have a better life. Only future will tell whether the small but influential changes trickling down from the top or rising from the bottom up will lead to a major transformation of North Korea's society and politics.
●Others question whether Kim Jong-un is the central driver of change, arguing that at his young age he does not have enough wisdom or power yet to lead the transformation of North Korea into a better place. Although I still cannot say with any degree of confidence whether Kim Jong-un is totally in control, partially in charge (and over what areas), or is presiding as a figure-head legacy leader over an emerging system of some sort of collective leadership, we believe every important change in the North has happened with his explicit or tacit consent, regardless of whose idea initially it was or who really benefited from it.
Whoever is pulling the strings behind the curtain in Pyongyang today, the most startling development is the new regime's evident drive to dismantle piece by piece Kim Jong-il's legacy — all done in the name of Kim Jong-il (!), although they still pay lip service to the so-called Kim Jong-il-style patriotism and encourage the nation-wide measures to eternalize Kim Jong-il's memory in statues and mosaic murals.
●Kim Jong-un dismissed his father's closest advisors such as former chief of general staff Ri Yong-ho, former head of state security U Tong-chuk, two defense ministers Kim Yong-chun and Kim Jong-gak, and scores of other party, state, and military officials who used to thrive under the previous regime.
●Kim Jong-un rehabilitated a number of senior government officials punished by Kim Jong-il, announced national amnesty last January, and reportedly ordered the shutdown of the notorious concentration camp for political prisoners no. 22 in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province. The motives for these actions are not clear yet: they could have been initiated to erase the evidence of past injustices and atrocities, or they may be early signs of political decompression set in motion by the new regime.
●Kim Jong-un steadfastly dismantles his father's hallmark military-first policy, by curtailing the military's arbitrary interference in economic and social life and emphasizing the Cabinet's centrality in economic management, by forcing the military to give up control over economic assets and converting the KPA's non-essential rear support assets such as shooting grounds, cavalry companies, and paratrooper-training grounds into civilian-run gun clubs, horse-back riding clubs, and aviation clubs. Moreover, last August, the North Korean media publicly announced that Kim Jong-un revised the KPA operational plans approved by Kim Jong-il. Gradual dismantlement of the Songun policy obviously exacerbates the strains in party-military and civil-military relations under the new regime.
●In a radical departure from his father's austerity policy, Kim Jong-un enunciated the people-first policy, promising that the North Korean people will not have to tighten their belts ever again. The North Korean government dramatically increased spending on the projects and facilities designed to satisfy the pent-up consumer demand — from supermarkets and restaurants to sports facilities, hotels, amusement parks, and recreation lands. Accordingly, Kim Jong-un reportedly amended scores of large-scale infrastructure development projects previously approved by Kim Jong-il, including the expansion of Sunan airport in Pyongyang, Hamhung airport and Hamhung railway station, as well as the construction of Yombunjin Hotel in North Hamgyong Province.
To be sure, the new leadership in Pyongyang has to deal with a very weak hand. Its choices are constricted by the binding legacies of Kim Il-sung's "juche" ideas and Kim Jong-il's Songun policy and last wishes. The scarcities plugging it are multi-faceted: kilowatts and calories, knowledge and skills, modern technologies and capital. Its dependency on China is huge and growing — from trade & investment to political support, diplomatic cover, military backing, as well as new policy ideas and technologies. Its sensitivities are many: the leaders' personal insecurities, persistent economic failures, declining military capabilities, environmental degradation, latent negative public sentiment, and, the last but not least, rising public expectations. Its vulnerabilities are obvious: disputed maritime and land borders in the South, "hostile policy" of the so-called enemy states such as ROK, US, and Japan, as well as the ever-lasting exposure to the WMD threat.
This notwithstanding, the foremost challenge facing the North Korean regime is no longer how it can survive the hard or soft landing. The North Korean government is now laying the preconditions for a national revival, and the big question is what will drive the take-off. In my judgment, Kim Jong Un is most likely to attempt to fuse his people's rising expectations, growing consumer demands, awakening nationalist aspirations and his country's developmental and security needs into the so familiar East Asia developmental model under the "Nation/State-First" slogan, relying on "dirigiste economics," "guided democracy," and "managed nationalism." Successful Unha-3 rocket launch on Dec. 12 bolstered Kim's domestic credibility and increased his international bargaining power.
●"People-First" (unbridled populism): Kim Jong-un may attempt to provide "bread and circuses" for the masses in the short-term, but his populist policy, which appears to be a knee-jerk reaction to the decades of acute austerity imposed on the North Korean people by his predecessors, can't last long, given the lack of domestic resources. Moreover, it can ignite a revolution of rising expectations that will be very hard to meet, and which can quickly spiral out of control.
●"Security-First": The new leadership in Pyongyang is unlikely to continue the "Songun business as usual" because it has already demonstrated its intention to dismantle the military-first policy. There is no "Songun with human face," and new leaders in Pyongyang appear to understand that. No matter how much the KPA is asked to "love the people" and "serve the people" by dredging rivers, renovating parks, and rebuilding the disaster-damaged areas, the North Korean people will never forget or forgive the tremendous sacrifices they made at the altar of Songun during the "Arduous March" and Great Famine in the 1990s. With the passing of Kim Jong-il, the military-first idea and policy is headed to the dustbin of history.
I judge North Korea under Kim Jong-un's leadership is poised to recover in the next five to 10 years. Not only will the North Korean government be able to "feed, clothe, and house" its own people to their satisfaction, but also Pyongyang will continue to build up its missile and nuclear capabilities, thereby nurturing its domestic legitimacy and growing its international strength. The big question today is how should the United States and the Republic of Korea respond to a more stable and stronger North Korea?
Dr. Alexandre Mansourov is an American expert on North Korea.
By Dr. Alexandre Mansourov
 |
| Alexandre Mansourov |
Although the new regime in Pyongyang is still based on the North Korean Workers' Party monopoly on power, tight repressive controls over the society, and authoritarian political culture, it is led by the young, charismatic, Swiss-educated leader, who has already demonstrated pragmatism in his policy approaches, considerable concern for the people's well-being, and interest in developing the knowledge-based economy and improving the country's relations with its friends and enemies alike.
●Some people are quick to assert Kim Jong-un is not a reformer. I disagree. Kim Jong-un is a Renaissance man by North Korean traditional standards. He evidently means well, and he is on the record saying he wants his people to have a better life. Only future will tell whether the small but influential changes trickling down from the top or rising from the bottom up will lead to a major transformation of North Korea's society and politics.
●Others question whether Kim Jong-un is the central driver of change, arguing that at his young age he does not have enough wisdom or power yet to lead the transformation of North Korea into a better place. Although I still cannot say with any degree of confidence whether Kim Jong-un is totally in control, partially in charge (and over what areas), or is presiding as a figure-head legacy leader over an emerging system of some sort of collective leadership, we believe every important change in the North has happened with his explicit or tacit consent, regardless of whose idea initially it was or who really benefited from it.
Whoever is pulling the strings behind the curtain in Pyongyang today, the most startling development is the new regime's evident drive to dismantle piece by piece Kim Jong-il's legacy — all done in the name of Kim Jong-il (!), although they still pay lip service to the so-called Kim Jong-il-style patriotism and encourage the nation-wide measures to eternalize Kim Jong-il's memory in statues and mosaic murals.
●Kim Jong-un dismissed his father's closest advisors such as former chief of general staff Ri Yong-ho, former head of state security U Tong-chuk, two defense ministers Kim Yong-chun and Kim Jong-gak, and scores of other party, state, and military officials who used to thrive under the previous regime.
●Kim Jong-un rehabilitated a number of senior government officials punished by Kim Jong-il, announced national amnesty last January, and reportedly ordered the shutdown of the notorious concentration camp for political prisoners no. 22 in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province. The motives for these actions are not clear yet: they could have been initiated to erase the evidence of past injustices and atrocities, or they may be early signs of political decompression set in motion by the new regime.
●Kim Jong-un steadfastly dismantles his father's hallmark military-first policy, by curtailing the military's arbitrary interference in economic and social life and emphasizing the Cabinet's centrality in economic management, by forcing the military to give up control over economic assets and converting the KPA's non-essential rear support assets such as shooting grounds, cavalry companies, and paratrooper-training grounds into civilian-run gun clubs, horse-back riding clubs, and aviation clubs. Moreover, last August, the North Korean media publicly announced that Kim Jong-un revised the KPA operational plans approved by Kim Jong-il. Gradual dismantlement of the Songun policy obviously exacerbates the strains in party-military and civil-military relations under the new regime.
●In a radical departure from his father's austerity policy, Kim Jong-un enunciated the people-first policy, promising that the North Korean people will not have to tighten their belts ever again. The North Korean government dramatically increased spending on the projects and facilities designed to satisfy the pent-up consumer demand — from supermarkets and restaurants to sports facilities, hotels, amusement parks, and recreation lands. Accordingly, Kim Jong-un reportedly amended scores of large-scale infrastructure development projects previously approved by Kim Jong-il, including the expansion of Sunan airport in Pyongyang, Hamhung airport and Hamhung railway station, as well as the construction of Yombunjin Hotel in North Hamgyong Province.
To be sure, the new leadership in Pyongyang has to deal with a very weak hand. Its choices are constricted by the binding legacies of Kim Il-sung's "juche" ideas and Kim Jong-il's Songun policy and last wishes. The scarcities plugging it are multi-faceted: kilowatts and calories, knowledge and skills, modern technologies and capital. Its dependency on China is huge and growing — from trade & investment to political support, diplomatic cover, military backing, as well as new policy ideas and technologies. Its sensitivities are many: the leaders' personal insecurities, persistent economic failures, declining military capabilities, environmental degradation, latent negative public sentiment, and, the last but not least, rising public expectations. Its vulnerabilities are obvious: disputed maritime and land borders in the South, "hostile policy" of the so-called enemy states such as ROK, US, and Japan, as well as the ever-lasting exposure to the WMD threat.
This notwithstanding, the foremost challenge facing the North Korean regime is no longer how it can survive the hard or soft landing. The North Korean government is now laying the preconditions for a national revival, and the big question is what will drive the take-off. In my judgment, Kim Jong Un is most likely to attempt to fuse his people's rising expectations, growing consumer demands, awakening nationalist aspirations and his country's developmental and security needs into the so familiar East Asia developmental model under the "Nation/State-First" slogan, relying on "dirigiste economics," "guided democracy," and "managed nationalism." Successful Unha-3 rocket launch on Dec. 12 bolstered Kim's domestic credibility and increased his international bargaining power.
●"People-First" (unbridled populism): Kim Jong-un may attempt to provide "bread and circuses" for the masses in the short-term, but his populist policy, which appears to be a knee-jerk reaction to the decades of acute austerity imposed on the North Korean people by his predecessors, can't last long, given the lack of domestic resources. Moreover, it can ignite a revolution of rising expectations that will be very hard to meet, and which can quickly spiral out of control.
●"Security-First": The new leadership in Pyongyang is unlikely to continue the "Songun business as usual" because it has already demonstrated its intention to dismantle the military-first policy. There is no "Songun with human face," and new leaders in Pyongyang appear to understand that. No matter how much the KPA is asked to "love the people" and "serve the people" by dredging rivers, renovating parks, and rebuilding the disaster-damaged areas, the North Korean people will never forget or forgive the tremendous sacrifices they made at the altar of Songun during the "Arduous March" and Great Famine in the 1990s. With the passing of Kim Jong-il, the military-first idea and policy is headed to the dustbin of history.
I judge North Korea under Kim Jong-un's leadership is poised to recover in the next five to 10 years. Not only will the North Korean government be able to "feed, clothe, and house" its own people to their satisfaction, but also Pyongyang will continue to build up its missile and nuclear capabilities, thereby nurturing its domestic legitimacy and growing its international strength. The big question today is how should the United States and the Republic of Korea respond to a more stable and stronger North Korea?
Dr. Alexandre Mansourov is an American expert on North Korea.
