 Senior Chinese official in North Korea: Choe Thae-bok, left, secretary of the central committee of the North Korean Workers’ Party, shakes hands with Wang Jiarui, head of the liaison department of the Chinese Communist Party’s central committee, in Pyongyang, Thursday. Wang also met Kim Yong-il, premier of the Cabinet. / Xinhua-Yonhap |
This is the sixth in a series of articles on U.S. President Barack Obama who was sworn in Tuesday.
By Tong KimBarack Obama's historic inauguration as the 44th President of the United States has inspired America and many other countries around the world with renewed hope for more justice, peace and increased economic well being.
While facing domestic challenges ― the economy, health care and energy ― President Obama must also deal with foreign policy priorities ― Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq and nuclear non-proliferation.
North Korea's nuclear weapons impose a grave security and diplomatic challenge to the Obama administration, which could become more grave if not addressed afresh and correctly from the beginning.
Despite the bitter record of hostility and distrust between Washington and Pyongyang and despite North Korea's increasing demands, the denuclearization of the North is achievable under President Obama's leadership.
During last week's Senate hearing to confirm Hilary Clinton as secretary of state, the direction and the goal of the new administration's policy on North Korea were unveiled: The Obama administration will pursue direct bilateral and multilateral talks within the six-party process to achieve the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear programs and inventory.
In the course of denuclearization, Clinton said, the Obama administration will confirm North Korea's past plutonium production and its uranium enrichment activities and get answers to questions of its involvement in proliferation to Syria.
She warned if the North does not live up to its commitment, the Obama administration would quickly re-impose sanctions and consider new restrictions.
But, like President Obama, the new secretary of state-designate said she would be ``willing to meet any foreign leader at a time and place" of her choosing.
However, coinciding with Clinton's hearing, Pyongyang began waging a provocative offensive in rhetoric, clearly intended to convey a message to the incoming Obama administration. On Jan. 13, the DPRK's foreign ministry spokesman stated that normalization should be realized first as a condition for denuclearization, and nuclear verification should also apply to the South as well.
On Jan. 17, a foreign ministry spokesman, in a response to the secretary of state nominee's position that ``normalized relations will not be possible'' without complete and verifiable denuclearization, said that the DPRK would not give up its status as a nuclear weapons state even after normalization, ``as long as it is exposed even to the slightest U.S. nuclear threat.''
Selig Harrison, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, told the press on Jan. 17 that the North Korean officials he met in Pyongyang said that ``North Korea has already weaponized the 30.8 kilograms of plutonium listed in the formal declaration and the weapons cannot be inspected.''
Harrison said his invitation to Pyongyang was timed for the delivery of a message to Washington just before the inauguration.
Harrison told the Washington Post that North Korea sees the Obama presidency as an opportunity to improve relations with the United States but it wants to remain as a nuclear weapons state until it decides that it's no longer threatened by the country.
Targeting Seoul and Washington, a spokesman for the Korean People's Army (KPA) General Staff, also on Jan. 17, declared the North Korean military will take an ``all-out confrontational posture against South Korea's hard line policy on the North.''
The KPA statement said in part, ``Our military retaliatory step will be implemented by limitless, merciless striking power… and a resolute action which can hardly be countered by any up-to-date means in the world.''
The motivation behind North Korea's offensive maneuvering may be interpreted several ways.
It could be Pyongyang's ploy to get the attention of the new U.S. administration so that North Korea will not be put on the backburner again.
It could be Pyongyang's test of the Obama administration, as recently warned by the national security team of the Bush administration.
It could be part of Pyongyang's attempt to capture advantageous negotiating leverage.
It could be a reflection of a power shift to the military hard liners after Kim Jong-il's reported stroke in August ― who have toughened Pyongyang's negotiating stance in recent months.
It could be for domestic consumption to control the people in the face of economic hardship.
Whatever the true motivation for upping the obstacle bar to the resolution of the denuclearization issue may be, it is clear that the North Korean players are re-posturing their negotiating positions and re-tooling their tactics.
So far they have not re-enacted such physical acts of provocation as reversing the disablement of nuclear facilities, testing or exporting long-range ballistic missiles, carrying out an armed naval clash on the West Sea of Korea, or conducting another nuclear test.
The North Koreans now claim that they developed nuclear weapons to protect their country, not as negotiating leverage for normalization with the United States or other benefits.
But they have known all along that normalization would not come unless they are ready to give up their nuclear weapons.
They also know without normalization and a peace mechanism in place, there is no better way to improve their security and the livelihood of their people.
They know the final stages of normalization and denuclearization could be settled in the formula of action for action as they demanded.
Even if their latest claim of having weaponized all their plutonium is true, the inventory of those weapons must be subject to verification. If they insist on mutual verification of the North and the South, they should agree to open all and any suspected KPA installations for inspection as well.
During the trilateral meeting between North Korea, China and the United States in 2003, the North Koreans said they had manufactured nuclear weapons, but later they said it was a false claim that was made as a negotiating ``tactic.'' Are they making another false claim a ``tactic?''
The North Koreans should understand that the Obama administration will be serious and flexible in engaging them, but it will never accept them as a nuclear power.
After a thorough review of where the issue was left off by the Bush administration, and after a development of new ideas and creative approaches, the Obama administration will deal with North Korea more pragmatically to achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
Denuclearization is still achievable.
The writer is a former senior interpreter at the U.S. State Department and now a research professor with Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University SAIS. He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.
