KoreaToday Will NK Rocket Launch Be Wolf in Sheeps Clothing?
By Jung Sung-ki
Staff Reporter
With the countdown to North Korea's ``rocket'' launch looming, the international community is focusing its attention on whether or not the planned liftoff slated for next week will be another cover for a test of the communist regime's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system.
North Korea announced that it had informed international aviation and maritime authorities of its plan to launch the pilot ``Kwangmyeongseong-2'' communications satellite into orbit with the ``Eunha-2'' space launch vehicle (SLV) between April 4 and 8.
The North told the organizations that the three-stage rocket would be launched at its Musudan-ri site in the northeast during daylight, and that the first spent stage would be jettisoned into waters about 120 kilometers from Japan's northwest coast and the second one would fall into the Pacific Ocean.
South Korean intelligence authorities said Monday that either a satellite launch or a test-launch of a long-range missile would likely take place April 4 or 5, as the North recently notified international aviation authorities that it would close two routes through its airspace during that period. On Thursday, U.S. counter-proliferation and intelligence officials confirmed a Japanese news report that North Korea has positioned what is believed to be a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile on its east coast launch pad.
Most experts here and abroad believe Pyongyang is apparently preparing to test-fire the 6,700-kilometer-range Taepodong-2 missile that can hit Alaska or Hawaii, under the guise of a satellite launch, and its authenticity will be revealed immediately after the launch.
They cite the Stalinist state's past history of covering up its missile programs and the similar designs and technologies between the ICBM and SLV.
In 1998, North Korea test-fired a Taepodong-1 ballistic missile over Japan and then claimed to have put the ``Kwangmyeongseong-1'' satellite into orbit. But no such satellite has been found in space since then.
In 2006, North Korea test-launched a Taepodong-2 missile, along with other short- and medium-range missiles, off the eastern waters toward Japan, but the ballistic missile failed 42 seconds into flight. The North also claimed that it had tried to send the ``Kwangmyeongseong-2'' satellite into orbit.
``North Korea's notification of its `rocket' launch plan to international agencies aims not only to justify its alleged missile test-firing under the name of peaceful space development program, but also to avoid possible missile interception by the United States,'' said Kim Tae-woo, a senior researcher of the state-funded Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).
Pyongyang is also worried about international sanctions against it following a missile test, Kim said, referring to the United Nations Resolution 1718, adopted in 2006 to ban all the reclusive state's missile-related activities.
Baek Seung-joo, an analyst at the KIDA, said the notice indicates North Korea is seriously troubled that the United States or Japan might try to intercept its rocket.
ICBM vs SLV
The main reason the North claims its missile test is a satellite launch is the similarity between the ICBM and SLV, as the two systems have almost same design, components and technology, according to experts.
A major difference is what equipment is mounted on the tip of the fuselage. With a warhead, it can be used as a ballistic missile, or transformed into a rocket with a satellite mounted, they said.
In general, an ICBM uses solid propellant engines, while SLV uses both solid and liquid rocket engines. In terms of trajectory, an ICBM re-enters the earth's atmosphere after its first and second stages are jettisoned, while an SLV continues into orbit after its three rocket engines are used up.
North Korea is using its Taepodong missile technology as the basis for its SLVs. It has two known ballistic missiles that could be used as these ― the Taepodong-1 intermediate-range ballistic missile and Taepodong-2 ICBM.
The two-stage Taepodong-1 uses a Rodong-1 ballistic missile for its first stage, and a modified Scud-C short-range ballistic missile for the second stage. Both stages are liquid fueled.
For the 1998 test, North Korea added a solid-fueled third stage intended to launch the ``Kwangmyeongseong-1'' into orbit. But the test was unsuccessful, as it was likely that the third stage failed to ignite, causing the satellite to be lost.
The Taepodong-2, a more advanced two- or three-stage missile, could also be modified for use as an SLV. Experts estimate that the missile could have a range of between 5,000-6,000km, depending on the size of its engine and estimated fuel capacity.
The failure of the Taepodong-2 in 2006 cast doubt on North Korean technical competence. Experts believed it would take more development and further testing for the North to secure a reliable missile or SLV.
Missile Interception
Chances of the United States and Japan to activate their joint missile defense system are slim since North Korea claims a satellite liftoff and any interception could increase risk to the region's major economies, analysts say. Pyongyang has said it would consider an interception an act of war.
But the possibility of a strike cannot be ruled out in the worst case scenario, and the missile defense test, at the least, will provide useful experience for the American missile shield, on which several billions of dollars have been spent, they say.
Senior Pentagon officials and U.S. commanders have expressed confidence in their missile interception capabilities.
Speaking to a Senate Armed Services Committee last week, U.S. Air Force General Kevin Chilton, chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, said the missile system the United States has been testing and partially deploying over the past decade was ``ahead of North Korean capabilities.''
``In the limited deployment capabilities that we have out today for the system, it is adequate to defend against what we believe the North Koreans could potentially put forward as a threat today,'' he told the hearing.
The U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system has multi-layered missile tracking and interception capabilities, with the help of an armada of air, sea and space intelligence assets above and around North Korea.
Air and space based intelligence assets include continuous electronic intelligence patrols by advanced U-2 aircraft flying at 70,000 feet, and EC-135 Rivet Joint-type aircraft flying lower with the hope of capturing North Korean voice transmissions, specifically involved with leadership discussions and decision making regarding the launch, including the countdown.
Special optically-equipped C-135 and P-3 aircraft are in the area to image the climbing vehicle when it does lift off, while a KH-12 optical and infrared spacecraft watches activities in the North. The KH-12 is known to have an optical camera with 10-centimeter resolution.
Once a ballistic missile is fired from a North Korean site, for example, infrared sensors of U.S. Air Force Defense Support Program (DSP) early warning satellites would detect heat from missile and booster rocket exhaust plumes and transmit related information simultaneously to the North American Aerospace Defense Command in Colorado Springs.
U.S. and Japanese Aegis destroyers operating in Korea's eastern waters, along with South Korea's Sejong the Great KDX-III Aegis destroyer, would track the missile and launch SM-3 ship-to-air missiles to shoot it down.
Should the attempt fail, the Alaska-based X-Band Radar system, with a detection range of more than 5,000 kilometers, would track the North Korean missile and Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) missiles would be launched to take it down midcourse while the missile is still outside Earth's atmosphere and at its highest trajectory.
In the terminal phase, U.S. Navy Aegis warships near Alaska would launch SM-3 missiles, capable of hitting targets 500 kilometers away, to intercept the missile. Ground-based PAC-3 interceptors are also used to engage the incoming missile.