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As South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is making his first official visit to Beijing, the visit is likely to be a ``getting to know you" session aimed at deepening understanding on strategic issues while strengthening bilateral economic cooperation.
Between the tragic aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake and preparations for the Beijing Olympics, Lee may find Chinese leaders both preoccupied with many concerns, including stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Successive South Korean presidents have returned from state visits to Beijing with phrases for relations with China that reflect an increasingly closer relationship, from ``full-scale cooperative partnership" under Kim Dae-jung to ``comprehensive cooperative partnership" during the administration of Roh Moo-hyun.
Now, South Korea has joined a growing number of countries that have a ``strategic partnership" with China. If the upgrading in terminology reflects growth in bilateral economic interdependence, the term is surely justified.
The Sino-South Korean trade relationship continues to grow at double-digit rates and represented almost one-fifth of South Korea's overall trade, reaching $145 billion in 2007, up from $100 billion in 2004.
If the Chinese and South Korean economies are to become even more intertwined, Lee and an entourage of top Korean business leaders will seek to assure equal access for Korean products in Chinese consumer markets and industrial sectors while promoting more effective management of disputes over intellectual property protection, market access issues, and the establishment of procedures that allow South Korean investors in non-competitive industries to exit the Chinese market in an orderly fashion.
China has been eager to start negotiations with South Korea on a bilateral free trade agreement, an issue deferred by the Roh administration.
When it comes to political relations, however, the idea of a ``strategic partnership" seems more aspirational than a reflection of reality.
The political side of the relationship remains relatively shallow and is overshadowed by uncertainties over a host of chronic irritants such as the Goguryeo history issue, Chinese handling of North Korean refugees, the future of North Korea, and most recently violent protests by Chinese students during the Olympic torch rally in Seoul.
These issues are manifestations of Sino-South Korean differences in world view, systems and social values that impose real limits on the level of partnership that can realistically be expected between South Korea and China at this stage in the relationship.
Chinese analysts have scrutinized the implications of Lee's policies toward North Korea and his renewed emphasis on relations with the United States and Japan.
Thus far, Lee and Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan have emphasized the importance of the economic relationship and reiterated that the respective South Korean relationships with China and the United States should not be cast in zero-sum terms.
But Chinese leaders want to know more about how and where China fits in South Korean foreign policy and explain Chinese views of South Korea.
South Korea's foreign relations are traditionally most effective when Seoul maintains positive relations with all of its larger neighbors, as was the case in the early part of the Kim Dae-jung administration.
In contrast to the Roh administration's ``balancing" approach motivated by concern about renewed Sino-Japanese rivalry, Lee's senior advisors appear to see the U.S.-South Korea alliance both as a hedge against China's rise and as a necessary platform via which South Korea might be able to enhance its strategic weight and leverage with its immediate neighbors.
Given that Sino-U.S. relations are stable and Hu Jintao has just returned from a positive visit to Japan, there is every reason to expect that Sino-South Korean relations should also improve.
Chinese leaders listened carefully to Lee's views on inter-Korean relations and may share their own interpretation of North Korean thinking based on Chinese conversations with senior leaders including Kim Jong-il.
Chinese leaders seemed very comfortable with Roh's policies toward North Korea and may be particularly concerned to understand the ``true intentions" behind Lee's more conditional approach to the North, especially as it relates to North Korea's food situation and near-term economic stability.
In addition to a desire for stability, Lee's policy toward North Korea contains a vision for North Korea's development and prosperity, an experience that both South Korea and China can share with the North if denuclearization is achieved.
If Lee can convince Chinese leaders to join in a cooperative approach to promote both stability and prosperity in North Korea through denuclearization, such an outcome would reinforce objectives that might truly live up to the level of a ``strategic partnership."
The writer is a senior associate with the Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS. He can be reached at ssnyder@asiafound-dc.org.
