Generation New President Elder Brother of ‘475 Generation’

By Andrei Lankov

Korea Times Columnist

It is often assumed that on the top of the social and political ladder, generations change one another in a nice and clean sequence: in a decade or two the power and authority will belong to the younger people while many of today’s leaders will enjoy their retirement, playing golf and writing memoirs. Usually this is indeed the case, but there are some exceptions.

Right now in Korea, we seem to be witnessing one of such infrequent twists: the rise of the “475 generation.”

Until some 10 years ago, Korean domestic politics was largely driven by rivalry between regional groups. However, from the late 1990s age began to play an increasingly important role as well.

It became clear that Korean society consists of distinct age groups, “generations,” each one with its own distinct set of political convictions and experiences. The administration of President Roh Moo-hyun heavily relied on the people who were described as “386 generation,” or 386ers for short. Those were people who were born in the 1960s, graduated from the universities in the 80s and were in their 40s a few years ago when the word was first coined.

They were the major driving force behind the pro-democracy movement of the late 1980s, and they were also enthusiastic supporters of the recent two administrations both as key officials and grassroots political activists.

However, in recent years the South Korean public felt increasingly disappointed with them. It is now widely believed that the 386ers have shown themselves to be incompetent, and the recent elections indicated that the popular sympathies moved to a different set of ideas, closely associated with somewhat older people, the so-called “475 generation.”

This name began to appear in the press only recently, and it is clearly coined in imitation of the 386 generation.

The 475ers are 10 years older than the 368ers: they were born in the 1950s and went to the university in the 1970s. It is also implied by the name that they are in their 40s now, but that is not the case. Most of them are over 50. The word was frequently repeated in the last few months when the face of the future Korean government became clear. A large number of Cabinet positions are likely to be awarded to the 475ers, many former university professors.

In a stable society, 10 years would not normally make a large difference, but in Korea the 475 generation is dramatically different from the 386ers, their younger siblings.

The major reason for such a difference is their divergent historical experiences. The 475ers still vividly remember the poverty and destitution of post-colonial Korea while the younger 386ers lived through the era of affluence, which is not known as the Korean economic miracle for nothing.

The 475ers were born when the 1950-1953 Korean War was a very recent memory, and all but a lucky few knew what it meant to be hungry. They saw slums and some lived in them. They vividly remember the time when a boiled egg was a rare delicacy and “being affluent” meant “being capable of eating as much as one wants.”

An average Korean in the early 1960s consumed a mere 45 grams of milk per year and a mere 7 grams of animal protein per day. Rice was a luxury, so the majority subsisted on corn or barley.

A radio was a luxury, and there were a mere 15,000 motor vehicles in the whole of Seoul (a large number of these were awkwardlooking cargo tricycles, a common vehicle in 1960s Korea).

Until the late 1970s, a TV set or refrigerator were luxury goods, available only to a lucky few, and color TV did not start operating until 1980.

One of the major criticisms of the 386ers was that “those idealistic but spoilt kids” seemed unable to appreciate the importance of economic growth.

The 386ers indeed are used to taking high economic growth for granted, so they tend to worry more about different non-economical issues like political democracy or social justice or environment protection.

The 457ers could not afford such a luxury. Their experience taught them that no high-minded project is feasible if it does not have a solid economic foundation.

They are also believers in individual will. They and their fathers once overcame impossible odds in order to transform their own lives and their country, and they believe that determination can do wonders.

Lee Myung-bak himself can be seen as the symbolic “elder brother” of the 475ers. He is elder but his experience is similar to those of many of his ministers. Born to a poor family, he barely survived amid the chaos of the Korean War.

Then he took advantage of the growth of college education and unprecedented increase in social mobility, and became first an employee and then a top manager in a major corporation. The corporation itself was created by the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s.

A one-time pro-democracy activist himself, Lee was not fond of dictators, but like other 475ers, he seems to believe that efficiency and growth should always come first. Many 475ers were involved in pro-democracy movements in their student years, but they usually lost interest in politics soon after graduation.

These people are used to responsibility and networks. They were born into large families. In the 1950s, the average Korean women had six children. They had to learn how to make sacrifices, even though in most cases they were on the receiving end of the system.

Many a success story of the 475 generation was paid for by efforts of the less lucky family members.

According to a famous saying, Korean universities of the era were founded on the piles of “cow bones.” Indeed, many a poor farming family had to sell their most precious possession, an ox or a cow, to pay tuition.

In other cases their sisters made the sacrifice, working in sweatshops, in order to give an academically successful brother his chance (it was still the age when women still did not count for much).

To an extent they have any interest in foreign policy, the 475ers are usually less nationalistic and more pro-U.S. than their younger siblings. The 386 generation frequently perceived the U.S. as first and foremost the major backer of a dictatorship they hated. For the 475ers, the U.S. was primarily a provider of vital aid and technology as well as a protector against geopolitical challenges and threats.

What should we make of this group? This author, being born into a relatively poor family in a relatively poor country tends to sympathize with their world view. However, it is not without serious shortcomings.

Like it or not, South Korea is no longer an impoverished developing nation anymore. Everybody has at least a bowl of rice here, and most people have much more. The breathtaking economic growth was necessary in the 1970s and 1980s, but it is of lesser significance these days.

After all, an owner of two cars is not twice as happy as an owner of one. The major task is to strike a balance. The 386ers seem to be too divorced from the immediate needs of the country’s economy and often live in a dream word.

The 475ers, on the contrary, tend to forget that humans are not merely consumers and producers of material goods.

Still, the change seems to be justifiable. The political pendulum moves back and forth, and this is what democratic policy is largely about.