2 Korean Leaders Have Internal Issues to Discuss

Tong Kim

By Tong Kim

The second summit between the two Koreas is less than a week away, as it is scheduled for Oct. 2-4 in Pyongyang. Preparations for the summit have been underway for weeks now and some of the details have been released _ including a huge delegation of leaders from all walks of life who will go the North Korean capital with President Roh Moo-hyun.

Unfortunately, it lacks bipartisan support. The Grand National Party (GNP), whose presidential candidate seems to have clinched this election, as he leads his challengers by three times in polls for the December presidential election, refused to endorse the inter-Korean summit. No GNP representative will join Roh's delegation to Pyongyang.

Controversial as it may be, the summit was made possible by a combination of several factors that have influenced the development of the political environment on the Korean peninsula. Perhaps most importantly, the steady progress we have seen in the recent denuclearization talks _ especially between the United States and the DPRK (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) _ was a favorable factor contributing to the holding of the summit.

Of course, there are reasonable political allegations that the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and President Roh, both wishing to continue their engagement and economic cooperation, are collaborating to prevent the GNP from taking over the presidency of South Korea.

Even if these allegations were credible, the GNP faces a tough challenge to justify its opposition to the summit at this point in time when the issues of denuclearization and securing durable peace preoccupy the minds of the people. The GNP should not forget that if it comes into power, it will also have to deal with the North. Roh has the presidential prerogative to conduct summit talks as he sees fit, an unchallenged legal basis.

In this column I wrote that Kim Jong-il should make an equivocal commitment to denuclearization. President George W. Bush said essentially the same thing when he met with Roh in Sydney during the APEC meeting.

I further wrote, without such clarification, many critics will continue to believe the DPRK regime has not made a "strategic decision" to dismantle all its nuclear weapons and programs. Given the nature of the power system in Pyongyang, it is crucial for the world to hear directly from Kim Jong-il that his country will indeed keep its promise.

The people of South Korea and the international community alike want President Roh to bring up the nuclear issue before he discusses a peace regime with Chairman Kim, who in my view is ready for this topic.

A positive outcome of the submit will help make further progress toward denuclearization at the six party talks, provided that multilateral talks are vigorously supported by bilateral negotiation between the United States and the DPRK. Without the bilateral negotiation the six-party forum will not be able to achieve its goal.

Washington's emphasis on the role of the multilateral forum as "the center of gravity" of denuclearization efforts is understandable, as other participants in the talks are equally sensitive to the inter-Korean summit. They all seem to be wary of whether the summit might distract from or downgrade the international efforts at the six-party talks.
Washington appears apprehensive about the negative impact of large-scale economic projects that Seoul is considering to rescue the wretched North Korean economy.

In Seoul, some are more worried that the summit may produce an agreement of a peace regime that will impact the coming presidential election. Some are also worried that their president would promise to shovel out more generous economic packages to the North with little in return.

When the summit plan was first announced in August, the then White House spokesman Tony Snow said that the inter-Korean summit "falls within the six-party process," a far fetched claim from Washington's point of view.

First, the summit is an inter-Korean event separate from the six-party talks. Second, with acknowledgement of the urgency of the nuclear issue, the two Korean leaders also have their internal issues to discuss _ such as building mutual confidence and an approach to national reconciliation and eventual unification.

President Roh should make sure that the United States and other friends of South Korea are properly informed of his plan for the meeting and especially of the results of the meeting.

I remember former President Kim Dae-jung met with President Clinton in Tokyo shortly before he went to Pyongyang in June 2000, and he called Clinton immediately after his return from Pyongyang. In addition, Kim Dae-jung sent his national security advisor Hwang Young-tak to New York, where Clinton was staying. Hwang briefed him for 45 minutes on the discussions Kim Dae-jung had with Kim Jong-il.

On the question of unification, some critics are concerned that Roh may agree on a further arrangement beyond the general principle of a lower level of confederation as stipulated in the June 15, 2000 declaration. In my personal assessment, the North Korean leader knows that it is impossible to unify Korea under his terms, which used to be called the "communization" of the South. His interest is focused on survival and economic recovery, without being absorbed by the South.

Any agreement on unification will only be symbolic in nature out of the political expediency of both sides. Continuing advocacy for unification in both Koreas is hollow political rhetoric, echoing a sentimental nostalgia from the past, when the Korean people believed unification would be the only way to a better life.

The idea of ``one nation, one state with two systems,'' either in the name of "confederation" or "a commonwealth" will probably be the most realistic way to unification. This form of states could last indefinitely until such a time when there would be few differences between both sides in terms of economic prosperity and political freedom. That day could only come through a long-term evolution in North Korea, barring an abrupt and drastic change.

The North and the South could agree to live peacefully together under an arrangement of two systems for the next 50 or 90 years. I am reminded of a 50-year self-rule granted to Hong Kong and Macau upon their return to China. The gaps between these political entities have been bridged fast. The same can happen to the North and the South.

Tong Kim served as senior interpreter at the U.S. State Department.

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