By Jae H. Ku
The year 2007 may be a watershed year for North Korea. In February, North Korea re-entered six-party talks to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully.
North Korea recently announced that it will disable its ``entire nuclear apparatus'' by the end of the year. From Oct. 2 to 4, North Korea's Kim Jong-il will host a summit meeting with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun; this will be the first summit between the two leaders and only the second summit between the two Koreas since the historic June 2000 summit.
The summit can further inter-Korean cooperation and complement the six-party talks in paving the way for the denuclearization. Yet, many in Seoul and elsewhere feel uneasy with both the process and the atmosphere in which the summit was arranged.
With public approval for the president in the high teens, a major breakthrough with North Korea could pay political dividends for the ruling coalition.
Therefore, many see the summit as an outright election ploy to garner votes with the younger generation by appealing to their sense of ``Korean-ness,'' nationhood, and nationalism.
The logic of the October surprise must surely weigh prominently with the Cheong Wa Dae strategists. If South Korea nails down a credible peace treaty with North Korea at the summit, the presidential candidate from the ruling coalition could run a campaign pledging to end conscription, a popular idea among the young.
The political dividend from the summit, however, is most likely to be negligible because Kim is not ready to reward Roh, or any other South Korean leader, just yet.
This has not stopped the South Korean government from going all out to woo Kim.
Recent Korean press reporting suggests that South Korea may be willing to accommodate North Korea by discussing the redrawing of the Northern Limit Line (maritime border with North Korea), providing billions of dollars in aid, avoiding tough issues like the nuclear issue (as evidenced by exclusion of foreign minister from the official delegation), and omitting human rights from the discussions.
In spite of what President Roh may have to offer, Kim is not likely to reciprocate in kind, that is, provide a peace agreement that will fundamentally alter the structure on the Korean Peninsula. Why? At the core, Kim's North Korea believes that a peace treaty can only be signed with the United States, one of the original signatories of the armistice.
This is consistent with North Korea's strategy to marginalize the South, despite its rhetoric of brotherhood.
Economically, the long-term viability of North Korea must come from trade with the outside world and diversifying its sources of economic assistance. This can only be done with the lifting of U.S. sanctions and the gaining of a modicum of credibility from the international financial institutions.
Only the United States can provide this through normalization with North Korea.
In essence, Kim sees South Korea as a timely and much needed savings account to tap into when needed.
How can President Roh turn this around? Perhaps, he can begin with a dose of tough love for North Korea.
President Roh should tackle some of the toughest issues facing North Korea. For example, while North Korea has agreed to disable its nuclear apparatus, it is not altogether clear what facilities will be included.
Tough negotiations lie ahead in the six-party talks. President Roh can do his part to press Kim to honor past commitments and to abide by the Feb. 13 agreement concretely.
President Roh's idea of an inter-Korean economic community via increased economic assistance and trade is noble and has merit. This concept is potentially popular with the voters and has support from the opposition.
The problem, however, lies with the sequencing of this approach. Will Kim get the billions of dollars upfront without giving up its nuclear weapons?
Finally, President Roh should raise the issue of human rights with Kim Jong-il. He should stand firm on the side of principle and history.
As a lifelong democracy and human rights activist, silence on North Korea's human rights tragedy of epic proportion only abets Kim's crimes against humanity.
President Roh has an opportunity to make history. He can provide a real roadmap for North Korea to join the international community.
Or he can reward Kim based on a misconceived domestic expediency. The latter will undoubtedly exacerbate Seoul's relations with Washington, thereby weakening South Korean national security in the long run.
Domestically, the electorate which is already demanding more reciprocity from the North may be less generous at the polls in December.
What kind of history will President Roh make?
Jae H. Ku is the director of the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. _ ED.