NK's not crazy: is that good?

Visitors at a bookstore in Seoul read the Time Magazine edition published in mid-February last year that featured North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on its cover. / Yonhap

Lankov's new book well timed for wave of interest in isolated state

Andrei Lankov

"The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia," Andrei Lankov, Oxford University Press

By Kim Young-jin

For all the bluster, North Korea's third nuclear test brought about predictable outcomes: sanctions, belligerent rhetoric from Pyongyang and an intensification of the perennial tensions that haunt Northeast Asia.

The North's propaganda machine churned out new tricks this time, including YouTube videos of North Korean rockets hitting the United States and warnings to expats to flee the South. The response adhered to long-held characterizations of the North as a state led by lunatics, itching for war.

North Korea expert Andrei Lankov has some good news and some tough news in his new book, "The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia." The Kookmin University professor argues that leaders in Pyongyang are not irrational _ they know not to cross the red line that would bring on their demise _ but cunning manipulators who believe survival depends on maintaining the status quo.

While this may provide relief from visions of nuclear calamity, it also means there is no silver bullet to the North Korea problem, he says. Reforms similar to those of China or Vietnam could destabilize the regime by giving the populace a taste of prosperity.

North Korean leaders "are neither madmen nor ideological zealots, but rather remarkably efficient and cold-minded calculators, perhaps the best practitioners of Machiavellian politics that can be found in the modern world," the Russian scholar and Korea Times columnist writes. "They have no option but to try to remain a pariah."

The North has been of particular interest since the death of late leader Kim Jong-il and the emergence of his son, Kim Jong-un. The young leader's gregarious style, which includes a penchant for American pop culture and a high-profile wife, prompted hopes of modernization but also fears that he would resort to military actions to prove his mettle.

Though "Real North Korea" doesn't tread much new territory for Lankov's prolific body of work, the book is well-timed to satiate a wave of new interest in the North. The professor is one of the best-suited for the task, having once studied at Kim Il-sung University; he is also one of the most engaging and wryly-humorous voices in a field largely populated by policy wonks.

Lankov takes readers back to the formation of the country in order to show the changes that have shaped its decisions and will lead to its inevitable transformation. Early leaders such as Soviet-backed founder Kim Il-sung may have been shrewd, Lankov says, but they were not cold-minded killers. "Rather, they were sincere _ if ruthless _ idealists who wanted to bring about a perfect world. They made the wrong choice, however."

The disruption of foreign aid after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a failure of the state economy, forcing Pyongyang to rely on diplomacy and the leveraging of its nuclear program. It also contributed to the collapse of the agriculture system and the state rationing system. North Koreans have increasingly relied on the country's informal markets, which have led to an increase of entrepreneurship and a bourgeoning middle class.

The biggest problem for the North, Lankov posits, is the staggering economic success of the South.

"North Korean propagandists face an unenviable situation: they have to explain the stunning prosperity of the area that at the time of the division was an agricultural backwater and is populated by members of the same ethnic group who share the same language and culture as the destitute inhabitants of North Korea. Now…the information blockade has become more difficult to maintain," he writes.

Lankov outlines four possible scenarios that could change the status quo, which comes at the expense of a repressed, impoverished population. The first involved Kim Jong-un changing the regime's ways and attempting gradual, China-style reforms.

Such a "Pyongyang Spring" however, would mean the regime would be less stable than under previous leaders and not require the regime to maintain the right balance of "terror, persuasion, and material incentives.

"If such a ‘developmental dictatorship' is to emerge in North Korea, the present author would welcome it almost wholeheartedly _ with full understanding that many will accuse him of being cynical and heartless. No system is perfect, and dictatorship, developmental or not, is bound to be nasty. Nonetheless, the lives of the average North Koreans will greatly improve under such a regime that is also less likely to be provocative," he says. Other scenarios include serious factional infighting, popular uprising or some contagion of unrest in China.

The author believes the fate of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were sealed by their economic inefficiency and that an increasing awareness among North Koreans of their economic woes will likely drive change in Pyongyang. He says the most effective way to change the country is engagement in official and informal exchanges to increase the flow of information into the country. These should include academic and cultural exchanges approved by Pyongyang, even if it is elite North Koreans who are the beneficiaries.

"To be frank, (elites) are exactly the type of people who matter most. Changes to North Korea might start from below, but it is more likely that transformation will be initiated by well-informed and disillusioned members of the elite," he says.

While his call comes at a time of diminished appetite for engagement, the book itself may be arriving at the perfect time. As interest in the North increases, "Real North Korea" is an informative effort that provides a well-rounded picture of the situation in an opaque country.