By Frank Ching
Almost as suddenly as it began, the severe tensions that descended on the Sino-American relationship in the winter dissipated with the spring and, last week, U.S. President Barack Obama held another meeting with his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, the fourth in a year.
In a way, the crisis was contrived. It was precipitated by the American announcement in January of a $6.4 billion arms sales package for Taiwan.
Although the United States has been selling arms to Taiwan for the last three decades, the ferocity of the Chinese response was unprecedented.
Oil was poured on the fire the following month when President Obama met with the Dalai Lama, even though the United States had told Chinese leaders in advance that he would do so.
Again, there were furious cries of American ``interference in Chinese internal affairs.''
American Ambassador Jon Huntsman was called in for a dressing down by the Chinese Foreign Ministry and told that the meeting with the Tibetan spiritual leader had ``seriously hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and seriously undermined China-U.S. relations.''
Other issues, such as allegations of Chinese cyber-spying, also beset the relationship. Google very publicly announced that it was moving its search engine from mainland China to Hong Kong.
On one level, China threatened reprisals against the American companies that manufactured weapons to be sold to Taiwan ― a list that would include Boeing, for whom Beijing is a major customer for passenger planes.
Far more importantly, however, China threatened to withhold cooperation on key international issues, such as sanctioning Iran for its suspected nuclear weapons program.
The Chinese wanted to make the point that if Washington were to disregard China's ``core interests,'' Beijing could retaliate by ignoring American ``core interests'' ― as if China would not be affected by nuclear proliferation.
For a long time, China would not respond when asked if President Hu would accept the Obama invitation to attend the nuclear security summit in Washington scheduled for April 12 and 13.
But then, at the end of March, the logjam was finally broken. Within a 24-hour period, two things happened.
First, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg held a press briefing, which was meant to be on his planned trip to the Balkans.
But the official went out of his way to talk about China and reiterated U.S. adherence to the ``one China'' policy, asserting that the United States does not support independence for either Taiwan or Tibet.
Second, President Obama received the credentials of the new Chinese ambassador, Zhang Yesui. During the meeting, the president reaffirmed the ``one China'' policy and stressed the need for the United States and China to work together on ``critical global issues.''
Both events bore all the hallmarks of having been orchestrated. They were immediately, and positively, reported in Beijing.
``China appreciates the positive remarks on China-U.S. relations made by President Obama and Deputy Secretary Steinberg,'' the Foreign Ministry spokesman said, ``and values the U.S. side's reiteration of its principled commitment on issues concerning Taiwan and Tibet.''
The next day, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was in Canada to attend a G8 meeting, said that China agreed Iran must not possess nuclear weapons and would play a role in forging sanctions against the Islamic nation at the United Nations.
In Beijing, it was announced that President Hu would attend the nuclear security summit in Washington. The crisis was over.
The question is: Did China gain anything from the crisis? Certainly, the United States will be more circumspect in the future about selling arms to Taiwan.
But since such arms sales are mandated by law, they are bound to happen again. Similarly, American presidents have been meeting with the Dalai Lama for 20 years, and such meetings will no doubt continue.
If anything, the nuclear security summit shows that despite all the talk of a rising China and a declining America, the United States is the only country that could have called such a meeting and successfully got so many countries to pledge to take action to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years.
China could have refused to take part out of spite but, if it did that, it would have tarnished its own image. China would have hurt itself much more than the United States by its petulance.
President Obama bowed when he shook hands with President Hu. The Chinese leader did not bow back. But the American had clearly won in this battle of wills. He could afford to be magnanimous.
Frank Ching is a journalist and commentator in Hong Kong. He can be reached at Frank.ching@gmail.com.