What to expect in 2011?

So, the year 2011 of the Christian era has finally arrived ― and, in accordance to the established tradition, it is time to wonder about what we should expect to happen in the relations between the two Korean states during the next 12 months.

By Andrei Lankov

So, the year 2011 of the Christian era has finally arrived ― and, in accordance to the established tradition, it is time to wonder about what we should expect to happen in the relations between the two Korean states during the next 12 months.

Right now, it appears as if the situation, so tense throughout 2010, is beginning to improve. The North has toned down its rhetoric and suggested that talks with the U.S. and South Korea might be a good idea. Actually, over the last two weeks it has virtually showered Seoul and Washington with proposals for talks for improving relations.

Does this mean that the recent dramatic round of the never-ending ``Korean crisis” is over? Alas, this is not the case. On the contrary, there are good reasons to expect that a new round in the crisis is about to start.

When Pyongyang strategists hope to squeeze some aid or political concessions from other side, they follow the same tactics. First, they manufacture a crisis, and do everything to drive tensions high. The missiles are launched, islands are shelled, and verbal threats are made. At certain moments, North Korean behavior might look positively insane, but this is a well-calculated madness. Once tensions are sufficiently high, Pyongyang will suggest negotiations. The other parties sigh with relief and start talks, which usually end with Pyongyang getting what it wants ― in exchange for being quiet again.

The sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island shelling, combined with the usually intense verbal sabre-rattling constituted the part of this ``policy of tensions”, which was aimed at South Korea. For Washington, North Korean leaders arranged a demonstration of the first-class uranium enrichment facility, thus providing a reminder about their large and growing proliferation potential.

So, as usual, Pyongyang reminded the world that it is dangerous, so it is cheaper and safer to pay it if off. But what concessions does North Korea hope to get this time?

As usual, what they want is, above all, money. In 2008 both South Korea and U.S. administrations halted unilateral aid to North Korea. This did not make Pyongyang leaders desperate ― as a matter of fact, the economic situation in North Korea is better than it has ever been since the early 1990s. However, this has made them way too dependent on China which is now the only sponsor of the North Korean regime.

North Korean leaders do not trust China, and this is not paranoia: China reluctantly supports the current North Korean regime, and it has no sympathy for the Kims’ absolute monarchy and has no illusions about its long-term sustainability. It was shown vividly by the WikiLeaks cables, but frankly this Chinese attitude has been known for years. Therefore growing dependence on China makes Pyongyang strategists uncomfortable, and they want Seoul and Washington to rejoin the game, so North Korea will be able to manipulate the contradictions between their manifold sponsors, milking all of them without becoming too dependent on any single one of them.

So, in the last few weeks North Korea decided to check whether their adversaries/donors are tense enough due to the recent crisis and whether they are now willing to talk and make concessions.

However, it seems that they are going to be bitterly disappointed: neither South Korea nor Washington is likely to give in right now, and their first reaction to Pyongyang’s charm offensive showed this. In South Korea, the current administration seems to believe that the hard line works (which is, probably, an illusion). In the U.S., the North Korean uranium program is seen as a threat, but a relatively minor one, so Washington is not ready to talk unless North Korea will start denuclearizing itself ― and this is not going to happen, since the current regime has not the slightest intention to surrender existent nukes.

So, it seems that North Korean strategists will soon see that this time their stratagems did not work. It has happened before: in July-October 2009, after a wave of provocations Pyongyang made conciliatory gestures somewhat comparable to what we see now. Soon it became clear that neither South Koreans nor Americans were eagerly rushing with generous aid packages. So, North Korean leaders decided that it would be a good idea to apply more pressure ― and we have just seen what they meant by this.

There are good reasons to suspect that the same scenario will be repeated. After a few bouts of diplomatic activity, Pyongyang will realize that money and aid are not coming, so it will start raising tensions again ― by shelling islands, landing marines, launching missiles or, most probable, doing something completely new and unexpected. If this is the case, we should not be misled by the current relaxation. In a few months’ time we might again be in the middle of a fresh crisis, with journalists rushing to Seoul to report on a war which, as they will be sure, will be ready to erupt in Korea. There will be no war, of course, but times will be tough indeed.

Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. He can be reached at anlankov@yahoo.com.