Workers Party Conference

By Andrei Lankov
Korea Times Columnist

So, on June 26 the KCNA, the official North Korean wire agency reported that the ruling Korean Workers Party (KWP) is going to hold a Party Conference in Pyongyang this coming September.

This is big news, since the conference itself is a very unusual event. Essentially, it is a downsized version of the Party Congress which is supposed to discuss urgent strategic issues. The last time a Party Conference was convened was in 1966, 44 years ago.

Generally speaking, in the last few decades the North almost completely jettisoned even the vestiges of the formal quasi-democratic rituals which exist in other communist states. The party Congress, which is supposed to meet every five years, has not convened even once since 1980, and even the KWP Central Committee has not held formal meetings since 1993.

There must be a mighty good reason to hold the conference now, and it is almost universally expected that it is for one purpose _ the appointment of Kim Jong-il's successor. The name of the successor has not been made public officially, but it has been widely known for about a year, after much hesitation and delays, the dictator's youngest son, Kim Jong-un, would be selected to lead the North Korean state.

Nobody expects any discussion to happen at the conference: the ``representative" bodies in North Korea consist of members who allegedly got 100-percent approval of their constituencies, and who always vote unanimously in support of the government decisions. However, these bodies sometimes have important formal functions. For example, a Party Congress was convened in 1980 when it was necessary to confirm the promotion of Kim Jong-il to the position of successor to his father.

Obviously, the North Korean leadership began preparations for the future without Kim Jong-il. And it is remarkable that these preparations seem to be carried out in a great hurry.

In early June the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), a rubber-stamping parliament of North Korea, held an unusual session. The SPA is normally supposed to meet once a year, for a short session which lasts merely a few days. However, this year SPA had already held a regular session in April. It is unusual to have two sessions within one year, and it is extremely unusual if a new session is convened just a couple of months after the previous one.

The rubber-stamping SPA still has one important function: it has to confirm the personnel changes in the Cabinet. And indeed, the last SPA session announced important changes in the composition of the government. The prime minister and some key cabinet members were replaced.

However, by far the most important appointment was the promotion of 64-old Chang Song-taek who was made the first deputy chairman of the National Defense Committee. This militaristic title is actually a close equivalent to the post of vice-president, since the chairman of the National Defense Commission is the supreme executive of the North Korean state. Kim Jong-il is running the country in such capacity.

The promotion of Chang was not unexpected: he has long been seen as the most influential member of the North Korean inner circle. Roughly the same age as Kim Jong-il, and married into the Great Family (Chang Song-taek's wife is Kim Jong-il's sister), he is believed to be one of the youngest and most energetic members of the increasingly gerontocratic leadership. Most of Pyongyang's top officials are now in their late 70s and early 80s, so Chang appears to be quite young against such background. His recent promotion seems to confirm what has been rumored for the last few years: Chang Song-taek is likely to become the person in charge of state affairs in case of Kim Jong-il's sudden death.

At first glance the choice of Kim Jong-un as a successor to his father seems to be strange. Of all available candidates, Kim Jong-un appears to be the least qualified. He is young, merely 27 or 28 years old, he has spent much time overseas, in Switzerland, and he has no political or administrative experience.

However, this might be exactly the reasons why the youngest of Pyongyang princes was chosen as the successor. It is not clear to which extent this choice serves the interests of Kim Jong-il and his family, but it clearly serves the vested interests of the North Korea's "old guard," the people who now surround the Dear Leader. In case of Kim Jong-Il's sudden death, the young prince who has no experience, no power base and no network of reliable friends will have to rely on the advice and guidance of his father's officials. So, by promoting Kim Jong-un the inner circle of Kim Jong-Il's advisers makes certain that even after the sudden death of the Dear General they will not face any huge challenges and will remain in control.

A new power structure is emerging: a member of the Kim family as essentially a powerless puppet (who still will be an object of hysterical worship) and a collective leadership whose members will include the present day top officials and they will manipulate the successor.

However, another peculiarity attracts some attention: the SPA session was convened in a great hurry, and Party Conference is scheduled a bit too soon. After all, it took eight years before the unofficial promotion of Kim Jong-Il in 1972 was made public at the Party Congress of 1980, and now the Conference is being convened merely one and half years after the campaign began. What are the reasons behind such a rush?

Of course, there might be different answers to this question ― after all, our knowledge of Pyongyang's high politics is limited to the extreme.

However, one explanation particularly stands out since it seems to be most likely. In recent pictures Kim Jong-Il does not look good. His physical appearance greatly deteriorated in early 2009, after he suffered a serious medical crisis (perhaps, a stroke) in late 2008. Then it appeared for a while that his health had improved, but recent pictures again show a rapidly aging man.

It is likely that North Korean top leaders know or, at least, strongly suspect that the Dear Leader might die at any time, and if this is the case, they have to speed up the preparations. After all, this serves their interests: they do not want chaos which might get them all killed, and they do not want any arrangement which will leave them out of the power equation. Their goal is simple: they want to stay in control until they die. Taking into consideration that the average age of this group is close to 80, this goal can be seen as moderate.

It means that in case of Kim's death not much will actually change ― for a few years, at least. If plans will be carried out as intended (a big ``if," of course), after Kim Jong-il's demise his country will be effectively run by the same people who are likely to continue with the same policies ― until senility and the reaper will take care of them, of course, in the not-so-distant future.

Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. He can be reached at anlankov@yahoo.com.