By Andrei Lankov
Over the last month, the world media has again begun to write about "growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula." Some have gone even so far as to hint that a new Korean War could be on the way. When Pyongyang promises to make Seoul a "sea of fire," there is little wonder that such statements are relatively common.
However, South Koreans are not particularly worried. The ongoing stream of bellicose rhetoric emanating from Pyongyang is a fact of life on the Korean Peninsula. There is little reason to worry that some conflict might happen, as experience has taught us that North Korea uses rhetoric when they do not intent to attack, and when they actually attack they do so without warning.
Nonetheless, the intensity of the campaign is rather unusual. In the past, the North Korean government has made outlandish declarations but seldom if ever has it threatened the outside world with such frequency and abandon. It appears that North Korean diplomats are playing an old tune now, but are playing it at a very high volume.
There are two possible explanations for the current campaign. First, North Korean decision-makers might be perplexed and annoyed by the diminishing returns of their standard tactics. Indeed, North Korea has in the past used the same kind of trick seeking aid. Threats were hurled, violent language used, and the outside world began to wonder whether stability in and around Korea was indeed under threat.
At the second stage, North Korean diplomats indicate their willingness to negotiate and solve the crisis of their own creation. Of course, they will not do this for free, but indicate that they expect diplomatic concessions and additional aid for their generosity.
Such tactics worked well for quite some time. However, after so many cycles, the targets of North Korean diplomacy have developed a healthy skepticism of bowing to North Korean pressure and providing rewards to North Korea for its willingness to behave itself for a while.
This does not mean that these old tactics do not work anymore, but it is clear that they are nowhere near as effective as they once were. It is indeed unlikely that this time the United States will rush to hand over generous aid. Therefore, facing increasing difficulties in applying their favorite tactics, the North has to outdo itself in its very fine art of brinksmanship.
However, there might be another reason behind the unusual intensity of the current campaign ― domestic problems that the North Korean government faces.
There are good reasons to believe the last decade or so was a time when the regime in Pyongyang began to lose support from the general population and even the lower elite. For decades, the regime's propaganda has promised a utopia just around the corner and, for a while, this propaganda was believed. It seems though that the reservoirs of credibility are all but depleted. North Koreans no longer believe or trust their government, nor do they take its promises seriously.
The latter contributes to growing domestic dissatisfaction. This does not necessarily mean that North Korea is on the brink of a popular uprising. However, it does seem that the North Korean government cannot take the docility and obedience of its people for granted any longer.
If this is the case, an unusually intense campaign might make perfect sense. This is a good way to remind the people that they surrounded by evil and scheming enemies who are on the verge of attacking North Korea. In a few weeks time, when the campaign has run its course, it will be possible to describe it as a triumph. Government propagandists are likely to say that the feared US invasion did not happen exactly because the bloodthirsty Americans were driven away by North Korea's determination, as well as by the strategic genius of the young General Marshall Kim Jong-un.
Paradoxically, the current campaign might be even perfectly compatible with changes in North Korea's leadership. Recent changes in Pyongyang's government indicate a further decline in the power of the military as well as the reemergence of civilian officials who are rumored to be reform-minded.
Contrary to what many might say, there is little contradiction between attempts at reform within the country and bellicosity towards the outside world. After all, a reforming North Korean government will need domestic stability as much as a conservative one, and propaganda histrionics is a good way of keeping the people under control.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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However, South Koreans are not particularly worried. The ongoing stream of bellicose rhetoric emanating from Pyongyang is a fact of life on the Korean Peninsula. There is little reason to worry that some conflict might happen, as experience has taught us that North Korea uses rhetoric when they do not intent to attack, and when they actually attack they do so without warning.
Nonetheless, the intensity of the campaign is rather unusual. In the past, the North Korean government has made outlandish declarations but seldom if ever has it threatened the outside world with such frequency and abandon. It appears that North Korean diplomats are playing an old tune now, but are playing it at a very high volume.
There are two possible explanations for the current campaign. First, North Korean decision-makers might be perplexed and annoyed by the diminishing returns of their standard tactics. Indeed, North Korea has in the past used the same kind of trick seeking aid. Threats were hurled, violent language used, and the outside world began to wonder whether stability in and around Korea was indeed under threat.
At the second stage, North Korean diplomats indicate their willingness to negotiate and solve the crisis of their own creation. Of course, they will not do this for free, but indicate that they expect diplomatic concessions and additional aid for their generosity.
Such tactics worked well for quite some time. However, after so many cycles, the targets of North Korean diplomacy have developed a healthy skepticism of bowing to North Korean pressure and providing rewards to North Korea for its willingness to behave itself for a while.
This does not mean that these old tactics do not work anymore, but it is clear that they are nowhere near as effective as they once were. It is indeed unlikely that this time the United States will rush to hand over generous aid. Therefore, facing increasing difficulties in applying their favorite tactics, the North has to outdo itself in its very fine art of brinksmanship.
However, there might be another reason behind the unusual intensity of the current campaign ― domestic problems that the North Korean government faces.
There are good reasons to believe the last decade or so was a time when the regime in Pyongyang began to lose support from the general population and even the lower elite. For decades, the regime's propaganda has promised a utopia just around the corner and, for a while, this propaganda was believed. It seems though that the reservoirs of credibility are all but depleted. North Koreans no longer believe or trust their government, nor do they take its promises seriously.
The latter contributes to growing domestic dissatisfaction. This does not necessarily mean that North Korea is on the brink of a popular uprising. However, it does seem that the North Korean government cannot take the docility and obedience of its people for granted any longer.
If this is the case, an unusually intense campaign might make perfect sense. This is a good way to remind the people that they surrounded by evil and scheming enemies who are on the verge of attacking North Korea. In a few weeks time, when the campaign has run its course, it will be possible to describe it as a triumph. Government propagandists are likely to say that the feared US invasion did not happen exactly because the bloodthirsty Americans were driven away by North Korea's determination, as well as by the strategic genius of the young General Marshall Kim Jong-un.
Paradoxically, the current campaign might be even perfectly compatible with changes in North Korea's leadership. Recent changes in Pyongyang's government indicate a further decline in the power of the military as well as the reemergence of civilian officials who are rumored to be reform-minded.
Contrary to what many might say, there is little contradiction between attempts at reform within the country and bellicosity towards the outside world. After all, a reforming North Korean government will need domestic stability as much as a conservative one, and propaganda histrionics is a good way of keeping the people under control.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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