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It would be an exaggeration to say that North Korea's third nuclear test came out of the blue. It is well known that nuclear tests go well with missile launches in Pyongyang's milieu. After the successful (the first successful) test of a long-range missile in December the nuclear test followed soon.
The test left little room for surprise. There is widespread condemnation, and we can pretty confidently expect a new, harshly worded resolution to come from the U.N. Security Council in the near future. It seems that China will support this resolution, too ― after all, it went to great lengths to prevent the test, though it ultimately failed in its efforts.
Earlier experiences have, however, demonstrated what will come of these international efforts. The short answer is nothing. Sanctions do not work, though this will be hard for many to accept.
The recent test has once again demonstrated the ineffectiveness of sanctions. North Korea has been subject to an increasingly harsh sanctions regime since 2006. During this period, Pyongyang has tested two more nuclear devices and has undertaken three missile tests (the last was a remarkable success). At the same time, this has also been a period of moderate improvement in the living standards of North Koreans – contrary to what is often stated in the international media, the lives of North Koreans are gradually improving, not worsening.
There is hardly a clearer case of sanctions failure. To a very large extent this is because of quiet Chinese sabotage. China certainly is seriously annoyed by North Korea's brinksmanship. Nonetheless, it does not want to corner Pyongyang, and a nuclear North Korea is a lesser evil compared to a collapsing North Korea. China is most likely not providing active assistance in the field of military technology, but food aid is provided in large quantities.
Chinese sabotage is not the only reason why sanctions have failed however. There are good reasons to believe that even a properly enforced sanctions regime would fail to achieve its goal. Certainly efficient sanctions are likely to be very bad for the North Korean economy, but it is quite doubtful that they will have any real impact on the policies of the regime. After all, North Koreans do not vote or rebel (at least, this has been the case until now), and hence cannot influence the decision making process.
Now the hopes of hardliners are pinned on so-called "targeted financial sanctions," these are quite similar to those imposed in 2006-07 which can be introduced unilaterally by the US. Such sanctions would make it almost illegal for the international banking system to deal with North Korean money. It is hoped that such a policy will deliver a serious blow to North Korea's trade, thus depriving the country and its leadership of hard currency.
It does, however, remain to be seen whether such sanctions will produce the desired effect. It should not be forgotten that North Korea's trade is dominated by China, most of the transactions are small and can easily evade outside observers. In some cases, payments can be made in cash (after all we are talking about relatively small transactions).
This is exactly how North Korean businesses operated when financial sanctions were briefly implemented six years ago. It is quite possible therefore that those financial sanctions might have some impact. Judging by experience to date however, it is best not to be excessively optimistic.
It seems that the inefficiency of sanctions is increasingly widely understood – even by people who publically advocate the implementation of hard-line policies. Nonetheless, a new round of sanctions is all but unavoidable. Even though experts tend to understand the uselessness of the exercise, decision makers, presidents, and prime ministers, as well as other dignitaries that seldom have a good understanding of North Korean politics.
It is clear that North Korea has challenged the international order, and sanctions are commonly taken to be a sufficiently harsh response. This is what the general public expects policy makers to do. Therefore, it is likely to be done as a sort of meaningless ritual dance or a face-saving exercise for the international community, a way to be seen to be doing something when actually doing nothing.
The question remains, what should be done next? It seems that a perfect solution to the problem is nearly impossible – North Korea's leaders will never agree to denuclearisation. A partial and very imperfect solution might be possible, but it will be achievable not through sanctions and tough talk but rather through compromises and negotiation.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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