A bumpy road ahead for Park

By Andrei Lankov

The presidential elections ended with the narrow victory of Park Geun-hye, leader of South Korea's moderate right.

So, it is time to wonder what we should expect from President-elect Park. For example, what is her policy toward North Korea likely to look like?

The last five years, the time of Lee Myung-bak's administration, have been a hard era when it comes to relations between the two Koreas. It was essentially the period of a Cold War, but at some points, tensions erupted into violent confrontations ― most remarkably in 2010, when the North Koreans first torpedoed a South Korean warship and then subsequently shelled a South Korean island.

In the last couple of years, most South Koreans have come to perceive the hard line of the current administration as unsustainable and dangerous ― even though it still has some supporters.

As a result, while campaigning Park has gone to great lengths on a couple of occasions to distance herself from the so-called "excesses" of the current administration ― she even said that she would not mind participating in a summit with the young North Korean leader (as a matter of fact, she met his father in 2002).

Should we expect Park's rule to bring with it an era of reconciliation and exchanges? Perhaps, but don't hold your breath.

To start with, Park's advisors tend to come from a group of right-leaning politicians and academics ― many of whom are almost paranoid about the North. They still perceive North Korea as a real threat to South Korean security, and they also see themselves as in competition with the North for legitimacy (even now!).

This group is therefore very reluctant to give unilateral concessions and unconditional aid to North Korea. Admittedly, the economic exchanges between North and South have always been extremely lopsided in favor of the North (even when these exchanges are not described as ''aid").

Nearly all significant joint cooperation projects would be unviable without the systematic infusion of South Korean taxpayers' money. Taking into account the gross economic differences between two Koreas, it cannot be otherwise.

Many around President-elect Park see these subsidies as gifts, which allow the North Korean elite to strengthen their repressive system and engage in nuclear and missile development. However, such giveaways are necessary to improve relations with the North, since the previous experience confirms: North Korea will only agree to behave itself so long as they get tangible economic benefits from doing so.

Park has also said that she expects North Korea to admit responsibility for the sinking of the Cheonan and the Yeongpyeongdo shelling. These demands are clearly a non-starter ― North Korea's leadership clearly understand that such an admission of guilt will give them not merely a loss of face, but also damage those influential forces in South Korea who blame the conservative-dominated South Korean government (and these forces tend to be friendly towards North Korea).

Such an admission will backfire, and North Korean decision makers know this from their own experience. In 2002 Kim Jong-il, while speaking with then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, accepted responsibility for the abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s. Back then, Kim obviously thought that such an honest admission would lead to better relations with Japan and, of course, more aid.

The response was the opposite, since the Japanese public was scandalized and normalization of relations between the two countries became unthinkable. This was not lost on North Korea's decision makers, who understand that honesty is clearly not the best policy.

So, it is quite possible that the first stages of Park's policies will not be marked by a dramatic change in Seoul's official attitude to North Korea. Most likely, she will show her interest in improving such relations, but will not rush to the North with truckloads of cash.

It remains to be seen whether incremental change will set in and whether the North Korean government will, in the meantime, patiently wait for a gradual transformation in South Korea's attitude. Alas, it is possible the North Korean government will grew impatient and then will do what it did in 2010, "punishing" a non-cooperative South Korean government by staging an armed incident or two – just to remind the South Korean voters that they should support a softer line next time.

If this is going to happen, it remains to be seen how President Park's administration will react to such challenge, but another five years of cold war is a distinct possibility.

Let's hope rather that President Park will move rapidly to get inter-Korean relations back on a positive track by attempting to arrange a summit in the New Year. At the same time, however, even a mild confrontation is likely to postpone improvements in North-South relations for another five long years ― and the probability of such a confrontation is rather high.

Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.