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The picture is still probably fresh in our readers' memory: Pyongyang, December 2011. A large black hearse with the coffin of the recently departed Marshall Kim Jong-il slowly moves through the streets of the North Korean capital. Eight people are walking alongside side it ― four uniformed military commanders on the left and four top civilian bureaucrats on the right, with Kim Jong-un (yet to be seen wearing a military uniform) at the head of the civilian line.
Well what has happened to these eight people over the last year? Their fate is quite remarkable: all the military officers have lost their positions, while all the civilians remain in place. This is important, not least because one of the few changes which could be observed in North Korea over the last year was a slow, but significant shift of power away from the military and back to the party-state.
Let's have a close look at the generals who held the highest military positions in the land as of late last year. Only one of them is known to be alive, his standing has diminished dramatically. His name is Kim Yong-chun, at the time of the funeral he was the first deputy defence minister ― second-in-command of the North Korean military. As one would expect, he was placed second in the line of four generals next to the hearse.
Kim Yong Chun lost his job in April ― allegedly because of bad health. He has not disappeared from public view, though he is now responsible for civil defence nationwide. This is not a complete disgrace for the man, but is clearly nonetheless a significant demotion.
The other three have fared much worse. At the funeral, the most prominent role was reserved for Ri Yong-ho, then chief of North Korea's general staff. On July 17, the North Korean public learnt that a special Politburo session relieved Ri of his troublesome duties. Nothing has been heard about him since then _ but if persistent rumours are to be believed his name is spoken of most unfavourably behind the scenes and in indoctrination sessions. It is not impossible that the old general is now under arrest, and it is all but certain that he has completely fallen from grace.
The third among the four generals was Kim Chong-kak, who at the time of the funeral was the first deputy head of the Korean People's Army (KPA) General Political Office. His job was in essence to be the top liaison between the party and military. He was briefly promoted in April, but in November he also lost his position and has not been seen since.
The last man is U Tong-chik, the first deputy minister of state security ― i.e. the real head of North Korea's secret police, intelligence and counterespionage service (quite a scary job, I would say). U was also fired in April and since then nothing has been heard about him.
We have witnessed the sudden dismissal of all four people who were just one year ago publically presented as the top military leaders of the country. This is a big deal, but purges of the military itself have gone much further than just the apex of its hierarchy. Many North Korean generals of lesser standing, including corps commanders, have also been dismissed. It also seems that a few weeks ago, North Korea acquired a new minister of defence, Gen. Kim Kyok-sik, whose appointment has not been made public so far.
So in spite of all the lip-service paid to the ''military-first" policy, the military has been marginalised and the centre stage has come to be dominated by lifelong party functionaries and technocrats. Kim Jong-un's uncle, Jang Seong-thaek, seems to be the most influential member of this emerging group. Predictably, he also participated in the funeral, he walked just behind Kim Jong-un himself.
People often present these purges as the struggle between moderate civilians and hard-line generals. There is little doubt that across the globe, the military tends to gravitate towards hard-line policies. Generals often believe that in this world there are few problems which cannot be solved by an artillery barrage or, better still, a precision missile strike. Nonetheless, we cannot know whether this is the case in North Korea. We know precious little about the actual political views, inclinations, and values of North Korea's top officials ― military and civilian alike.
So it is therefore possible that what we see is merely a power struggle between two interest groups who differ little in their actual approach to political questions. Sometimes a power struggle is just a struggle for power. At any rate, the removal of top military commanders has yet to have any visible impact on North Korean government policy.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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