By Andrei Lankov
Dear readers, I am sorry to say so, but this seems to be the last regular column on North Korea I shall publish in The Korea Times. Professional and personal issues have left me little choice but to cut down on the amount of journalistic writing, and from now on, I will write on North Korea only for some other specialized websites.
The column has been around for nearly 15 years, with hundreds of pieces published by The Korean Times. I would like to express my gratitude to my editors and, of course, my readers. However, I will continue to contribute articles on topics that are not related to North Korea.
Leaving the hospitable pages of The Korea Times as a regular columnist, I have to assure my readers that the topic of North Korea is not going anywhere. North Korea's future is difficult to predict, but all conceivable scenarios are likely to be painful and costly ― both for the North Koreans and their neighbors.
It is absolutely possible that North Korea will become another "development dictatorship" in East Asia ― this seems to be what its current leaders want and, objectively speaking, it might be the least unacceptable future. However, it is not going to be perfect.
While fast economic growth will improve the lot of the vast majority of the North Koreans (like it has in reforming China and Vietnam), the elite have to maintain political stability ― and the only way to do so is to remain repressive. This means that while millions of common North Koreans will be lifted out of poverty, tens of thousands will live hellish lives in the prison camps, where many of them have already and will perish.
Last but not least, the success of a "development dictatorship" in East Asia will probably make the countries' division permanent. The North Korean elite, firmly in control, will have no reason to unify with a much stronger South for many decades, and then the two societies will probably drift too far apart to be merged.
The second possibility is a regime change that almost certainly will result in unification with the South ― or, rather absorption of the North by the South. The transition, alas, is unlikely to be another velvet revolution ― the North Korean elite see themselves as cornered, and will fight to the death, like the cornered Alawite elite is doing right now in Syria. Things might be complicated by involvement of the neighboring great powers ― above all, the United States and China ― and, in the worst-case scenario, the internal turmoil in North Korea might even trigger an international war fought on Korean soil, with Koreans being its main victims.
However, even if such threats are avoided, and regime collapse is relatively non-violent, with merely a few thousand people being killed (an optimistic scenario, actually, given the situation), post-unification reconstruction is going to be very, very painful. The huge gap between the North and South Korean economies will take at least a generation to be bridged, and until it is, the North Koreans will remain third-class citizens in the unified state, with low incomes and little power. The frictions and distrust between the former North and former South will last for decades, poisoning the atmosphere of post-unification Korea.
At any rate the Korean Peninsula remains a flashpoint ― and now this flashpoint is seriously going nuclear. While the Kim family has thus far loved their palaces and banquets too much to start a war, one cannot completely rule out the possibility of a conflagration of forces in the near future. A technical mistake or a false alarm might trigger a war. It is also possible the Kim family will choose to deliver a nuclear first strike if they, rightly or wrongly, see themselves as under attack, a victim of South Korean or American provocation. For example, a mass uprising in Pyongyang could be interpreted as a CIA or NIS plot, with predictably grave consequences for people in Seoul, but also, perhaps, in Tokyo and San Francisco. This is, of course, a low-probability scenario, but not beyond the realm of the possible.
And, no matter what the future holds, the North Korean government will have virtually no choice but to play the high-stakes diplomatic games that hold the best chances for their survival, but that can still get out of control.
So, as a regular columnist I am bowing out, but the "North Korean issue" is here to stay ― perhaps, for decades. Alas, the problem can be mitigated and even gradually dealt with, but no fast and sure solution exists, no matter what ideologues and pundits of all colors tell you.
Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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The column has been around for nearly 15 years, with hundreds of pieces published by The Korean Times. I would like to express my gratitude to my editors and, of course, my readers. However, I will continue to contribute articles on topics that are not related to North Korea.
Leaving the hospitable pages of The Korea Times as a regular columnist, I have to assure my readers that the topic of North Korea is not going anywhere. North Korea's future is difficult to predict, but all conceivable scenarios are likely to be painful and costly ― both for the North Koreans and their neighbors.
It is absolutely possible that North Korea will become another "development dictatorship" in East Asia ― this seems to be what its current leaders want and, objectively speaking, it might be the least unacceptable future. However, it is not going to be perfect.
While fast economic growth will improve the lot of the vast majority of the North Koreans (like it has in reforming China and Vietnam), the elite have to maintain political stability ― and the only way to do so is to remain repressive. This means that while millions of common North Koreans will be lifted out of poverty, tens of thousands will live hellish lives in the prison camps, where many of them have already and will perish.
Last but not least, the success of a "development dictatorship" in East Asia will probably make the countries' division permanent. The North Korean elite, firmly in control, will have no reason to unify with a much stronger South for many decades, and then the two societies will probably drift too far apart to be merged.
The second possibility is a regime change that almost certainly will result in unification with the South ― or, rather absorption of the North by the South. The transition, alas, is unlikely to be another velvet revolution ― the North Korean elite see themselves as cornered, and will fight to the death, like the cornered Alawite elite is doing right now in Syria. Things might be complicated by involvement of the neighboring great powers ― above all, the United States and China ― and, in the worst-case scenario, the internal turmoil in North Korea might even trigger an international war fought on Korean soil, with Koreans being its main victims.
However, even if such threats are avoided, and regime collapse is relatively non-violent, with merely a few thousand people being killed (an optimistic scenario, actually, given the situation), post-unification reconstruction is going to be very, very painful. The huge gap between the North and South Korean economies will take at least a generation to be bridged, and until it is, the North Koreans will remain third-class citizens in the unified state, with low incomes and little power. The frictions and distrust between the former North and former South will last for decades, poisoning the atmosphere of post-unification Korea.
At any rate the Korean Peninsula remains a flashpoint ― and now this flashpoint is seriously going nuclear. While the Kim family has thus far loved their palaces and banquets too much to start a war, one cannot completely rule out the possibility of a conflagration of forces in the near future. A technical mistake or a false alarm might trigger a war. It is also possible the Kim family will choose to deliver a nuclear first strike if they, rightly or wrongly, see themselves as under attack, a victim of South Korean or American provocation. For example, a mass uprising in Pyongyang could be interpreted as a CIA or NIS plot, with predictably grave consequences for people in Seoul, but also, perhaps, in Tokyo and San Francisco. This is, of course, a low-probability scenario, but not beyond the realm of the possible.
And, no matter what the future holds, the North Korean government will have virtually no choice but to play the high-stakes diplomatic games that hold the best chances for their survival, but that can still get out of control.
So, as a regular columnist I am bowing out, but the "North Korean issue" is here to stay ― perhaps, for decades. Alas, the problem can be mitigated and even gradually dealt with, but no fast and sure solution exists, no matter what ideologues and pundits of all colors tell you.
Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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