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For a few months, North Korea watchers and media have been actively discussing the then-coming Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers' Party. It was not uncommon to hear that this Congress would become a major turning point, where Kim Jong-un would declare dramatic policy changes and perhaps embark on a wave of radical social and economic reforms.
However, nothing like that happened. The Seventh Congress turned out to be what such pompous events have usually been ― a boring exercise in self-congratulation, full of eulogies to the Kim Family, but little of any lasting substance.
Perhaps, one should not be surprised by this: a brief look at communist bloc history easily confirms that party congresses are grossly overstated events whose actual political impact has always been quite small.
With few rare exceptions congress of the Leninist parties in the communist blocs have never been places where new policies are first formulated. At best, such large gatherings merely rubber-stamped existing policy changes, thus giving them a measure of additional legitimacy. For example, scholars often point to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (1956) as a place where Stalin's personality cult was exposed and criticized. It is true that on during this particular congress, Nikita Khrushchev dropped a political bombshell by delivering his "secret speech" full of renunciations of Stalin. However, by the time of the congress, de-Stalinization had been in place for over two years.
Neither was the Chinese Party Congresses of the 1980s the place where new policy of ‘reform and openness' was explored, fleshed out and formulated. At most, the Congress merely confirmed new policies already put forth years earlier.
The major goal of Leninist Party Congresses is not to introduce new policy, but to demonstrate a supposed universal support for the country's leadership and their political decisions and emphasize the party's wisdom and farsightedness. In Communist countries with a strong personality cult (like North Korea) the great wisdom of the leader are bound to be the dominating topic of Congress meetings.
The Seventh Workers Party congress was no exception. Kim Jong-un read the usual boring and dry formal report which contained countless references to former victories as well as promises of upcoming success. In passing, Kim mentioned "our style of economic management" ― obviously a reference to a greater independence of economic units and, in some cases, benign neglect of private businesses. Nonetheless, his speech did not demonstrate much emphasis on the economy.
Foreign policy mentions were equally as uninspiring and dull. North Korea once again reaffirmed its commitment to remain nuclear no matter what, but promised it would never use its nuclear weapons unless its "sovereignty is threatened" (a remarkably nebulous wording). It also suggested a number of peace proposals, virtually all of which are wholly unacceptable for major negation partners, and thus moot.
Of certain interest is the rare criticism of China. Kim Jong-un emphasized that his country would never emulate a "neighboring country" which followed a dangerous path of "openness and reform." Throughout his speech, he also emphasized and sort of glorified his country's isolation, claiming that North Korea should only count on its own efforts and resources. This is another sign of the notorious and, frankly, unexplainable, antipathy that North Korean decision-makers seem to feel towards China in recent years.
It has been expected that at the Congress Kim Jong-un would promote new people, leaders of his generation. However, that has not happened either. After the Congress, the young Supreme Leader is surrounded by the same familiar old faces.
At any rate, the Seventh Party Congress, in spite being the first such event in 36 years, has been remarkably uneventful and frankly a rather boring occasion. It seems that it met merely to confirm that the political power would shift back to the party from the military, as well as to emphasize the young leader's willingness to return to the party-centered management of his grandfather's times.
However, a word of warning is necessary: the silence about reforms should not be misconstrued as a sign of Pyongyang leadership's unwillingness to reform. In fact, the past several years have been full of significant changes, often initiated from above. There are good reasons to believe such policies will continue. Nevertheless, the Party Congress is simply not a venue to discuss such changes, especially when such changes must be cautious, conditional and slow.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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