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North Korea has a reputation for being a strange, unpredictable and irrational place. To some extent, this reputation is well deserved, but sometimes seemingly irrational North Korean actions actually have clear and logical roots ― when seen in the correct light, that being the perspective of the decision-makers themselves.
It seems that quite recently we have seen another action of this type. When North Korea had its nuclear test in early January, they declared that they had tested a thermonuclear device (commonly known as a hydrogen bomb).
There is hardly any need to venture into the technicalities of nuclear physics. For our purposes it will suffice to say that a hydrogen bomb is far more powerful than a regular nuclear device, but is also far more difficult to develop and use.
Thus, the vast majority of outside observers, including in North Korea's neighbors, are highly skeptical of North Korea's claim. What's more, the seismic signature of a thermonuclear bomb blast is very different from a regular nuclear bomb's, and it did not take long for scientists to confirm that the North Korean media was not telling the truth.
This led many observers to wonder why the North Korean government made claims that were certain to be disproven. Some cited this statement as proof of North Korea's irrationality and alleged inability to foresee the consequences of its actions.
One can hardly agree with such opinions, however. Actually, North Korean claims, no matter how false, make perfect sense, if we remember a basic fact: politics is local. Indeed, the improbable claim was meant for the domestic audience, not for outsiders. The former has no way to verify said claim's authenticity or otherwise.
This coming spring, North Korea is scheduled to hold the Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers Party. This will be a grand display of Leninist party pageantry that has not occurred for some 36 years. The purpose of this is seemingly to show to the North Korean public that decades of crisis are now finished and that normality is fast returning.
However, Kim Jong-un badly needs something to tout to his congress as a dramatic success ― something that will make a big splash (bang?). Of course, another regular nuclear test, described truthfully, could have been done, but such events aren't so novel as they were in 2006, when the first such test was done. North Koreans have been told repeatedly about their country's nuclear arsenal since then.
Other options might be to launch a long-range missile or tell the people, regardless of success or failure, of the successful placement of a satellite into orbit. The North Korean government has already done this a number of times, however ― even though their satellite really reached orbit only once. Thus, such an event would probably be too modest for the coming congress. It just would not be impressive enough to undergird the great claims of the Kim Jong-un genius.
The North Koreans made a logical choice, conducting a regular nuclear test while presenting it as a thermonuclear detonation. But so long as it is for domestic consumption, what is the problem? Of course, some North Koreans listen to foreign radio broadcasts, and more are travelling overseas.
Nonetheless, what reason do we have to believe that North Korean party cadres ― and a significant part of the public ― would take foreign broadcasts at face value? They understand that the foreign media is not a big fan of their country's leadership, and are inclined to see such broadcasts as part of a propaganda campaign. This is not to say that they will completely ignore foreign reports, but in all likelihood, the vast majority of the North Korean audience will decide that there is no way to know the truth ― and many of them, driven by patriotic feelings, will be more inclined to believe the official statements of their government.
Thus, once again the North Korean government proves to be less simple-minded and crazy than many want to believe. We should not be too surprised about this. Had they really been as mad and stupid as they are sometimes present to be, how would they have survived against such bad odds? Like it or not, these people usually know what they are doing.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.