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So, North Korea had another nuclear test on Jan. 6, and the world media is in a state of its usual frenzy. There are talks about provocations, irrational bellicosity and the like, as well as hints at the coming retribution.
However, one should be skeptical about these hints and this frenzy in general. Experience tells us that one should not expect anything new. The U.N. Security Council is likely to have another emergency meeting, and rest assured, there will be another resolution condemning North Korean actions, and there will be some additional sanctions. There will also be talk of diplomacy, some of the more dovish foreign policy wonks and politicians will talk of the need to be understanding of North Korea's special needs and desire for security ― on the assumption that what we really need to do is persuade North Korea that it has nothing to be afraid of.
The net result of all these activities is also clear from prior experience: expect no real results. North Korean scientists will continue to work hard, and before too long, there will be a fifth and then a sixth nuclear test.
Like it or not, the North Korean elite believe that they need nuclear weapons. The international community has little in the way of any means to push North Korea to disarm.
There are a number of reasons why Kim Jong-un and his government believe that they have to have nuclear weapons and both those reasons are quite compelling, but, above all, they need them for security. They assume that nobody would invade them if they have nuclear weapons. They also remember quite well that the only strongman in recent history to surrender his nuclear weapons in exchange for economic concessions was Colonel Gaddafi. Some 10 years ago, Western diplomats vocally urged North Korea to learn from his example. No doubt, this is exactly what they have done.
One cannot expect Kim Jong-un to sell nuclear weapons to the West because he does not have any desire to end up like Colonel Gaddafi, and also because he believes that Sadam would still be living in his palace had he actually had the Weapons of Mass Destruction that some seemingly believed he had. The young Kim's advisors also understand that the nuclear weapons program is their only significant negotiating chip in dealing with the outside world.
Thus, there is little if any hope that the North Korean government can be bribed into denuclearization. Unfortunately, there is also little hope that it can be blackmailed into surrendering its nuclear weapons through heightened international sanctions.
So far, sanctions have proved to be remarkably ineffective. Ironically, the introduction of the sanctions against the regime in 2006 roughly coincided with the time when North Korea's economy began its slow recovery following ten-odd years of crisis. Sanctions slowed down neither this deep recovery nor the advance of the nuclear weapons program.
Sanctions do not work because they are made with the noblest intentions. The security has thus far targeted sanctions against the elite alone, on the assumption that North Korea's army generals and party secretaries, being deprived of their Hennessey cognac and Swiss watches, will challenge the regime in some way. This strategy is based on the assumption that the regime would fall but for the loyalty of its supporters.
This might indeed be the case with many dictatorships, where unhappy generals are always ready to start a coup and replace the current rulers with somebody more generous with giveaways. However, North Korea is different: the elite understands that regime collapse will not merely bring another leader, but rather result in the absorption of the entire country into its affluent and powerful neighbor, South Korea. If that happens, the North Korean generals and party secretaries would lose everything, so they prefer to survive without Hennessey cognac and Swiss watches, but keep their stability instead.
Another reason why sanctions have not worked and will likely never work in the future is China's refusal to endorse and/or participate in truly comprehensive sanctions. This is understandable: China does not like the idea of a nuclear North Korea, but it likes the idea of regime collapse and civil war right next door even less. The final result of such anarchy is likely to be unification with South Korea and the emergence of a pro-American government right next to China, this of course is a prospect to be anxious about for Beijing's elite.
Thus expect nothing to change. This is not a pleasant state of affairs, but so long as the Kim dynasty remains in power in Pyongyang, expect North Korea to keep its nuclear weapons and keep on improving them too.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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