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The North Korean leader Kim Jong-un recently surprised the world (well, the part of the world which cares to take notice) by openly claiming that his country is capable of producing not only nuclear but also thermonuclear weapons.
For those of our readers who are not up on nuclear physics, it makes sense to remind them that thermonuclear weapons, often called hydrogen bombs (H-bomb), are based on the principles of nuclear fusion and tend to be far more powerful than regular nuclear devices.
The world remains unimpressed. Most experts do not believe what the supreme leader has said, they think he is bluffing.
There is good reason to think so. First, the H-bomb is far more difficult to build than the nuclear devices North Korea has thus far tested. As a matter of fact, none of the "new nuclear powers" (Pakistan, India and Israel) have tried to acquire this technology. Their reluctance is easy to understand: for countries without a pressing need, the cost-benefit is not particularly impressive.
Indeed, while an H-bomb is significantly more powerful, the possession of such weapons will not dramatically increase North Korea's ability to deter a foreign attack. If North Korea adds a couple of thermonuclear devices to its arsenal, this will not produce a dramatic increase in the power of what they already have – they already have one or two dozen nuclear weapons. However, it will cost a lot – in the unlikely case that they actually produce a working device, of course.
Hence, there is good reason to believe that North Korea is bluffing again, and there is a form of logic to this bluff that is quite transparent.
The last couple of months were marked by a rather sudden turn in North Korea's foreign policy. Pyongyang has suddenly changed its tune after a few years of refusing to deal with the outside world and maintaining distance even from its erstwhile sponsor, China.
North Korean diplomats are courting China, working hard to improve relations with countries Europe, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, while also still doing what they can to solve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea abduction, which blocks improvements in relations with Tokyo.
One can speculate as to why they suddenly changed track. In a country which is basically an absolute monarchy, a sudden change of mind at the top might be the cause. It is more likely, though, that the North Korean leadership came to realize that North Korea needs foreign investment, and is also worried about the relatively poor harvest this year.
The Holy Grail of North Korean diplomacy is, of course, normalization of relations with the United States, accompanied by large aid packages delivered from Washington. However, there is a serious obstacle in the way of this goal, namely, the U.S. demand for denuclearization as a prerequisite. This condition is non-negotiable. At the same time, the North Koreans are absolutely determined that they will keep their nuclear weapons, come what may. They believe that only nuclear weapons can save them from the sort of sorry end that terminated the regimes and lives of Sadaam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi experienced. Like it or not, they might very well be right.
Hence, they appear to be angling for an improved version of the 1994 Agreed Framework, in which the U.S. and other interested parties paid North Korea to stop developing its nukes. Admittedly, North Korea has now tested nuclear weapons, so the United States is not happy about the idea of such a deal. Paying North Korea to stop developing more weapons while letting them keep what they have already made is basically tantamount to rewarding extortion.
Thus, North Korean diplomacy has only one hope: to terrify the United States to the point that Washington believes the political and financial costs of paying a random penalty are smaller than the cost of allowing North Korea to continue developing nuclear technology. The only realistic way to do so is to develop and successfully test a long range missile that is capable of hitting the continental United States, as well as demonstrate the ability to weaponize existing nuclear devices.
However, this is easier said than done. So far, North Korea's nuclear devices are too large and heavy to be installed in warheads, and North Korea still has no missiles capable of reaching the United States. Thus gesture and bluff are what they have to use in this game.
Will this work? Most likely, it will not. Had North Korea been able to conduct a thermonuclear test, this would probably make some differences. But verbal claims just arouse modest media interest. If you want to use thermonuclear devices in a game of brinksmanship, you should demonstrate that you actually have one. Tests matter, statements do not.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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