Birth of a missile power

By Andrei Lankov

So, the North Korean government made a public statement, claiming it has restarted its nuclear facilities, will soon launch another prototype long-range missile (or peaceful satellite, as they prefer to describe it) and perhaps will conduct a nuclear test.

This statement created some uproar in the world media, even though it contains nothing new. The same declarations come from Pyongyang every year or two, usually followed by nuclear tests and missile launches. This bellicose rhetoric is an established, if picturesque, part of North Korean diplomacy, and, like any diplomatic rhetoric, it should never be taken at face value. Nonetheless, the statement likely means that North Korea is preparing to launch another missile. Thus, it might be a good time now to refresh our memories about North Korea's missile program.

The North Koreans always badly wanted missiles, but it took a long time before they got any. In the 1960s, North Korea bought some short-range missiles from Russia, but soon it was discovered that neither the Russians nor the Chinese were willing to sell to Pyongyang even medium-range missiles. Both communist great powers were painfully aware of North Korea's propensity for military provocations and did not want more trouble on the Korean Peninsula.

Throughout 1970s, the North Koreans begged both the Russians and Chinese to change their positions, but achieved nothing. Finally, a shortcut was found. Around 1980, the North Koreans secretly purchased a small number of the Soviet R-17 (aka SCUD-B) missiles from Egypt. The Middle Eastern country, a one-time close ally of Russia, bought the missiles a few years earlier.

North Korean technicians reverse-engineered what the spies got, and from the mid-1980s they began to manufacture a cheap simplified copy of R-17 (SCUD-B). The technology was also used to build larger missiles. The ultimate goal of the program has always been a reliable long-range missile, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the continental U.S. Such a weapon was seen as an ultimate deterrent.

Thus, advancing the SCUD-B technology, and using some pieces of the Soviet technology they managed to acquire clandestinely in the early 1990s when the former Soviet Union was in great disarray, the North Korean engineers began to work on their missile program.

The first attempt to launch a long-range missile was undertaken in August 1999. As with all subsequent North Korean launches, it was presented as an attempt to launch a research satellite. In a sense, it might be true, since simple satellites were indeed the payload of all tested missiles. However, the satellite launch technology and long-range missile technology are very close, albeit not quite identical.

In August 1999, the satellite failed to reach orbit and fell into the Pacific. The North Korean media, however, claimed that the launch was a success. The subsequent launches, irrespective of the actual results, were presented in the same way, or not mentioned at all ― with only one exception.

The next test took place in 2006 and ended in failure: the missile (a new and, presumably, improved version) disintegrated in the air some 30-60 seconds after launch. New tests were conducted in 2009 and April 2012, both unsuccessful as well.

However, the efforts of the North Korean scientists and technicians finally produced results. In December 2012, the North Korean Unha-3 missile succeeded in putting a satellite into orbit. It appears that the satellite did not work as intended, but it was a success nonetheless. All these launches were, incidentally, made in direct violation of U.N. resolutions which ban North Korea's use of the ballistic missile technology, but such things seldom stop any government from pursuing policies it considers desirable.

The usual excuse is that North Korea is testing ''peaceful" rockets, not "dangerous" missiles. This excuse is lame, no doubt, but one still keeps in mind that some differences between missiles and rockets exist. The most important is the need to have what is known as a re-entry vehicle, a tough capsule which protects the warhead on its way from the orbit down to the Earth's surface and the intended target. North Koreans so far have not even tried to test this vital technology.

So, the North Koreans are working hard to acquire long-range missile capability, but the way to go is long. In 16 years, only five tests have been conducted ― a very small number indeed. Obviously, the tough economic situation and other factors inhibit the North Koreans' ability to launch as frequently as necessary. Additionally, no re-entry vehicle has been tested, and the only success so far has been with putting a satellite into orbit, not hitting a target.

The new test is unlikely to change much. The North Korean missile program exists and is unlikely to wither away. However, it will take years, if not decades, before it will become reliable from a military point of view.

Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.