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Recent reports seemingly confirm that the North Korean government has entered the final stages of preparation for a missile launch. The launch site in Tongchang-ri, near the Yellow Sea, has recently been expanded and upgraded. In late July North Korean engineers also built a protective roof over the launch pads. The most likely purpose of this roof is to cover the final preparations from the preying cameras of foreign satellites.
This is something that has been widely expected. Rumours about an imminent missile launch or, perhaps, a nuclear test have been doing the rounds for some time. The likely time is early October, that is, around the time that North Korea will officially celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the ruling Korean Workers Party.
What is the likely reaction of the outside world? As usual, expect plenty of verbal condemnation and some other semi-symbolic actions with little in the way of actual impact. However, in some regards, this launch might have more serious consequences than similar events in previous years.
There is little doubt that in the event of a North Korean missile/nuclear test the United States will react most strongly among the major powers in the region. Most likely, additional sanctions and tough rhetoric will follow such an event. Nevertheless, given the track record of sanctions and words, one should be sceptical about whether such measures will have any noticeable impact.
After all, the North Korean economy began to recover and grow again around the time it was being subject to full-scale international sanctions for the first time back in 2006. Sanctions have little impact on an isolated economy like North Korea. Nonetheless, sanctions are as much for a domestic political audience within the United States as they are an exercise in punishing bad behaviour (or at least, being seen to do so by other would-be nuclear states).
If sanctions are introduced, the majority of major world powers are likely to be supportive, since nobody is happy about nuclear and missile proliferation. One should be slightly sceptical, though, about Russia's position, given Moscow's efforts to improve relations with Pyongyang in recent years as well as its current tensions with the West. However, even Russia is likely to support at least some additional action against North Korea.
The most important question, though, hangs over the reaction of China to such hypothetical but likely events. Over the last decade, China has been by far the most important trade partner of North Korea, controlling roughly three-quarters of North Korea's foreign trade (most of the rest is controlled by South Korea).
In the last two or three years, relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have been remarkably bad. While both sides maintain a facade of cordial rhetoric, very often they exchange thinly veiled criticism of each another and barely hide their mutual displeasure. The new Chinese leadership looks upon North Korea with far greater mistrust and doubt than its predecessors. It was particularly annoyed by the third North Korean nuclear test in 2013, which was conducted in spite of explicit Chinese warnings. The 2013 purge and execution of Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-un's uncle and major advisor, who was greatly connected with Chinese political and business interests, also worried Beijing. The deterioration of relations resulted in a decrease of Chinese assistance to North Korea.
Recently, however, there have been some indications that both North Korea and China would like to improve relations. Even if such attempts bear fruit, they are likely to be seriously jeopardized by missile launches.
Indeed, while China may need and desire a stable North Korea, it looks upon Pyongyang's missile and nuclear programs with growing disapproval and displeasure. Thus, it is quite possible that a launch would provoke serious retaliation of some sort from Beijing. A Chinese decision to reduce the amount of trade, for instance, would probably represent a severe blow to the North Korean economy. Same results are likely to be produced by the introduction of much stricter custom regulations.
However, presently it is too much of a stretch to expect such a turn of events. It seems more likely that another missile launch will be followed by developments we have seen play out before amongst diplomats: a short outburst of opprobrium backed by little in the way of concrete action before the entire issue slides off the front pages of the world's newspapers and websites.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
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