.jpg/dims/resize/740/optimize) |
Every May or June, South Korean research centres publish North Korean trade statistics. Surprising though it sounds, this is what the South Koreans do. The North Koreans made trade statistics (and most other statistics) classified back in the early 1960s and have only once ― in 1984 ― released such figures. However, trade figures are relatively easy to reconstruct. It takes two to tango, all international trade requires two countries. Since all of North Korea's major trade partners reliably report their trade stats, a reconstruction is not too difficult.
The 2014 round of statistics tells a familiar story. Surprisingly indeed, many political issues that were expected to have an impact on North Korean trade have seemingly failed to do so. Neither North Korea's increasingly tense relations with China, nor growing cordiality with Russia have had much of an impact on trade patterns.
When dealing with foreign trade data as published in South Korea one has to keep in mind an important and potentially hazardous feature of this data: it does not normally include trade with South Korea. Technically, South Korea does not see its Northern neighbour as a separate state; constitutionally it is classified as a part of the Republic of Korea. Hence, it appears strange, if not flat out treacherous to apply the same terms to inter-Korean trade as to normal international trade. Indeed, a special vocabulary is utilized to describe such interactions, and North-South trade is usually excluded from regular trade statistics.
If we follow this politically correct approach, we might be surprised to find how prominent China is in North Korean trade volume. Indeed, last year, 90.1 percent of North Korea's trade was with China. If we are more cynical and factor in North Korean trade with the South, the Chinese share will decrease significantly, but still remain large at 68.9 percent.
It is remarkable that the obvious cooling of relations between North Korea and China has so far failed to adversely affect trade relations. In 2014, North Korea's trade with China increased by 3.7 percent.
Following the same cynical approach and counting inter-Korean trade as international in nature, we will see that trade between the two Koreas constituted 23.5 percent of North Korea's total trade volume in 2014. Most of these transactions are related to the Gaesong Industrial Zone, the last surviving inter-Korean project from the "Sunshine" era period.
Most readers will probably be surprised when they learn that in spite of all the fuss surrounding Russo-North Korean relations, and renewed friendship between the two, trade between the two remains insignificant: it constitutes a mere 0.9 percent of North Korea's total trade volume. Thus, in spite of all declarations and high-level visits, North Korea's trade with Russia is still 70 times less than its trade with China (the gap actually increased last year). It is also remarkable that North Korea's trade with Russia actually decreased by 11 percent compared to the 2013 level. Given how little the two sides have to offer one another economically, such statistics are not so surprising as they may appear.
Excluding South Korea, North Korea's total trade volume was $7.6 billion last year. This represents a slight increase on 2013.
The specifics have remained quite stable for the last decade. Exports are still dominated by mineral resources, especially coal and iron ore ― they form 37 percent of the total. The single most important item North Korea exported overseas in 2014 was, as in previous years, coal. China has a great appetite for this particular resource, but in recent years the gradual switch in house heating towards natural gas has resulted in a significant decrease in coal prices on the international market. In the last three or four years, coal prices have nearly halved and for North Korea this has been a significant economic blow.
The second most important North Korean export is seafood. Most of this seafood goes to China, but a part of it is then re-exported by Chinese intermediaries to Japan and South Korea. Seafood constituted 21.9 percent of North Korea's exports in 2014.
Somewhat surprisingly, North Korea also exports steel ― still produced relatively cheaply at its still functioning steel mills.
Amongst North Korean imports, fuel was the highest in demand, closely followed by electrical appliances, boilers and motor vehicles.
So no major surprises this year: trade patterns remain largely unchanged, North Korea continues to export resources, import machines and is still heavily reliant on manufactured goods from abroad, usually China.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.
![[INTERVIEW] Retired FSC chief finds inspiration exploring Koreans' ancestral roots](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/6642af4d9fed4cae8a8a951eedbbaa6f.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
![[INTERVIEW] 'The Flag': Kwon Jin-ah's love letter to people chasing their dreams](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/286500d853334c96ab51e56d74fe38f2.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
