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As reported by the international media, Kim Jong-chul, the older brother of North Korean ruler Kim Jong-un, has been spotted once again at an Eric Clapton concert, this time in London.
This is not the first time that Kim Jong-chul has been spotted overseas. His addiction to modern music, essentially a product made by and for the scions of the affluent middle class in the rich world, has been known for some time. The same is applicable to his younger brother's love of basketball, and perhaps some other Western sports.
All of this reminds us that the current generation of North Korea's top elite are very different in their outlook and lifestyle from their grandfathers and fathers.
North Korea is basically a quasi-feudal state. This is not necessarily a term of abuse, but rather, a matter of fact statement.
For the last 60-odd years, the country has been run by a small group of elite families, numbering two or three hundred at most. These families dominate the high level posts in the government, party and military, inter-marry and enjoy a comfortable and secluded lifestyle. Nowadays, the third generation of these families, now in their 20s and 30s, is beginning to replace their parents (as their grandparents are long gone).
The first generation of the elite consisted principally of guerrilla fighters who fought the Japanese in the Manchurian countryside in the 1920s and '30s, as well as kids from poor farming families who joined the regime in 1945-50 and fought with distinction in the Korean War. They were not renowned for their interest in education, and many of them did not have much in the way of formal schooling.
On the other hands, these people ("Kim Il-sung's generation") were often highly motivated and believed in a mix of nationalism, Leninism and Maoism, which has been North Korea's ruling ideology since around 1960. They lived agreeable lives, to be sure, but their idea of luxury was rather modest by the standards of today, and they obviously saw themselves as fighters for the glory of the Korean revolution. This generation died out between 1975 and 1995, though.
Starting from 1970s, they were replaced by their children, graduates of elite North Korean schools. These people grew up in what was, by North Korean standards of the time, the great privilege and luxury. They were remarkably isolated from the "lesser orders." They did pay some lip service to official ideas and usually even shared some of them, especially state-dominated nationalism. However, they were far less committed than their fathers and they were far more inclined to enjoy the privileges they had.
Their ideas of culture drew principally from those of the Soviet Union and East Europe of the period. These people were hardly bookish, but they were still significantly better educated than their parents. At the same time, they had very little exposure to the outside world, began to travel overseas at rather advanced ages and did not speak foreign language. Right now, they are being replaced by the next generation, the founders' grandchildren.
The "golden youth" of Kim Jong-un's generation are remarkably lacking in ideological commitment. They most likely perceive Juche as merely ideological fodder for the common folk. Many of them have studied overseas or visited foreign countries at rather young ages at least. Their cultural ideal, though, does not come from Moscow or Warsaw, as was the case with their parents. The younger generation does not need substitutes, they know London and Paris well, and prefer Eric Clapton to Alla Pugacheva, a Soviet pop-star, tremendously loved by their parents, including Kim Jong-il himself.
In their lifestyles, they tend to imitate the lifestyles of middle and upper class youngsters in the developed world. They listen to the same music and enjoy the same sports. Like their parents and grandparents they are not particularly bookish or intellectual (but this does not mean they are not smart), but they certainly make for better company. Contrary to what is often stated, they do not live in luxury. Except for the immediate Kim family, the lifestyle of much of the top elite is probably closer to the lifestyles of a Manhattan corporate lawyer, rather than that of a Gulf oil sheik's family.
Will this generation's access to the outside world and understanding of its popular culture have an impact on the policies they might implement? Perhaps, but don't hold your breath. History has shown us many times that elite individual lifestyles and cultural preferences do not necessarily have a direct impact on the lot of their subjects.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him atanlankov@yahoo.com.
