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Things are beginning to change in North Korea ― or so it seems. For decades, the world has expected that, sooner or later, North Korea would emulate the remarkable success story of China. It was assumed that eventually the North Korean government would start switching to a market economy, while still keeping its Juche rhetoric and authoritarianism.
For a long time, optimists were disappointed. Reforms, seemingly long overdue, have not happened for decades. There was good reason for the North Korean government's unwillingness to embrace reform: in a divided country such moves are likely to be dangerous.
Nonetheless, it seems that the new Pyongyang leadership has decided to take the risk. Judging from recent reports, it seems that the new leadership has begun where it should begin ― in agriculture.
Well, actually the change began two years ago. On the June 28, 2012, Kim Jong-un delivered instructions dealing with agricultural reform. In essence, the instructions envisioned two major changes to the way agriculture worked.
First, the production team which has hitherto numbered some 15 members, would be reduced to five or six farmers. This seems like a mere technicality, but it is actually very important since, under the new system, the teams are based on individual households. In other words, under the new system, one household can become a work team and this will enable a family to work as a unit, while keeping up appearances of state-run agriculture.
Second, it was stated that teams would be allowed to keep a large part of the harvest for themselves (30 percent or more). This is a decisive break with the past when North Korean farmers were required to surrender the entire harvest and live on fixed daily rations provided by the state.
In 2013, the new system was introduced in state-run cooperative farms across the country. It has been described as "experimental," thus it can be rescinded at any time. Nonetheless, the results were very encouraging. According to the observations of some Chinese experts who visited North Korea of late, the ''experimental" areas have increased their output by some 30 percent. This is remarkable, especially given the fact that the amount of fertilizer used and tractors available has not changed at all.
Admittedly, this should not be seen as a major worry. North Korean agriculture is quite primitive, generally involving toiling the earth with the use of 18th century technology. In such an environment, the simple switch to private agriculture from the grotesquely inefficient state farms can produce very good results, as the Chinese experience of the early 1980s vividly demonstrated. In merely five or six years from the launch of the reform around 1978-79, pretty much all Chinese people could eat as much as they liked ― perhaps for the first time in their country's very long history.
The harvest of 2013 was exceptionally good ― indeed, it was the best in two decades. For the first time since the 1980s, North Korean produced enough food to keep its population fed, albeit just slightly above the subsistence level. This was often explained as a result of good weather, but it seems that the new system played a major role in that success.
This year, the weather was not kind to the farmers: a massive drought damaged the crops this spring. Nonetheless, the new model helped the country survive the hard times with little damage: the preliminary estimates also indicate this year's harvest will be reasonably good, too.
So, there is little surprise that North Korean leaders decided to speed things up. Recently leaked documents indicate that on May 30 a special decision of the Central Committee envisioned the radicalization of the agricultural reforms. It has been promised that in 2015, farmers will be allowed to keep 60 percent of the harvest, and will be also issued large private plots.
The reforms themselves are long overdue. It is clear that the North Korean government has avoided reform out of a fear of the likely political consequences. Such fears may be well grounded, but out of all the possible social and economic reforms, such modest changes in agriculture appear the least risky. Revolutions usually start in cities, and farmers tend to be politically docile, especially when they see their living standards grow.
At any rate, for North Korean leaders the reforms are a risky decision and their chances of success are probably not that high. Nonetheless, we can only wish them success.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.